Law, Moral Rationality and Ideals: Modifying the Principle of Generic Consistency to Define Legal ‘Ideals’ as Part of Transparent Autonomy

Research output: Contribution to conferenceAbstract

Abstract

Olsen and Toddington argue that there is a logical connection between law and moral rationality - against the Positivist claim to autonomy (from morality) in legal systems – , as the justificatory basis for the law’s continued legitimacy rests upon the transparency of autonomy. Although they effectively demonstrate that such a connection exists, we lack a concise explanation of how that connection might validly operate. This paper seeks not only to demonstrate that a necessary connection between law and moral rationality exists, but further that it is a dialectical necessity from the point of institutionalising practical reasoning. In developing this idea further I set out to use a modification of Gewirth’s argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency to show that the inclusion of ‘ideals’ (‘goods’ for that system) are logically necessary for an agent to maintain his status as an agent following the institutionalisation of legal reasoning. That is, for legal systems to have authority over those subject to them, such systems must (necessarily) be premised on ideals which are transparent in its autonomous reasoning. By recognising this we are able better to comprehend Dworkin’s ‘Herculean’ claims to the Integrity of law as a means of interpretation and justification.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventDemocracy, Rights & Reason(s) - University of Westminster
Duration: 12 Feb 2015 → …

Conference

ConferenceDemocracy, Rights & Reason(s)
Period12/02/15 → …

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Moral Law
Autonomy
Ideal
Rationality
Legal System
Authority
Justification
Logic
Integrity
Practical Reasoning
Positivist
Morality
Transparency
Institutionalization
Legitimacy
Inclusion

Cite this

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title = "Law, Moral Rationality and Ideals: Modifying the Principle of Generic Consistency to Define Legal ‘Ideals’ as Part of Transparent Autonomy",
abstract = "Olsen and Toddington argue that there is a logical connection between law and moral rationality - against the Positivist claim to autonomy (from morality) in legal systems – , as the justificatory basis for the law’s continued legitimacy rests upon the transparency of autonomy. Although they effectively demonstrate that such a connection exists, we lack a concise explanation of how that connection might validly operate. This paper seeks not only to demonstrate that a necessary connection between law and moral rationality exists, but further that it is a dialectical necessity from the point of institutionalising practical reasoning. In developing this idea further I set out to use a modification of Gewirth’s argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency to show that the inclusion of ‘ideals’ (‘goods’ for that system) are logically necessary for an agent to maintain his status as an agent following the institutionalisation of legal reasoning. That is, for legal systems to have authority over those subject to them, such systems must (necessarily) be premised on ideals which are transparent in its autonomous reasoning. By recognising this we are able better to comprehend Dworkin’s ‘Herculean’ claims to the Integrity of law as a means of interpretation and justification.",
author = "Jack Thompson",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
note = "Democracy, Rights & Reason(s) ; Conference date: 12-02-2015",

}

Law, Moral Rationality and Ideals : Modifying the Principle of Generic Consistency to Define Legal ‘Ideals’ as Part of Transparent Autonomy. / Thompson, Jack.

2014. Abstract from Democracy, Rights & Reason(s), .

Research output: Contribution to conferenceAbstract

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