Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors

Tri Nguyen, Chau Duong, Nguyet Nguyen, Hung Bui

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of directors.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)501–539
    JournalReview of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
    Publication statusPublished - 3 Nov 2019

    Bibliographical note

    This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. The final authenticated version is available online at:


    • Accounting Conservatism
    • Banking Expertise
    • Boards of Directors
    • Accounting conservatism
    • Banking expertise
    • Boards of directors


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