Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors

Tri Nguyen, Chau Duong, Nguyet Nguyen, Hung Bui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of directors.

Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Nov 2019

Fingerprint

Banking
Accounting conservatism
Expertise
Board of directors
Bankruptcy
Financial leverage

Bibliographical note

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2

Keywords

  • Accounting Conservatism
  • Banking Expertise
  • Boards of Directors
  • Accounting conservatism
  • Banking expertise
  • Boards of directors

Cite this

@article{41d870076ec343dea01f886e76072fa7,
title = "Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors",
abstract = "Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of directors.",
keywords = "Accounting Conservatism, Banking Expertise, Boards of Directors, Accounting conservatism, Banking expertise, Boards of directors",
author = "Tri Nguyen and Chau Duong and Nguyet Nguyen and Hung Bui",
note = "This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2",
year = "2019",
month = "11",
day = "3",
doi = "10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2",
language = "English",
journal = "Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting",
issn = "0924-865X",
publisher = "Springer",

}

Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors. / Nguyen, Tri; Duong, Chau; Nguyen, Nguyet; Bui, Hung.

In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 03.11.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors

AU - Nguyen, Tri

AU - Duong, Chau

AU - Nguyen, Nguyet

AU - Bui, Hung

N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2

PY - 2019/11/3

Y1 - 2019/11/3

N2 - Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of directors.

AB - Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of directors.

KW - Accounting Conservatism

KW - Banking Expertise

KW - Boards of Directors

KW - Accounting conservatism

KW - Banking expertise

KW - Boards of directors

UR - https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3101495

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075889876&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2

DO - 10.1007/s11156-019-00851-2

M3 - Article

JO - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

JF - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

SN - 0924-865X

ER -