Language Games in a Visual Environment

This Ph.D. submission is in two parts : a dissertation : a series of visual works. The two parts of the submission are complimentary. Neither should be thought of as a 'commentary' on each other.

The subject of the dissertation is the relationship of the visual to the discursive and its subsequent effect on the notion of the 'Plan'.

The opening of the dissertation builds up a view of the different relationships these two may have, and how it is possible to discuss these relationships in different ways.

As a model for these relationships I have used Diderot's *Salon of 1767*. In this essay Diderot begins to reassess the relationship between beholder and artist, and the nature of the relationship between the seen and the recorded. The seven sections [Diderot's 'Sites'] each serve to introduce a particular relationship between criticism and practice, and introduce consideration of such topics as the Sublime, the incestuous relationship between the work and its critique, and the relationship of landscape, model [as in the form of landscape garden], and the painting.

The second section takes a look at more specific relationships, in a historical sense as in Emblems and Devices, and in a linguistic sense as discussion of Heidegger's work on 'Form' and Lyotard's *Discourse/Figure*. These chapters are distillated in the final chapter 'PPP' in which aspects of these notions are reassessed in relation to a potential visual work.

The third section begins with a précis of Steinberg's thoughts about inconsistencies found in the plan of Borromini's church of San Carlo and then moves on to consider possible explanations which may occur through the reading of Deleuze's book *The Fold*. This develops into a discussion of the nature of the idea of 'the Plan', and its is significance in the creation of a work of Art.

The final section, Vasculum, attempts to re-order these finds into a network of ideas, images, events which will serve as an encyclopaedia [a Diderotian notion in itself] from which a potential visual response can be mounted.

LANGUAGE GAMES IN A VISUAL ENVIRONMENT

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Brighton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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January 2000

Manual

The plan

This dissertation is <u>part</u> of a work : this dissertation is part of a <u>work</u>.

The other parts of the work constitute visual works. Objects. Things.

One objective of the work is to open up a discussion about the figural and the discursive.

As we will see, these do not have an easy relationship.

Consequently there is not an 'easy' relationship between the two parts of <u>this</u> work.

The writing and the 'things'.

This 'unease' is in many ways the subject of the dissertation.

The figural /discursive debate is not therefore the <u>subject</u> of the dissertation.

It constitutes the place, the locus, the fulcrum of the <u>work</u>.

....

There are three sections to the dissertation.

A discussion of issues raised by Diderot in his *Salon of 1767*.

A chapter exploring different attitudes to the figural and the discursive - discussing in particular Lyotard's work in this field.

A section discussing Deleuze's notion of the Fold in relation to Borromini's Church of San Carlo.

Each of these chapters exists independently.

But they are connected by/through notions.

Some of these notions are destructive, in that they in turn, damage and destroy the identity of their own boundaries.

And in these chapters each of these notions may be described in a different way. They may be thought of as being inside or outside of the argument at any one time.

The final scene of this devastation is the work itself.

The last section introduces the secondary theme of the dissertation. The Plan and its relation to the sententious : the laying down of the Law. But in the Wildean sense of 'Nature following Art' the plan of the dissertation itself will have already undergone some of the contortions that will be described in San Carlo's Plan.

So there is some f[r]iction here between 'saying it' and 'how it is said'.

. . . .

Diderot tears open the canvas. He 'invades' the picture surface, moves freely inside it and describes views not visible to the beholder. Appropriation. Copying . Eventually, plagiarism.

Vernet undertakes to describe a scene through a series of paintings depicting different viewpoints, each competing for the beholder's interest : Diderot dissolves the notion of the beholder's fixed position.

He constructs a fiction within fiction and a paradox within a paradox.

A double art of confusing art and nature : nature and garden : model and 'model'.

Diderot expands this notion of the privileged 'inside' in *Conversations on the Natural Son*. He re-enacts the emotional impulses of the beholder, but is able to see the blurring of the divide between the 'pure' criticism of the philosopher and the less pure, more 'human', passionate, self -indulgent criticism of the cicerone.

There is an enjoyment here, a sense of pleasure. Of ' Jouissance'. He *enjoys himself.*

This is a theme, too.

Lyotard considers the relative qualities of the figural and the discursive.

Initially he privileges the figural over the discursive. He underlines the 'modernity' of the figural, its relative lack of historical baggage, again, its jouissance.

Forms, copies, repetitions bind these two.

Emblems, devices, rhetoric would seem to fix them together

But

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P E N C E R
P A N C E R
P A N S E R
P E N S E R
P O N C E R
P O N S E R
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casts them adrift again

⏮ to recap
. . . . This work has a plan : there are three sections.

This work is also about the idea of the 'Plan'. About the differences between the plan as a foundation, and the plan as a developing idea, 'the planning'. The example, the specific, is Borromini's church of San Carlo.

Borromini's Plan, that is, his geometry, was not apparent in the 'earth'. It was not underground or in Heidegger's words, 'pressed to the earth', but existed above ground, in the air, in 'real' space. A geometrical abstract that reached out and disseminated its own laws in its own space.

Deleuze invents the theory of the 'Fold'. The Fold contrasts Renaissance certainties with the conflicts inherent in the Baroque. These conflicts lie between the inside and the outside, and the plan and the elevation.

just

Prefacing

. . . . "**R**"ousseau was embarrassed about having written a novel. He wrote two prefaces to La Nouvelle Heloise. In the second he introduces a c[s]ensor "**N**", to pre-empt criticism. **N** likes the plot, but criticises the characters as being too "Romanesque". He implores **R** to tell him whether the letters are true. But the fiction is truer than the truth because it is lived.

Ils se refusent aux vérités décourageantes: ne trouvant nulle part ce qu'ils sentent, ils se replient sur eux-mêmes; il se détachent du reste de l'Univers; et créant entre eux un petit monde différent du nôtre, ils y forment un spectacle véritablement nouveau.[1]

'I read while writing: slowly, taking pleasure in prefacing at length each term'[2] A written preface provisionally localises the place where, between reading and reading, book and book, the interscribing of 'reader(s)','writer(s)', and language is forever at work. Hegel had closed the circle between father and son, text and preface. He had in fact suggested, as Derrida makes clear, that the fulfilled concept - the end of the self-acting method of the philosophical text - was the pre-dicate - pre-saying - pre-face, to the preface. In Derrida's reworking, the structure preface-text becomes open at both ends. The text has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end. Each act of reading the 'text' is a preface to the next. The reading of a self-

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[1]Rousseau   O.C., vol. II, pp.16-17   [They refuse to accept discouraging truths: finding nowhere that which they feel, they rely only on themselves (become self-sufficient), detaching themselves from the rest of the universe, and believing themselves to be a little world different from ours, they form there a truly new spectacle].

[2]Derrida   "Positions," in Diacritics, 3, 1973, p.43., quoted in *The Archaeology of the Frivolous*, p. 2

professed preface is no longer an exception to this rule.[3] . . . . and . . . . 'There is, then, always already a preface between the two hands holding open a book. And the 'prefacer', of the same or another proper name as the 'author', need not apologise for 'repeating' the text'.[4]

In Derrida's The Archaeology of the Frivolous, he says [writes] that his text merely precedes Condillac's. He remarks . . .'you have already remarked that this *alleged Introduction*' . . . . . .that 'All that can be said against a preface, I have already said. The place of what absence - of what of whom of what lost text - does the preface claim to take? Thus disposing and predisposing (of) a first word that does not belong to it, the preface - a crypt in its turn - will take the form of what pre-serves (and ob-serves me here), the irreplaceable. 'I shall not engage myself beyond this first word in (the) place of another'. . . . . . *of Grammatology* contains the 'Introduction to the 'Age of Rousseau': this work will present itself gradually. I cannot therefore justify it by way of anticipation and preface. Let us nevertheless attempt an overture'. . . . . I am introducing here - me - (into) a translation.[5]

"That says clearly enough to what lengths I will be taken by these double voice-tracks; to the point of effacing myself on the threshold in order to facilitate your reading. I'm writing in 'my' language but in your idiom you have to *introduce*. Or otherwise, and again in 'my' language, to *present* someone. Someone who in numerous and altogether singular ways is not there and yet is close and present enough not to require an introduction."[6]

The Preface (Vorrede) which precedes the Introduction (Einleitung) to Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* warns the reader against its own status, its own sententiousness in laying down the law.

 . . .   there can be no introduction to philosophy . . . . [7]

We [who is this speaking?] must distinguish the preface from the introduction. They do not have the same function or dignity in Hegel's eyes, though they pose an analogous problem in their relation to the philosophical corpus of the exposition. The introduction (Einleitung) has a more systematic, less historical, less circumstantial bond to the logic of the book. The introduction is unique, it deals with the general and essential architectural

[3] Spivack   Preface to Derrida's 'of Grammatology' p. ix
[4] Spivack   Preface to Derrida's 'of Grammatology' p. ix
[5] Derrida   of Grammatology '   p. 97

[6] Derrida   Diacritics, 9, 1979, p. 4
[7] Hyppolite   Genesis and Structure   pp. 53-55

⌐ Diderot's *pierres d'attente* , toothing stones, touchstones, stones in waiting, ends, edges, which by their nature, their <u>place</u>, anticipate other endings. ⌐

problems, and presents the general concept of its self-division and self-differentiation. Prefaces, on the contrary, multiply from edition to edition and take into account a more empirical historicy. They respond to a necessity of circumstance.

This [therefore] will not have been a book.
Still less, despite appearances, will it have been a collection of *three* 'essays' whose itinerary it would be time, after the fact, to recognise; whose continuity and underlying laws could now be pointed out; indeed, whose overall concept or meaning could at last, with all the insistence required on such occasions, be squarely set forth. [8]

To put the old names to work, or even just to leave them in circulation, will always, of course, involve some risk . . . . to deny this risk would be to confirm it: it would be to see the signifier - in this case the name - as a merely circumstantial, conventional occurrence without any specific effect.[9] .

Inside of all this lurks the structure of the *double mark[*" "], an opposition which insists that one of the terms retains its old meaning so as to destroy the other to which it doesn't quite belong, to which it had never quite yielded. The history of this generated by hierarchic struggles. Gives rise to a double writing - a repetition without identity.

The preface would retrace and presage. A preface would [will] announce in the future tense . . . . ['this is

what you are going to read'][10] . . . . . the conceptual content or significance of *what has already been written*. And read enough to have been analysed and precied in advance. The 'pre' of the preface makes the future present, draws itself closer - reduces the future to the present {presence} ,reduces the illusionistic space in the 'picture'. . . . .

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[8] Derrida   Outwork   p.3
[9] Derrida   Outwork   p.5
[10] Derrida   Outwork   p.7

But what do prefaces actually do? . . . can they be grouped in terms of history, typography? Do they form a genre? Do they have a common predicate or do they have their own subdivisions and *tribes*? . . . these questions cannot be answered in a declamatory fashion - but along the way, en route, aller chercher un détour . . . . . . take up the place, the apparition/umbra, pre- occupying place of the preface the magic slate[11].

But does a preface exist? On the one hand - this is logic itself - this residue of writing remains anterior and exterior to the development of the content it announces. Preceding what ought to be able to present itself on its own, the preface falls like an empty husk, a piece of formal refuse, a moment of dryness or loquacity, sometimes both at once.[12]

. . . . . the narcissistic admiration of the father for the son . . . . anticipating / prefacing Lysimond here . . . *prefaces* are another stumbling block; the *self* <u>not</u> Dorval is detestable . . . . Condillac in De l'art d'écrire, describes the 'abuse of prefaces';

'Prefaces are another form of abuses. There all the ostentatiousness of the author reveals itself, as he ridiculously exaggerates the worth of his subject. It is quite reasonable to describe the point at which those who have written before us have left a science on which we hope to shed new light. But talking on of one's work, of one's sleepless nights, of the obstacles that had to be overcome; sharing with the public all the ideas one has had; not contenting oneself with a first preface but adding another to every book, to every chapter; giving the story all the attempts made without success; indicating numerous means of resolving each question, when there is only one which can and will be used: this is the art of fattening a book to bore one's reader. If everything useless were removed from these books, almost nothing would remain. It is though these authors wanted to write only the prefaces to the subjects they proposed to examine: they finish having forgotten to resolve the questions they have raised' [13]

. . . . these questions will not be answered, at least not finally in the declarative mode, *Along the way*, however a certain *protocol* will have - destroying this future *perfect - taken up the pre-occupying place of the preface . . . it has the structure of the magic slate.*

Prefaces [forwards {back . .

⏮ ⏭ ⏸   ⏩ ⏪

[11] Freud un bloc magique [Wunderblock]- note on the Mystic Writing pad 1925 - discussed in Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing" in Writing and Difference pp. 196-231
[12] Derrida   Outwork   p. 9
[13] Condillac   Œuvres complètes   pp. 446-47

. . . .}, introductions, preludes, overtures, preliminaries, preambles, prelusions and prologues] are always subject to their own annulment. On reaching the end of their *pre*, its own form has erased itself (sous rature) but yet it still supplies a *shadow* , an *umbra* to its subsequent. Intro, preface Entr'act , all these must have parity with Part 1or is part two's authority being challenged in advance? But does a preface exist?

Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit claims that "It runs out of breath on the threshold of science". For a philosophical text a preface is neither useful nor possible. Where would it take place? Is the preface internalised in the very text it is predating? Could it be something that falls off the text? Is it wanting to say too much? The self-presentation of the concept is the *true* preface to all prefaces. *Written* prefaces are phenomena external to the concept, while the concept (being-abreast-of-itself of absolute logos) is the true *pre-face*, the essential *pre-dicate* of all writings.[14]

Therefore . . . . the *preface* must be distinguished from the *introduction*. For Hegel, they may create similar problems, but they have different functions.

Introductions . . . . . . (Einleitung) more systematic, less historical, less circumstantial relation to the book . . . deal with 'architecture', divisions, subdivisions.

preface . . . . multiplied from edition to edition . . . . a more empirical historicy . . . an occasional necessity.

the preface therefore is an hors d'oeuvre; it contains general information on goals and the relationships of this work and others on the same subject. The introduction is an integral part of the book: it poses and locates the problem, and it determines the means to resolve it.

So this text has [will, possibly, as it is read] be the preface. Situated parergonally in the introduction, it will

indicate any [structure of] sense [of structure] one wants to make of it. The ingredients. There is the F

of pre**f**ace and, later, the Fold.

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[14] Derrida   *Outwork*   p.15

And now the # INTRODUCTION .... including a short preface

The original motivation for this work came from two separate but ultimately linked events. Firstly a chance encounter with P.N. Furbank's biography of Diderot [on a bookshelf next to the absent[ce] Derrida - pace the Encyclopédie], and then a passage in Lyotard's essay *'Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Experimentation.*[15]

The time is past when we can plant ourselves in front of a
Vernet and sigh along with Diderot 'How beautiful , grand,
varied, noble, wise, harmonious, rigorously coloured this is!'
Don't think we don't regret it. We are philosophers though, and
it's not for us to lay down how you should understand what
artists do.

This statement by Lyotard encapsulates [and opens up] most of the questions that this work raises. [I must interrupt at this point and explain the relationship between the text and the 'things', the 'visual pieces'. Together, they are 'the work'. They are not a commentary on each other. They are independent of each other. But they are dependent on each other. There are qualities, aspects in each which connect with each other. But there are also differences, which is to some extent self-explanatory as it happens 'inside the work as a whole'. But this text, in order to let truth be in its aberrancy, would be a text in which linguistic time itself [the time in which signification unfolds, the reading time] would be deconstructed; a book the reader could start anywhere, and read in any order. This narrative freedom I demand from the reader. There are three chapters. One of them relates to the 'sites' of Diderot's *Salon of 1767.* The other two sections relate to the material I am dealing with in the visual pieces that will also be part of 'the work'].

Diderot therefore the organiser and the collector and ultimately the reporter on knowledge, but also the conversationalist, the rewriter, the parodier, the pasticheur and stealer appropriator inspiring this little Encyclopédie.

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[15] in 'Camera Obscura'   trans. M. & D. Brewer   pp. 110 - 25   John Hopkins 1984

Portrait of Diderot by
Fragonard, ca. 1769
Paris, Louvre

. . . . . . the written preface now continues as a third text, free of its need to preface, it can now offer recapitulation and a resultant discourse to its former strident trumpet. It can now deal in treatments, variations, decorum and rhetoric : it can go beyond itself. It can become its own treatment of itself.   So though the preface starts out in a position outside the work, and the introduction celebrates its [possibly undeserving] inclusion inside the work as part of the *system,* the introduction by its very nature is susceptible to deviation. For as the introduction should not intrude, should not enter the text, its role is to seduce, to deviate the text from itself, but only just enough . . . . , So this infiltration of one space to another

now finds itself being used as a metaphor for the work, this 'thing' in hand. The introduction now has a place [topos] which is dynamic and inherits its own narrative through its interplay and conversation with the interior. It moves along with it, commentating, describing, criticising, laying down the law as it exercises its role of parergon. But the preface now sees itself set in stone, its place at the temple certified. But as the presentation of ['this'] creates an anticipation ['will'] , it necessarily demands the recapitulation ['have been'] and the resultant conclusion ['therefore'] . There is therefore created out of this the possibility of gaming, a dialectic between two ways of treating a notion, a position of prediction , of foretelling, of [even] anticipation of memory, hindsight, recollection, re-examination, reminiscence, review, and on the other hand, a contemplation that is doubled in that it sees itself inside its own intimate, interior, domestic setting. So in this moment of self-reflection, the Preface situates itself in figural terms both inside and outside of the frame, and in discursive terms both before and after the dissertation it promotes and transgresses, it exists in a space/time warp. So the 'Preface' will follow, shadow the work. Prefacing as it goes, sometimes turning itself into the form of a 'gloss', sometimes into an encyclopedia, sometimes into a narrator.

Diderot's *Salon of 1767*

It was in 1737 that the Salon became a regular event. The term 'Salon' derives from the 'Salon Carré', a set of rooms in the Louvre. Between 1737 and 1743 the exhibitions were held annually. From 1748 until 1795 they were biennial events. They opened on August 25, the King's name day and they lasted through September. Members of the Académie Royale were entitled to enter work. The exhibition was free, and a large section of the populace would pay a visit - indeed it was in reality the only opportunity the public had to view contemporary work. The exhibition was accompanied by a 'livret', a catalogue, literally a list of the works displayed. While these exhibitions were reviewed in newspapers and journals from the outset, it was not until Grimm, in his *Correspondance Littéraire,* and eventually Diderot, in his *Salons* , began writing about the works that any relationship to the word 'criticism', as we understand it, ensued.

Diderot's introduction to this discussion of Vernet's [1] work in his Salon of 1767 [2] describes his coming upon a social gathering of culturally optimistic people discussing the merits or otherwise of poetry, of art and of philosophy in a genteel and idyllic rustic setting. Diderot's writing is conversational and abundant in social observation. He talks about the leisure of a 'discerning clientele' indulging in the discussion of intellectual pursuits in a rural situation. A bacchanalian academy set in paradise. But Diderot hints at a certain coarseness of argument coming from them : they are disorganised and their arguments 'circular'. Diderot is at pains to set these apart from a real intelligentsia. They are onlookers, part of the 'crowd scene'. Diderot though, is 'focused'. From one of this group Diderot selects his - as he calls him, *cicerone* [3]. Diderot's a/illusion to Cicero paradoxically warns the reader of some possible journey, feat, memory, place which will have a significance in the future. Diderot is on holiday [en vacance]. [As in his Conversation on the Natural Son, he is 'on leave', 'relaxed', 'uninhibited', - away from d'Alembert, Buffon and the rest of his Parisian circle. Perhaps he can allow himself a certain latitude, a certain freedom of expression? A certain licence/permission, perhaps to test some boundaries? - to move out of the 'picture' of conventional criticism and move across/through the frame to a landscape of fantasy and critical laissez-faire?].

This sense of licence was at the heart of the whole notion of Diderot's choice of critical subject. Eighteenth century French paintings were subject to a hierarchy of genres. History painting, such as Fragonard's *Corséus and Callirhoé* was certainly judged to be intellectually superior to landscape paintings such as Vernet's. It was a question of 'events' versus 'appearances'. However in the eighteenth century the artist's role as mediator between art and reality began to be reassessed, as can be inferred from this comment by Joshua Reynolds

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[1]   Claude-Joseph Vernet (1714-89)

[2]   Diderot on Art   V.2   The Salon of 1767 ed. and trans. by John Goodman   Yale 1995

[3]   *cicerone* - a person who conducts and informs sightseers.
        [C18: from Italian: antiquarian scholar, guide, after Cicero, alluding to the eloquence and erudition of these men]

Whether it is the human figure, an animal or even inanimate objects, there is nothing, however uncompromising in appearance, but may be raised into dignity, convey sentiment, and produce emotion, in the hands of a painter of genius

Landscape painting's rise in importance was linked to the emerging interest in the ideal, [as distinct from ideal models] and the argument that it has the power to select and reorganise the real in order to attain a selective imitation, and, eventually, the sublime. These matters are discussed and defined in Batteux's *Les Beaux Arts Réduits a un même principe*. As the principal genres were organised in a hierarchy, so were the individual categories sub-divided. Landscape painting was itself divided into the 'heroic' and the 'pastoral'. Landscape painting, and its necessity of observation at first hand also loosened the grip of 'Le Maître' on the pupil. It also encouraged the importance of the notion of the 'personal response' and the three-way pact of nature, the artist, and the viewer [and the viewer's response to the picture and the possibility of the picture stimulating the viewer into imagining their own response to the scene, and how that would differ from the artist's]. This interest in observation and the senses came in the first instance from Locke in his thesis that all knowledge was derived from the information gathered by the senses, and then particularly by Diderot and Condillac in France. In his introduction to the Encyclopédie, Diderot emphasises the power of observation to reveal the truth. Knowledge was the result of the mind's comparisons of different observations. Visual experience became the subject of a whole new range of subject matter such as his essay entitled *Letter on the Blind*, and particularly in his *Salons*. Diderot , like Reynolds, felt that every object in nature was a potential subject for the artist. In his 'Composition, 1753', he discusses the organic, interdependent nature of the objects inside the painting [the discussion of the rose]. For Diderot, the painting had to exhibit the same organic unity as did nature, where everything had its own place and functional rhetoric - the commonplace, manners. The painting was a mimic of the organisation of the world as well as the resemblance of it. Diderot was making a point that painting was moving towards a situation where the organisation, not the subject, was paramount.

Diderot then plays one of his 'distancing games'. He writes a critical commentary and inserts it as a precursor to the type of analysis he will eventually use in his discussion and description of Vernet's work . A pre-echo, a preface. Diderot will serve up this game several times more. . . . . He starts his piece by making disparaging remarks about his ability to do the works justice. He apologises in advance for his 'rash comments'. He promises a promenade rich in error and misjudgment. Diderot is in reality already distancing himself from the notion of himself, encouraging the reader to disassociate his remarks, and see them as mere entrances, opening gambits whose calculated naiveté provide a platform, a scene for 'Diderot' to come to the rescue. There is already a conversation piece in the making.

I felt my movement suddenly checked

the first site

. . . . to the right, in the distance , a mountain summit rose to meet the
clouds

at this moment chance had placed a traveller there, upright and serene.

The traveller fulfils the role of the 'focal point'.

The Shepherdess of the
Alps. 1763
Musée Clavet
Avignon

4

The base of the mountain is obscured by a mass of rock

the rock stretches across the view

Diderot begins to let slip his 'confusion' between the painting and the scene. The scene is endless, infinite. There is no 'edge' to this view. Only something artificial, contrived, can have an 'edge' to it.

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4   Several of the paintings which Diderot commented on are lost or destroyed. I have substituted works which fit Diderot's general description and which were painted reasonably prior to 1767

this severs the foreground from the background

On the far right, on a rocky outcrop two fishermen are in conversation.

Extending into the distance there is an embankment, along which a wagon
makes its way to the distant village.

Diderot then arranges for his *cicerone* to ask him if an artist such as Vernet could have improved upon this scene. With a clump of trees perhaps placed in a well-mannered position? Would he have been able to render the subtleties of light? Of course replies Diderot, of course he would, has he not invariably succeeded in the past? Diderot's use of the phrase 'well mannered' hints at a discursive, rhetorical reaction to the forming of a relationship between picture and scene. He seems to be at once guarding against the temptations of augmentation. As augmentation lends grandeur to the insignificant, taken 'to its highest degree', or sometimes 'even beyond it', it moves out of the realms of the ordered into that of the wild and uncontrollable. There is then a parallel mimicry created : that of the movement between the frame of picture and scene, and the movement in and through their frame of 'acceptable' discourse. Perhaps Diderot was mindful of the danger in this augmentation, a situation where 'words must necessarily fail him' , the sudden unavailability of a vocabulary to continue with his argument. That the augmentation of [in] the language would create a limit on the augmentation of the meaning. Decorum therefore can't have a positional view in the sense of a 'stance', it must [must] instead generate its own sense of appropriateness. Diderot's fear of augmentation mirrors his subject. He seems to be seeing augmentation as a property whose life depends on the frugality of its usage, but whose effect demands maximum exposure, possibly a mechanism for infiltrating the discursive by the figurative. His plea for something beyond the superlative brings him in conflict with duration. He has to sever the repetition of augmentation in order to pass through the finality of the superlative.

19

Whereas augmentation feeds on gradation and what can be termed 'appropriateness', this 'supra' superlative can never be part of the superlative that it cannot exist without.

This causes Diderot to retreat, to move a step back, inside the frame of decorum [itself the scene of augmentation]. He confronts his own politesse, manifested in the gradation of the polite [Latin *politus,* polished] through the textures of gradation [a gradation which is only completely possible through the visual or the oral, discourse always has unequal [rude] 'spaces' between the words] which could be described in terms of 'the genuinely polite', the 'extremely polite', the 'quite polite'. The measure [measured] of its politeness related to the appropriate level of politeness deemed necessary at the time and in those particular circumstances [at the place], and from this the calculation [a politeness in itself] of the corridor, the no man's land separating [joining] the frontiers through which [nervously] progress is made. Augmentation therefore insists on compliance with a legislature of limitation. A statute [from Old French *estatut,* from Late Latin *stattum,* from Latin *statuere* to set up, decree, ultimately from *stare* to stand], returning augmentation back into the arms of

sententiousness, a mechanism for limiting the 'mostness' of the most. *F*orte! *F*orte!

*F*orte! Schumann would later demand. Manners, propriety, 'the proper', 'the polite' must also present themselves for an aesthetic interrogation. Propriety/proportion. A different reason for commencement and termination, concealment and display, frugality and exposure. Diderot plays with the reader's suspicions when he gives the air of only being half interested in this conversation. The main thrust of his perceptions, he tells us, is concerned with a small part of the scene, a microcosm, a model of the whole. In one example, Diderot picks out a torrent of water, then tells his *cicerone* to go back to the Salon where he will find the

subject of this scene. Yes, the subject, not the object - for the painting has included in it an extra, a supplement, in the form of a wisp of cloud which by its position in space clarifies the disorder of the previously perceived nature. Diderot uses this device to be able to revisit the paintings, or at least to put himself in the position in the scene, to open up a space between the view and the work that had its own territory, its own legitimisation. Vernet's paintings are not, he is saying, 'actualities'. They are combinations of reality reconvened to give a particular effect. To be convincing , they must be in accordance with the laws of nature, and, paradoxically, in order to do this they must create a scene of independent legitimisation through which these fragments are filtered. Diderot is claiming here that Vernet has an instinctive knowledge of nature's laws, and was therefore able, and with justification to summon up the correct 'piece' to insert at any time. This enabled him to think of the

landscape in terms of a 'sense impression', a ground on which to improvise.

The debate between the "beautiful" and the "picturesque", which culminated in the great controversy of the 1790s, has its roots in the early and mid-18th century. Diderot seems to be arguing for a space between the landscape and the picture. A half way house. A place where each situation can reflect on each other. A model. In essence, figurally, a garden. It is no coincidence that contemporary to Diderot's salon pieces were earnest debates as to the finer details of how a landscape should be designed, and how such a landscape could and should be *perceived*. To some extent, the argument polarises in Richard Payne Knight's distinction between the linear and the painterly, the clear and the unclear, the 'beautiful' and the picturesque' [and later in the beautiful and the sublime]: whereas sculpture and poetry require order and regularity 'painting and music delight in wild and irregular variety' - thus addressing themselves to sight and hearing respectively, and producing 'merely' sensual pleasure. The argument implies that the picturesque depends less on the nature of the whole than on visual and tactile/visual - such effects as the 'smooth' lawn and other properties inherent in that whole : the

21

picturesque is merely that kind of beauty which belongs exclusively to the sense of vision, or to the imagination guided by that sense.

The notion of 'poetic invention' is assumed to be linked primarily to visual images, a view confirmed by the essayist Joseph Addison, [1672-1719],

there is no Single Image in the Fancy that did not make its first Entrance through the Sight

The visualisation of a scene was regarded as an indication of the highest achievement of poetry. The popularisation, in the 18th century, of Plutarch's reported quotation from Simonides that

painting is silent poetry, and poetry a speaking picture

suggests a parallelism between poetry and painting that committed poetry to what Coleridge later described as 'the despotism of the eye', and painting (as well as landscape garden design) to a poetic/moral content *ad extra* that received its most articulate expression in the works of the picturesque theorists such as Capability Brown and William Kent.

Classical landscape paintings such as those of Claude were popular in the 18th century because of their explicit content. Natural landscape could be seen to possess, on the one hand, structured harmony that could be associated with landscape painting or, on the other, wild disorder redolent of the sublime. A third option would be, of course, a balance of the two. In any case, intention whether human or divine, artful or natural, is implicit : the poetic force of landscape is contained in what _is_, not in what it can be seen to say : Vernet, or 'Vernet seen through Diderot's eyes', or rather 'his mind', supersedes the portioning of nature into gardens by an approach to nature which sees it as neither garden nor natural landscape. But to define an aesthetic that fully encompasses the structure and intention of a garden, notice must be taken of the physiological approach to the nature of beauty and how such an approach developed from a visual rhetoric and its consequent critiques of symmetry, harmony and variety. The contemporary controversy over the notion of favouring of the 'belts, clumps and vapid lawns' of Launcelot Brown, and the straight avenues and parterres of 'old', especially Italian, gardens is encapsulated in the debate over 'false taste' and 'modern gardening' , a criticism of which forms much of the basis for a theory of the picturesque. Published in 1725, Francis Hutcheson's *Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* is one of the first systematic works of modern aesthetics. Distinguishing between 'simple' and 'complex' Ideas of Objects, he talks of the 'Diversity of Fancy' concerning the latter, a diversity which leads to 'Far greater Pleasures', an inherent ingredient of a 'Sense of

Beauty'. An open plain 'not diversified by Woods, Hills, Water, Buildings', he argues, is less pleasurable than a 'fine landskip'. It is the appreciation of complex ideas (and he cites gardens as an example of such ideas) which forms 'a fine Genius or Taste', and which leads towards an experience of the beautiful. The difference between external sense, to which objects can give no pleasure, and internal sense, is crucial in this respect: internal sense is the 'passive power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety'. Beauty is thus created by figures in which there is 'Uniformity amidst Variety'.

Hutcheson extends the notion of imitation to include imitation by intention or idea rather than of a natural object alone, so that beauty can be induced by 'Correspondence to some universally supposed *intention* of the Artificer'. He then goes ahead to use a gardening illustration: artists may not attain highest intention simply by imitating 'original beauty' (that is, by imitating objects), because 'relative Beauty' (that is, imitation of intention) with a degree of 'original Beauty' could give greater pleasure, and therefore a higher sense of beauty. He adds: 'Regularity in laying out of Gardens in Parterres, Vistas, parallel walks, is often neglected to obtain an Imitation of Nature even in some of its Wildernesses'. But there is a paradox here, a paradox that underlies picturesque theory: how can natural irregularity be *designed?*

This obvious need for the construction of a language of contrast and harmony developed into such notions as 'Prospects' and 'Solitude' : In effect, open views of landscape and enclosed areas within gardens. But inside this argument of contrasts there must be a place of harmony, a 'mean Pleasure' . . the midway point where the senses can rest in equilibrium. The landscape, or 'Situation' as it was sometimes termed, should reject extremes, otherwise the senses would 'pall and be displeas'd'. This notion of constrained opposites is similar to Shaftesbury's 'compos'd' and 'accidental' and indeed to Horace's 'simplex munditiis' translated as 'unaffected Simplicity and Neatness, a noble Elegance and Decency, a due Proportion, demonstrating the beautiful, and harmonious Rules of Symmetry and Variety'. Ideally then the beauties of formal gardens lie 'within a narrow compass', while the mind 'requires something else to gratify her' and is satisfied more in natural landscape where the eye can wander up and down 'without Confinement'; that in effect nature is more pleasurable the more it resembles art.

This position, this midway, desires the feeling of 'connection' : the meeting of characteristics so as to form firstly a harmony, and eventually a rationale ' the nice Assemblage of Parts proportion'd to each other and justly, connected together in one general Form, Structure or Arrangement'. This is a visualisation, as it were, of Shaftesbury's concept of universal harmony and what he calls the 'sense of order and proportion' seen in his book *Characteristicks.* The illustration for 'Treatise IV' has a dark and a bright side balanced by a double-faced woman

representing the duality of man. The dark side is a 'distracted universe', a
natural landscape of rugged mountains and the sun in eclipse, while the bright
side, ruled by the scales of Libra, shows a perspective avenue representing the
Elysian Fields. In contrast, the illustration for 'Miscellaneous Reflections'
shows Ephesian Diana (nature) in front of a gentle landscape of hedgerows and
hills and, above in a pediment, a basket containing flowers mixed without order,
representing 'freedom from form'. To the left, a blind alley is closed off by a
net that traps birds and suggests the restraints of hypocrisy. At the beginning,
as well as at the end, of the century, neither formal avenue nor natural landscape
has a fixed meaning. The malevolence of natural landscape or the restrained
'hypocrisy' of rigid formality must be contrasted with the simple formlessness of
nature and the harmony and balance of perspective avenues.

But 'connection', means more than just an 'assemblage of parts'. The balance
becomes not only judgement of taste but is also subject to a 'neurological'
definition. Burke points out that the Sublime stretches the nervous fibres beyond
their normal tone and induces horror, while beauty relaxes the fibres below their
normal tone and induces pleasure. In this sense the psychological effects of the
picturesque act as a moderating influence to these sensations, in that it corrects
'the languor of beauty or the tension of sublimity'. Thus the purpose of these
'improvements' is to mix 'what is striking with what is simply pleasing'.

The Picturesque thus occupies the 'middle ground'. Burke sees beauty as
characterised by smoothness and gradual variation, but this blandness excludes the
variety and intricacy essential to the picturesque. On the other hand a
conclusion can be drawn that beauty is only beauty when contrasted with sublimity
[languor and tension] in the mean of the picturesque (garden and park). There is
no such contrast in Brownian "modern gardening" where "everything is distinct and
separate" introducing a "solitary and insulated appearance". Formal gardens
possess an overall "connection" or sense of the totality of nature; every visible
accompaniment is in unison, so that systematic regularity can be determined from
every point of view. Just as Italian gardens synthesise garden and landscape
beyond the garden, formality not only harmonises but associates parts as well.

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Diderot then moves <u>his</u> position too. He looks at this argument from a different

viewpoint and at the same time moves the nature of the argument. The new question asks
'is the painting more or less perfect than the subject. Do we look at art through nature, or is
our idea of nature conditioned by an aesthetic constructed by us from our observation of
art?'

Diderot moves on firstly to another slightly different question. He begins with an illustration
describing the difference between chance and probability. Art has the properties of chance.
Nature exhibits the constraints of probability. He moves on to experiment with the idea of
beauty and quantity. Is beauty there because there is always more ugliness? If there were
more things beautiful than ugly would there be a need for this category? Is it an absolute or a
relative? Is this formula based on scarcity and value? Does it have an economy? Diderot
reflects his contemporaries Condillac and La Mettrie in his interest in the mechanical, the
copy, the cliché and the commonplace, the systematic and the symmetrical. He asks *If one
were to invent a machine capable of producing paintings like Raphael's, would such paintings
continue to be beautiful?*   No, Diderot tells us. But the machine - by which I think he
means a rational and knowing presence - could be beautiful. The process itself could achieve
the same heights as the paintings by the nature of its inherent intellectual and spiritual
presence. The resultant image was an image of this process as much as a resemblance of a
form. Diderot conjures up an image of Raphael as a painting machine, producing a steady
supply of Raphaels. These would become commonplace, so that they became as common as
leaves and clouds. If this were to become fact we would then marvel at the order of these

things, the relationships that nature had graced them with. Diderot was inferring that the process of looking has the same value as the organisation of this experience. They are the same in the sense that one cannot exist without the other. Diderot finishes the first site with a coup de théâtre.

At this point a western wind sweeping across the landscape enveloped us in a
thick, swirling cloud of dust.

The whirlwind introduces the scene of the immediate, the power of nature, the irrational, the pointing up of place and time, [I was there when . .] the idea of motion, the entrapment of the metaphor, as perhaps Diderot wants to pretend that nature is entrapping himself - or at least wishes/pleads for it to do so.

The second site

to the right, mountains covered with trees and wild shrubs

Summer Evening,
Landscape in Italy, 1751

Rohrau Schloss
Graf Harrach Collection

in shadow, as travellers would say. *In half-tone,* as artists would say. Diderot immediately brings up the subject of the connection between perception and its recording and judgement. The second site is explored in a much more systematic way than the first.

Diderot notes a passer-by too keen on travelling to take in the scene. . but . . .' (we) penetrated further into a distant prospect well beyond the mountain we'd climbed which had

previously blocked it from our view'. Diderot wants to get past the 'view' and into the very scene of the viewing. His companion remarks on passing a particularly dramatic scene . . . *and Louthenberg, and Vernet, and Claude Lorrain? . . .* Diderot invokes the dualism of fear and pleasure in nature and the spectacular.

To the left and right, the foot of mountains, to the left a wide, dark cavern

Diderot sees a cave and immediately imagines a young boy and girl emerging. She has covered her eyes with her free hand, as if she feared the light and wanted to encounter the young man's gaze.

On the bank of the lake a woman rests with her dog

further, on the same bank

a group of men and women such as an intelligent painter would have imagined them.

Diderot second guesses the painter's intentions. He pre-empts his decision making, he steals his thunder. Diderot is stupefied.

I was motionless, my glance wandered without pausing at any single object.

Silence, solitude, suspension of time, the eternal, the immense, the vast : all the main characteristics of the grace of stupefaction and the sublime are here.

Burke [1] talks of the passion caused by the Sublime.

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[1]   Edmund Burke   A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful   2nd edition 1759

28

'The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror.'

Burke sees the sublime as a state of mind attained when all other matter is dismissed. Admiration, reverence and respect are secondary effects to Astonishment. Burke's introduction to his topic states quite clearly that his intentions are centred around power, developed and itemised in terms of qualities and quantities of terror and dimension.

Burke speaks too of the passion caused by the Sublime. Astonishment in the soul results in horror, a state of being where the mind is entirely filled with horror - there is no space left for entertaining any other notions. Burke's notion of a space entirely filled with horror is impressive in its inclusivity, but unconvincing as a reality. Horror itself must have its own scales of grandeur or otherwise. Astonishment therefore is the highest power imaginable - though lesser ones are admiration, reverence and respect. Burke develops his idea of terror into the hermeneutic sphere. Fear robs the mind of rational thought. It is an apprehension of pain, and therefore resembles actual pain. With regard to sight, what is terrible is also Sublime. The Sublime is dangerous. Terror is linked to size, to largeness, such phenomena as oceans and deserts. In contrast to this mental and figurative excess, the discursive terminology used to describe these effects must be used sparsely - there is no room for hyperbole, which would lessen the effect, not accentuate it. For Hyperbole, though it implies an intensity of feeling inside the metaphor, also violates the decorum in that it distorts the truth by saying too much. It expands the sense of the meaning to such a degree that its frontiers fracture and it virtually invites trespass. But like many transgressions, it is committed in order to be discovered and punished. It craves 'the oxygen of publicity'. It insists on its own notoriety and demands investigation and reportage. Yet

there is no intent to deceive here. Diderot uses the device to put the reader in authority. The author charges the reader with the responsibility of calculating the level of compensation necessary to estimate the difference between the claims of the hyperbole and the experiences that the author assumes that the reader is in command of. So Diderot's hyperbole is a trope of difference and proportion, which while defying decorum in one aspect, invents a new decorum of contrivance between author and reader, and introduces another possible problem of the author being cast adrift if that understanding is not forthcoming.

Burke continues his own augmentation.

'To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary'.

He sees the paradox of the diminishing returns of description and clarity, for clarification of the nature of the force involved only results in its diminution. Understanding the danger makes it appear less dangerous. This 'unknowing' is part of the nature of the danger. Burke develops his notion of this 'unknowing'. He sees reasons in nature why the obscure idea, when properly conveyed, should be more 'effecting' than the clear. Ignorance of things is a quality that causes our admiration and excites our passions. Knowledge and reason dilute the terror. Again Burke evokes rhetoric when he makes a rather startling statement [in the sense that it 'suddenly' appears in the argument] that 'Vulgarity is a form of unknowing.' Burke sees that a multiplicity of images heaped on each other creates a feeling of confusion and emotional turmoil. As a critique is applied to them, and their relationships and functions become apparent, they lose this blur, they lose their obscurity. Continuing his excursion into the figural, he offers the sense that painting deals with mimesis, and much of the pleasure of painting is in this recognition,

and that often in nature the hazy, the dark and the indistinct produce grander passions than the lucid and the clear. [Throughout this comparison Burke has recourse to the figural in his description of both painting and poetry]. Greatness points towards infinity. It cannot perceives its bounds. To perceive an object is the same thing as to perceive its bounds. When painters try to give clear representations of the terrible there is always a problem with tragedy resembling farce, when the very striving for the earnest results in the grotesque. He would sympathise with Diderot's dilemma, that painting has no temporal dimension, and terror is a temporal phenomenon. Seeing all the elements at once is akin to listening to the notes of a cadence simultaneously. Burke is now beginning to move around the edge of his own canvas. He expresses the authority of height over length . . .

> 'To the sublime in building, the greatness of dimension seems requisite . . . no greatness in the manner can effectually compensate for the want of proper dimensions. Too great a length will mean the perspective is lost'

As a quality of the sublime, physical largeness is a major value, though smallness and even minuteness [proportion again] can also have the quality of the sublime in terms of contrast.

> 'Might is an ability that is superior to great obstacles. It is called dominance: if it is superior even to the resistance of something that itself possesses might'.

Kant introduces the category of the Dynamically Sublime. The arousal of fear is the primary quality of this sub-division. But fear is a quality that is best judged and appreciated from a position of safety. From this position terror and fear can safely be analysed and various gradations and categories

delineated and tabulated. Indeed, the greater the safety, the greater the augmentation of this fear factor. These graduations mirror a complementary scale of 'gladness', of appreciation of safety and well-being, of liberation from danger. Kant introduces a sequel [echo] to Diderot's description of Vernet's painting ' On the other hand, consider bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightening and thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river, and so on.'

Kant defines the Dynamically Sublime in terms of our relationship with fear. On the one hand there is our terror and fear when confronted with nature, and on the other hand our desire not to be dominated by these forces, but to be able to judge them and consequently our ability to come to terms with them by calling on our own strength to overcome these very terrors. The terrors that nature can conjure up therefore excite our imaginations to overcome and elevate ourselves above nature itself. So the dynamic is the imagination, the ability to see outside the terror, to place it in our own context, not just the natural world's.

Diderot cries out.

He shatters the solitude by now feeling the need to express to nature what it is showing him. The

beholder speaks back, giving nature its gift of astonishment. There is an economy here, a tacit agreement of

what worship requires and donates to the beholder.

It's a fictional view one has to believe exists somewhere.

Diderot plays with the beholder. This is the very scene, but is it possible to know this? Diderot now constructs a stage set out of the assorted scenic bric-a-brac he finds to hand to hang his argument on.

here is a vertical plane balanced on two mountain peaks

The space above is in light

the space at the sides is in shadow

Again, Diderot describes the scene in terms of a composition , made up of tones, half-tints, darkened areas - that is areas deemed to have been altered, and constructed. The mezzo-tints render the scene in a display of systematic tonality. There is a perfection too in this very substitution. There are objects which are clear and distinct, and there are other objects which could have these qualities too if their importance was thought necessary.

There are cool waters in the foreground

the suggestion of heat in the background

Diderot fantasises, then comes out with

How remarkable how the artist has created the aerial perspective.

Diderot needs his companion, the Abbé, to be shocked by this naming of a pictorial device to describe the scene. He has substituted a construction of a landscape for the real thing, therefore producing a painting independent of the work. Diderot is actually describing a garden, a scene somewhere between the illusionary and the real. A place where gamesmanship and deceit can be played out for real.

33

Following the shore of the lake

Night was beginning to fall

they retraced their steps back to the chateau.

By way of a coda, Diderot describes the recitation of passages from Virgil that the two children, who were not allowed to accompany the two on the scenic part of the journey, had learnt <u>by heart</u>. Diderot uses this narrative device to allow him to compare

the differing charms of painting and poetry.

Diderot mirrors Poussin in his mixture of allegory and fantasy. Again Diderot resorts to the use of the dream as a way of describing reality without having to be part of it himself. Diderot treats the dream as a landscape painting, and like his criticism of these, he wants to be seen to be part, to take part in it.

'I dreamt of the different charms of painting and poetry: of the difficulty of rendering into one language the passages one understands best in the other.

Diderot launches into a long description of Jupiter's headache. Jupiter's headache is eased by the birth of Minerva. She enters the world through his mouth, and in full battle-dress. Though everyone admired her beauty, her dress was the centre of discussion. Jupiter had his daughter try on all of these garments, but it was universally decided that the original dress was superior.

Diderot tells us that the Abbé had no difficulty in understanding the point of the fable, but he makes no effort to explain its place in the text to his readers.

The Abbé is 'blinded' by a dust storm

Diderot sees the event as a occurrence which 'marks a point', a happening which anchors a particular experience to a place or a moment in time, as Cicero's memory system used symbols to mark every fifth or every twentieth room[2]. This is further developed by continual changes of tense. Diderot challenges the rights of these events to disturb the order of nature. Or, paradoxically, are these events too part of the 'order'. Is there anything outside of this state of affairs? Diderot develops this into the nature[!] of chance and probability.

[2]   see Frances Yeats   The Art of Memory   Ch. I

The third site

Diderot and the Abbé rest on the shore of a cove.

There is a chateau whose garden slopes down to the sea -

An Italian Landscape 1758

Cheltenham Art Gallery

In fact the starting point of the promenade. The walkers are tired. Instead of retracing their steps, the group hire a skiff and row back across the bay. Of course this has the effect of showing them a mirror image of the scenes they have experienced.

They again pass the cave.

As they do so Diderot threatens to invent an incident of storm and disaster. *It would have brought the cries of frightened women from the terrace to your ears.*

He returns to his theme of the beholder in his emphasis on the feelings of the watchers of the tragedy rather than the feelings of the victims. The victims are to experience their terror through seeing the frightened cries and anguished demeanor of their women on the shore. But suddenly the storm has abated. It was a dream - or rather it wasn't a dream, it was a fiction. Not even a real fiction, but an imagined fiction, a threatened fiction.

Diderot's writings are full of examples of his experimentation with various forms of narrative. He was particularly fond of the 'duologue', but in 'Conversations with the Natural Son' Diderot invents a scenario where characters, actions and thoughts could at any one time be written and read as being either Diderot's own thoughts, the thoughts of his companion, the writer 'Diderot', or the thoughts and fancies of the writer's various characters - in reality as it were, or in 'character'.

This is a brief résumé of Conversations with the Natural Son[1]

'Diderot' took a break in the country, [a similar situation to the salon piece itself] and heard from several quarters an extraordinary story, that of a man who on the same day had risked his life for another, and at the same time given this other person all his wealth and the woman who was the object of both their passions. This man was Dorval, who 'Diderot' then befriends. Dorval relates to him the strange tale of events that happened in his family, 'Diderot' finds that Lysimond, Dorval's father, has suggested that he write a drama based on the events. This would be for a

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[1] Diderot's play, Le Fils Naturel was not a success when first performed. Diderot decided to incorporate the text into another work, an extended essay, which he named 'Conversations with the Natural Son'

private performance. In fact it is not really a 'play' at all, it is a masque, a ritual, performed in the actual house in which the actions originally took place.

However Lysimond dies before the play can be performed. Notwithstanding this the other characters in the play plan a performance, each playing 'themselves'. There would be no audience, except 'Diderot', who Dorval, as a favour, allows to watch the play unseen from a hideaway. The 'text' of *The Natural Son* then follows.

The 'novel' then resumes. 'Diderot' explains why he could not see the last act. Dorval's father, Lysimond had been held captive by the British. The sight of the character 'Lysimond' [played by an actor] in prison clothes and in a bad state had so upset the actors that they were unable to carry on.

'Diderot' was moved more by this interruption of reality than of the actual play itself. He asks Dorval for a copy of the text of the play which he returns to him with remarks and questions written in the margins. They become friends and spend time together walking in the country discussing their ideas for a new kind of theatre.

This turns out to be a form of natural realism where the actors talk and react to each other rather than address the audience as in the Comédie Française, and where the action takes place without the conscious awareness of an audience. There is a discussion of the virtues of the *tableau* over the *coup de théâtre,* and there is a visionary discussion on continually changing scenery and contiguous and synchronised action.

Dorval insists that what he has written is not a play, since the realistic portrayal of events was its raison d'être. When 'Diderot' criticises a piece of dialogue, Dorval agrees with him, but argues that since the dialogue was a true record of an utterance made by the character in real life, it was incumbent upon him to reproduce this in the 'play' even if a more verbally satisfying solution presented itself. Put another way, the play might have been better if things had happened differently.

Diderot's use of conversation and duologue is widespread in his work. Le Fils Naturel and the Salon of 1767 have many qualities in common . . . . .

. . . . . Dorval insists that what he has written is not a play, since the realistic portrayal of events was its raison d'être. When 'Diderot' criticises a piece of dialogue, Dorval agrees with him . . . . During this sequence of the conversation we are aware that it is 'Dorval' who is addressing us. Diderot uses this ploy as a means of doubly assuring us of the authenticity of his views,
. . . . . *Here is what we said. But what a difference there is between what Dorval said to me and what I write!*
for it is a character in[side] the play that is addressing us, a figure that is at any one time both 'in character' and 'himself', only differing for us in the imaginary differences that we may choose to invent for him.

. . . . Diderot talks about his own work in a seemingly objective way through the voices of Dorval and 'Diderot' . This too is a prismatic reflection of the style Diderot selects for the play itself, but whereas in the play itself Diderot forces the characters to mimic each other to death [Lysimond is a metaphor for this - he dies for the play, for Diderot to live . . . a sacrifice] in the real life, the sunny uplands of the 'Conversations', Diderot allows [himself, 'Diderot'] the liberty of being both inside and outside of his own persona.

Dorval, who is portrayed as a rather passive character in the drama, does come to life in his role as the conversationalist. Did Diderot purposely write his character down, so as to write him up in the novel? Is Diderot suggesting that a figure is more interesting in reality than in character - that it is the quality of the author's text which can seek to elevate them back to and beyond their real 'role' in life?

'The performance was so life-like that, forgetting at several points that I was a spectator, and an unseen one, I was about to leave my place and add real character to the scene'

What does Diderot, or even for that matter, 'Diderot' mean by 'real'? 'Diderot' is often tempted to unmask himself [both physically and literally] and join in the action [2]. He

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[2] In 1765 Fragonard exhibited 'The High Priest Coresus Immolates Himself to Save Callirhoë '
The subject derives from *Pausanias'* Description of Greece. Calydon spurns love of the priest Corseus / she is beset by plague of madness initiated by Callirhoe / Dionysus instructs Coresus to kill Callirhoe / instead, Corseus kills himself.

Diderot was commissioned to review the work, and the resultant piece was published in the Salon of 1765. Due to a misunderstanding over the Louvre's opening hours Diderot was unable to see the picture itself, but wrote a review of it in the double conceit of an imaginary dream. The subject of this dream was a morning spent at the exhibition and an ensuing evening reading Plato.

'It seemed that I was enclosed in the place known as Plato's cave. It was a long and gloomy cavern. I was sitting in the midst of a crowd of men, women and children. We all had our feet and hands in chains and our heads so firmly fastened by wooden clamps that it was impossible to look round. But the thing which surprises me was that the majority of my fellow-prisoners were drinking laughing and singing, not seeming in the least troubled by their chains, and you would have said, so far as appearances went, that it was their natural situation in life and they had no desire for anything different. It even seemed to me that people looked rather hostile at those who tried to free their feet and hands or head or help others to do so; that they called them evil names; that they shrank away from them, as if they had an infectious disease: and that, when any mishap occurred in the cave, these would be the first to be blamed. Installed in the way that I have explained to you, we all had our backs turned to the entrance of this habitation and were only able to look at its far end, which was hung with an immense canvas or curtain. Behind us there were kings, ministers, priests, doctors, apostles, prophets, theologians, politicians, rogues, charlatans, makers of illusions, and the whole troupe of merchants of hopes and fears. Each had a supply of little coloured and transparent images, of the kind suitable to their own condition: and these images were so well constructed, so well painted, so numerous and so varied, that there was all that was needed to represent every scene of life, comic, tragic, or burlesque. These charlatans, I then realised - placed as they were between us and the entrance to the cave - had hanging behind them a great lamp, to the light of which they exposed their images; and the shadows of these latter, passing over our heads and growing in size as they travelled, were cast upon the great screen at the end of the cavern, forming whole scenes - scenes so natural, so true to life that we took them for real. Sometimes they made us laugh, till we split our sides; sometimes they made us weep salt tears - a fact which will seem less strange to you when I say that behind the screen other subordinate rogues, in the pay of the former ones, supplied these shadows with the voices, the accents, the speech appropriate to their roles.
The screen at the end of the cave is filled with figures weeping, laughing, gambling, drinking, singing, revelling. One is drowning, one is being hanged, a third is being placed on a pedestal. The screen clears and the story begins to unfold............................. a young priest of Bacchus appears, ivy-garlanded and bearing a thyrsus. He serves beakers full of wine to a group of Maenads, and all grow drunk and rush through the streets to the fury of the citizens. The priest is

was not able therefore to adequately separate himself, as an entity, from the play itself - he had therefore lost the ability [right] to enter into any critical relationship. In the same way, in the scene when Lysimond [played by an 'outsider' {an actor}] enters and the rest of the cast are overcome with grief to the point that the performance is abandoned, again shows this lack of 'space' between reality and fiction - in the sense , as Diderot talks about in The Paradox of the Actor, that the actors are not totally 'in character'. There is something of their persona that refuses to go inside the character, and there is some of the character that the actor is unable to contain and has to egress. The 'old man' plays Lysimond [real time] acting out Lysimond's actions [history]. The other actors are unable to continue, so deep is their grief. But what is subject of the grief's desire? Is it the grief [surely already consummated] for Lysimond's return from capture? Or is it the imagining of the emotions unleashed of an 'undeceased' Lysimond coping with the re-enactment in the play of his emotional return? Is it the pathos that the actions of the old man in imitating the role of the dead Lysimond that are so unbearable to the rest of the cast?

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then seen trying to seduce a woman, who treats him with scorn. By now all the citizens are drunk too and engage in an orgy of incest. Some old men, untouched by the fracas, are seen in a Temple. They are weeping and beating their heads on the floor when a loud voice proclaims 'She must die, or another die in her place'. The walls of the Temple fall away revealing the floor which is covered in rich carpets. To the right is a sacrificial vessel and on either side huge towering columns of white marble. There is a black urn half draped with bloodstained cloths, a giant candelabrum, an altar and a brazier. The high-priest Corseus now appears and utters a cry (which draws an answering groan from Diderot). Next, a young woman appears, trembling and as pale as death, for she is the sacrificial victim. Meeting the priest Corseus, her lover, she sinks to the floor. Three acolytes enter, one of amazing beauty. As the sacrifice is prepared, the Temple fills up. The priest raises his knife and... thrusts it into his own breast. All watch thunderstruck as the chill of death falls over him. Even the aged priests 'whose cruel regard must often have fed on the vapour of the blood shed at altars', cannot withhold their tears . . . . .'

Diderot pictures human life as a series of a captivating but essentially trivial scenes of passion, cruelty, and superstition devised by mountebanks, a condition that, as humans ourselves, we are incapable of ignoring. Diderot attempts to not only imagine Fragonard's painting , but to imagine the creative process, the decisions, the exclusions that it underwent. In doing this he recreates the critical function too. He criticises the painting as it exists in its various stages, and also revises his own opinions in the light of the various (imaginary) developments that the painting moves through.

Diderot is making a distinction between a public effect, [such as a history painting] and a private performance, [landscape, still-life], perhaps anticipating what was to become known as a soiree, in which the performance, though containing a 'text', was essentially made special by the difference and uniqueness of that performance [at that time, at that date, in those rooms etc.]. In his Paradox, Diderot goes further and explains that there is a difference in relation to acting in fiction and feeling the effects of (say) tragedy in reality

. . . . *Have you ever been Cleopatra, Merope, Agrippina? What do these people matter to you?*

Diderot is moving towards the scene of decorum and the proper, towards a rhetoric for the theatre, for the soiree, for nature itself. In each of these there is an economy of means, a compromise, and some sacrifice of the truth of nature.

Diderot describes himself walking away from the play when it is abandoned after the second act [another instance of the promenade]

. . . . . *I must be a fool to get upset like this. All this is just a comedy. Dorval made it up out of his head. He wrote the words from his imagination, and today we are amusing ourselves acting it out.*

Diderot tries to imagine the play as fiction, but fails. But this 'failure' is fiction too. The melodrama that ensues is a supplement to the action, it could even be thought of as a coda, or more fanciful [as Dorval would desire it] the culmination, the last variation 'con brilliante'. In procuring the dénouement, of positioning it outside the drama itself, Diderot prevents the reader from entering the same relationship to the text as the characters have to the drama, and therefore insists that the spectator enter the disputed territory, of the private/spectacle, order/subversion in person.

At one point Diderot also takes his players, 'in character', out of the drama altogether, and moves them into the critique. 'Diderot' is discussing the merits of a particular scene in the play

. . .What a fine tableau, for it really was one, I think, was made by Poor Clairville, lying on his friend's breast, as though it were the only refuge left to him.

Diderot allows Dorval to interrupt -
You may well think of his troubles, but what about mine? How cruel that moment was for me! - the interruption referring to an action in his own life and its resemblance to that of a scene in the drama, so therefore breaking the hymen of the critic's thought of the text as 'the last word'.

Dorval's play can only ever be an impression of the play. We are not seeing 'what actually happened'. In fact in the introduction Diderot makes it quite clear that 'Diderot' is aware of this, which of course introduces the reader to the first signs of a rift between the real and the dramatic
. . . . but what difference there is between what Dorval said to me and what I am writing!

The exclamation mark is a taunt.

I can no longer see Dorval, I can no longer hear him. I am alone, amid the dust of books and in the darkness of my study .... and the lines I write are feeble, sad and cold.

By using Dorval as the 'fountain of knowledge' and 'Diderot' as 'the inquisitor', Diderot is able to depend less on, and even give the impression of not caring about, the narrative development of an exterior plot. He is more concerned in creating an alternative interior narrative which takes as its subject the accommodation, harmonisation and reconciliation of Dorval's and 'Diderot's' concepts of the real and the imaginary.

The **fourth** site

River Landscape with a Waterfall 1762

Florence, Uffizi

This is treated in a far more impressionist manner. The linearity falls into disrepair, the sightings are more random, the scenario less systematised, the objects less distinct. Gone are the geographical and athletic references. Instead there is a more reflective style of writing. The observations become more conversational, more generalised, more allegorical, less picturesque. He rests his eyes on the

landscape rather than travels around it, and he begins to put more emphasis onto reflection rather than mere observation.

Vernet's paintings were not portrayals of actualities. They were combinations of fragments of reality reconvened to give a particular effect. These were fully convincing and were in accord with the laws of nature. Diderot felt that Vernet had an instinctive knowledge of nature's laws, and therefore was able to summon up the correct 'piece' to insert in the jigsaw at any time. He was master of his own game. Diderot is seeing in Vernet's painting method a relationship between composition and precomposition, a type of serialism in which the actual landscape was the starting point in terms of a sense impression, a 'ground' ['grounds' in terms of legitimisation too] on which to improvise. Imitation is at the service of expression. Vernet's role as the painter is seen as an inspired mediator between art and reality - which Diderot celebrates in the Salon in the double pun of 'the point of view'. As Diderot infiltrates Vernet's picture space, he recreates the experience itself through experiencing, with us in company, its reconstruction. Diderot asks us to take on the role of the eyewitness - not in the observance of nature, but of the witnessing of the verification of the moment of the sensation when art and nature are the same. He is asking us to take the place of Condillac's statue, to be a vessel, a mute, to which the artist can attach the various sensations which allow us to see his vision, to allow us to make our own representation through his eyes. So the reader, the viewer, is not allowed to see just the finished result. But the spectator is allowed to become totally absorbed in the aesthetic experience. Inside this construction was an understanding that though the work may live through the deceiving of the eyes, through its representation of a three dimensional world in two dimensions, the emotions were not to be part of this: there was always an inside and an outside here, always a line , a frontier of demarcation. In this sense, the spectator's entry into the picture is not illusion. The success of the work depended on total absorption in the process of looking at the work. Diderot was insistent that nothing was to intrude between the spectator and the painting. The painting

should have a dominating idea and nothing should distract the beholder from the central concept. Flamboyant brushwork and allegory should also be sacrificed to dramatic unity. These were distractions that inserted a membrane [member] between the work and the spectator. The spectator had firstly to decipher its meaning, engaging the mind before any emotional responses could flourish. The ideal work of art is therefore one in which the spectator feels the same emotion as s/he would do in reality. The artist must never therefore admit to the presence of the spectator, [which Diderot overcomes/subverts in the Conversation on the Natural Son], otherwise the latter's emotional involvement could waver. Diderot praised Vernet's concentration on a single recognisable pictorial idea for its ability to encourage this behaviour. Pictorial conventions could not necessarily on their own ensure enthralment. The subject was of equal importance. It was essential for the viewer to be made to feel sympathetic [in sympathy] with the subject, to make him identify with the issues. Diderot gives a list of subjects which he feels have 'universal substance', subjects which may encourage the suspension of difference between art and reality. But this rationale relied ultimately on the desire and will of the spectator to want to enter a state of empathy, to want to be part of the 'scene': the artist requires the complicity of the viewer. More than this, it was essential to stimulate the viewer's imaginative and creative responses to the work. In fact their participation. The viewer can then extend the imaginative perspective of the work [which by its very nature will be edited] through their own imaginative resources, controlled of course by the same rules and regulations [sententious > sententia maxima > maximum meaning] which the work will have literally or subconsciously ingrained in the viewer's rationale. Diderot is arguing that the 'art object' was only half of the event. The other half contained the potential of the spectator's imagination [an undefined quantity], giving rise to the notion that all art is 'left open', that the artist's signature, the 'signing off', is a moment of egress, not termination. This new emphasis on the imaginative response to a work of art let in the concept of interpretation, and the consequent notion that there were as many interpretations as there were viewers. It is interesting

to note too the beginnings of the interest in the sketch. Previously thought to be merely a means of gathering and recording information for attachment to later, constructed, and considered views, these became documents of interest in themselves. For they were seen as documents containing, without egress, the very essence of the 'scene', unadulterated by any 'thoughts' or intellectualisation. They were an essence, a perfume. They were 'fresh' and 'natural' responses, as if the very act of working from them diluted their innocence. This innocence had a temporality - as if it diminished as the time between the act of drawing and that of painting expanded. By their very nature[!] they were often unfinished, therefore 'left open' for the viewer to [countersign] continue in their imagination their own development and conclusions, or even their concept of where the artist's imagination may have led them. At the same time this allowed the spectator to gain a privileged 'view' of the 'artist at work', to continue, without any barrier of public presentation, the innermost, private reveries of the artist, which became one of the central themes of the Romantic period. This notion of egress encourages the anticipation of the dream, the continuance of the visual effect back into a spoken /written narrative. This naturalistic setting invokes the reverie, a state which alters the previously static relationship of observer and observed [1].

[1]Diderot   -   Conversations on the Natural Son -   second conversation

'The next day, I went to the foot of the hill. It was a lonely, wild place. The view was of a few hamlets spread out over the plain; beyond, a range of irregular, jagged mountains which formed a part of the horizon. We were shaded by some oak trees, and the muted sound could be heard of an underground stream flowing nearby. It was that season when the earth is covered with the fruits it grants to the toil and sweat of man. Dorval had arrived first. I went up to him without him noticing me. He had abandoned himself to the spectacle of nature. His chest swelled out and he was breathing deeply. his eyes were fixed on everything around him. I could see on his face the various impressions in what he saw, and I was beginning to share in his rapture when I cried out, almost involuntarily " He is under the spell".

Diderot also hints at the notion of the involuntary, the incapability of the spectator to escape the painting's advances, and the implication that the more irresistible the painting is, the more its philosophical value, and that this desire is something that is in ourselves, and that the work of art is a catalyst to the unveiling of these thoughts and emotions.

Rocky river landscape 17(

Birmingham, Alabama.
Museum of Art

The sixth site

In the distance,

To the right

Landscape with a
Waterfall, 1761

Vercelli,
Museo Borgogna

49

he top of a rock disappearing into the clouds

In the foreground, an old building, an arcade leading to a lighthouse

behind this , a range of hills

To the extreme right, a waterfall

To the left, a promontory with fishermen going about their work

On the promontory, a forest

to the left a rock, a stone building, an inlet of the sea

To the right, the lighthouse and the sea stretching into infinity

If you do not make an effort to reconstruct this site to yourself accurately, you will take me for a madman when I tell you that I uttered a cry of admiration, that I was left motionless and dumbfounded . . .Oh nature, how great you are! Oh, Nature, how imposing, majestic and beautiful you are!

Diderot is in agreement with Burke in their connecting of Infinity and terror - They both connect the sublime with a venture into the unknown, the possibility of a psychological space inside the spatial, perspectival ordering of

objects in illusionistic space. The notion of 'ordering' is seen as a condition of the sublime. A great profusion of things which are splendid in themselves are magnificent. Apparent disorder also creates a sense of grandeur. In the opposite direction Burke goes so far as to say that

'The appearance of care is unhelpful to the portrayal of magnificence'.

This apparent confusion creates the illusion of infinity, a place where perspective and visual laws, agreements, vanish. Burke then goes on to consider power. Magnificence and Power. Pain, he claims, is much stronger than pleasure. Pleasure is 'stolen' from us. Pain is submitted on us, against our will. Strength is beautiful when controlled, it becomes sublime when it is acting against our will and gets out of control. Magnificence and Complexity. A quality Burke associates with the sublime is that of difficulty. Burke uses the example of Stonehenge to suggest that objects that are obviously the result of toil and struggle have a grandeur [the rudeness, and as before, the vulgarity of the work] that approaches the sublime. Dexterity has the opposite effect, that of reducing the task to that of mere manners.

Burke again has recourse to the figural when he considers light. 'Colours depend on light'. A rapid change from light to dark can astonish, but darkness is judged to have more of the Sublime than light. Burke quotes from Milton. 'Dark with excessive light thy skirts appear'. Extreme light, by overcoming the organs of sight, obliterates all objects, its effect resembling darkness. Thus two ideas as opposite as can be imagined are reconciled in the extremes of both, their opposite nature brought together in producing the Sublime.

In addition to this description of objects, Diderot makes special note of the atmosphere and lighting.

Closer to us all colours remain distinct, while in the distance they blend together and soften, their fusion producing a dull white

and,

. . . a patch of forest lit by light originating from its far side

Burke writes an account of his notion of vision. He gives two contrasting theses. Vision is performed by having a picture formed by the rays of light which are reflected from the object, painted in one piece, instantaneously on the retina, or least nervous part of the eye.'

'Or, according to others, there is but one point of any object painted on the eye in such a manner as to be perceived at once; but by moving the eye, we gather up with great celerity, the several parts of the object, so as to perform one uniform piece.'

Burke then conducts an argument between these two propositions. He makes out a case that the physical act of perception causes pain, and is therefore part of the sublime. His argument suggests that light from a large body strikes the eye in an instant. That body is made up from a multitude of small points, the rays from which make this effect on the retina. So that all these minuscule strikes on the retina add up to a bombardment, which shakes the retina to such a degree as to cause pain.

His explanation of the second thesis is that if only one point of an object is visible at any time, the eye must scan these with 'great quickness', and consequently this will result in muscles being stretched and strained to a point of pain. Both explanations result in the construction of a vibratory,

uncertain domain where vision is created in an environment of tension and unease.

This domain is realised in Burke's mind by the contemplation of darkness. Defying Locke's conjecture that darkness is 'not naturally' an idea of terror, Burke sees darkness as a place of uncertainty, a place in which mankind cannot know in 'what degree of safety they stand'. This inability to see potential danger, the ignorance of surrounding objects, and the inability to detect potential foes forces the unfortunate to pray for light. Burke suggests that darkness and blackness are virtually indivisible, though blackness may be used in terms of confined spaces. He gives an example of a newly sighted person being disquieted by seeing blackness. Blackness, Burke defines as but a partial darkness. It derives its powers from being 'not black' and also from being surrounded by other colours.

Closer to us all colours remain distinct, while in the distance they blend together and soften, their fusion producing a dull white

and,

. . . a patch of forest lit by light originating from its far side to be transitory, to have a temporality similar to terror, which to continue its effect must be used infrequently. When the terror abates 'smoothness and glossiness' will dissipate it, and modify the starkness of the original.

It is in the sixth site that Diderot 'owns up' and discloses that these visits have been pure fiction, that the subject of his gaze was in fact Vernet's paintings.

seventh picture

This essay is entitled 'picture', as distinct from the previous six 'sites'. Diderot declares that he is no longer addressing the Abbé, he is addressing the reader directly. This is the most complex site in terms of loci. Backwards and forwards moves the shuttle, concocting the correct nuance from the various narrative strands.

Landscape with Fishermen, 1763

Quimper
Musée des Beaux-Arts

1   In the centre the moon is floating above the horizon, intermittently hidden by dense cloud, creating a scenario of the lit and the unlit, and the drama of the movement between them.

2   To the right   i   a building

ii   forward from this, some abandoned pilings

iii   forward to the left

			a boat

3   further back   a sailing vessel advances towards the building

4   to the rear   limitless expanse of the ocean

5   far left   i   steep rocks

                                  ii   beneath which the esplanade begins

6   far right   esplanade finishes at fountain.

7   Inside this area, Diderot describes the position of a multitude of characters, and he goes on to surmise   their relationships and likely employ.

The position of objects is now described in relationship to each other. Diderot then interjects one of his favourite devices [devices, as in signs], that of analepsis, the restorative, the invigorating, the stimulating *analeptikos* , the cure. The cure for the art is the looking. The cure for the looking is the painting. Diderot then begins to effect the position of the painter, or at least a position in between Vernet's initial impulse and his compositional decision making. . .'

'Forget the right side of his Moonlight, cover it up so that you can see only the rocks and the esplanade on the left, and you'll still have a beautiful picture. Isolate the portion with the sea and the sky, with the lunar light falling on the water, and you'll have a beautiful picture. Consider only that portion of his canvas with the rocks to the left, and you'll still have a beautiful thing. Content yourself with the esplanade and what's happening on it, look only at the steps with the various tasks being carried out there, and your taste will be satisfied. Cut

out only the cistern with the two figures leaning against it, and you'll have a choice bit of painting under your arm.

Our aesthetic appreciation of nature enables us to relate to the world, to understand our limitations and the possibility of transcending them. But we are not creators of nature and neither do we formulate its critique, for we stand outside the nature to perceive the harmony that exists between our faculties and the objects on which they employed.[1]

Kant, writing 30 years after Burke and Diderot, also foresaw problems inherent in the idea of beauty. He saw that the idea of taste was a paradox, that aesthetic judgement was a contradiction since 'aesthetic' suggests subjective experience and 'judgement' suggests universal assent. 'Beauty' could easily be seen as part of the 'object' - a confusion of taste and fact. The pleasure of the object is intuitive - though it is expressed in the form of a judgement. Judgements therefore can be thought of as aesthetic because of their relationship to direct experience. These judgements must be empirical, they must have been formed through experience.
Acquiring the judgement of taste would mean a fundamental premise under the condition of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then , by syllogism, draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, Kant reasoned, was impossible, for the pleasure must be felt immediately in the perception of the object, and it is always experience, and never conceptual thought that gives the right to aesthetic judgement, so that anything which alters the experience of an object would alter its aesthetic significance. Aesthetic judgements therefore should be free from concepts since beauty itself is not a concept in itself. The consideration of an aesthetic experience is not judgemental in the fact that it is the showing, the pointing out of the particular features that is important, not the explanation of them. This pointing out is akin to the notion of taste, a rationalisation of experience in a communal sense, based on agreement. The notion of beauty is rationalised too in the communal feeling

[1] Immanuel Kant   Critique of Pure Judgement

of/for pleasure. The idea that others feel as you do is not derived from experience. It is a presupposition. This would in part explain Diderot's decision to write this critique in the form of a conversation, and to involve the Abbé as a receptacle for the storage and instant recall of these judgements. Diderot puts forward the idea that there can not be any one judgement, suggesting that the judgement consists of a state of thinking about judgement, of thinking that a theoretical judgement might be valid, that it would have the possibility of being seen to be so.

Diderot is clear that the pleasure in the beautiful, though it is immediate, nevertheless involves contemplation and reflection, and that aesthetic pleasure must also have the ability to be communicated through sight and the hearing, the senses that permit contemplation. Again, the invention of the Abbé enables Diderot to emphasise this point, suggesting to him that the act of contemplation requires that an object be thought of as a unique event rather than a universal concept, indeed, that the object becomes isolated from the world while it is gazed on. But contemplation is more acute than this. Every 'interest' the observer finds in the object is noted, is abstracted and stored. The object is under surveillance. The object is not an end to its means, but an end in itself. The observer's desires, aims and ambitions are held in abeyance [inside the fold] in the act of contemplation. There is a continual desire for the cycle to remain incomplete, to remain in limbo where the object can exist in a disinterested state.

Kant then questions the role of rationality in aesthetic contemplation. He argues that imagination has a central role in the synthesis of concept and intuition. Imagination is double-edged. It turns intuition into fact, but at the same time requires the fertilisation of experience with concepts. Kant thought that imagination could be freed from the rules of understanding.

Kant wants us to take pleasure in beauty in order to experience the harmonious workings of our own faculties and to project that harmony towards and onto the empirical world. We

57

will see in objects the unity we discover in ourselves. This is the origin of our pleasure. Kant divides beauty into two categories, and makes a preliminary judgement on each

being perceived without the aid of conceptual thought -	free
requiring conceptualisation of the object. -	dependent

To perceive a painting one needs to understand the concept of the content and how it is expressed. This beauty would be less pure than the 'free' beauty associated with nature itself. Nature is a pure beauty. There is no 'interest', no agenda, no 'purpose'. It produces feelings in us of organisation, of placement, of the proper. Kant puts forward a notion that aesthetic unity displays purposiveness without purpose, to the point that the experience of looking at objects and judging them finally discolours our ability to see nature 'freely'. It makes us look with a purpose. This concept of 'aesthetic experience' leads us to the notion of 'design' in nature, and the recognition that the artist in us would want to use these findings for our own ends.

The aesthetic idea also imprints on our senses the idea of the transcendental. The idea of the artist striving to go beyond the limits of experience to show things in a completeness that nature does not show. Kant calls this aesthetic condensation. It is the experience of trying to reach the transcendental that produces this aesthetic experience - this striving not just beyond our own imagination, our own experiences, but beyond our own conceptions. This leads to an aesthetic experience where we view ourselves in relation to a transcendental reality which lies beyond the field of thought. We come to see our limitations and the grandeur of the world. We perceive the harmony between nature and our faculties, and by the purposiveness of the relationships between the two, we experience beauty, but when we are dwarfed by the enormity of the world, and our inability to understand and control it, we glimpse the Sublime. The Sublime is a force. It incites us to abandon sensibility, manners, rhetoric. Kant defines the Sublime in a number of ways - 'that the mere capacity of thinking which, evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of taste', and, 'an object of

nature the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas.' The judgement of the Sublime approaches a moral judgement too. As the beautiful demands agreement on taste, in the Sublime we demand the extent the limits of the experience of the awesomeness of nature. By not taking the transcendental viewpoint he lacks the basis of a true morality.

Kant defines the Dynamically Sublime in terms of our relationship with fear. On the one hand there is our terror and fear when confronted with nature, and on the other hand our desire not to be dominated by these forces, but to be able to judge them and consequently our ability to come to terms with them by calling on our own strength to overcome these very terrors. The terrors that nature can conjure up therefore excite our imaginations to overcome and elevate ourselves above nature itself. So the dynamic is the imagination, the ability to see outside the terror, to place it in our own context, not just the natural world's.

Kant develops this further in his divisions of the mathematically Sublime [Ch. 26] and the dynamically sublime [Ch. 28]. The Sublime requires a 'mental movement' combined with an 'estimate of the object'. The mathematically sublime relates to the need for cognition of the absolutely great. Small, medium and large are all relativisms, but magnitude is a judgement, dependent on measure. Magnitude is always judged in terms of comparisons, of relatives. The Sublime cannot be judged by comparison. It can only be judged by its own criteria, that of the Sublime. Kant states that it is impossible to calculate the Sublime since both the multiplicity and the magnitude are unknown. It cannot therefore be computed. Its magnitude must always be based on comparison and can therefore be judged only in terms of aesthetics. But these comparisons must not be the result of personal judgement only - they must be capable of being upheld by universal agreement. He puts forward the notion that the 'object' need not necessarily exist at all, it may be formless, since only its potential greatness is needed to convey the judgement of being Sublime. 'Instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind in appreciating it that we have to estimate as Sublime'. The feeling of the Sublime is one of

dissatisfaction in our inability to free our imaginations to the point where we can use reason to judge the Sublime. This restlessness is manifested in our need to 'set in motion' the quest for the Sublime, and whereas what is beautiful can be judged in restful contemplation, the Sublime is always a place of conflict between imagination and reason. Kant finishes this chapter . . . . . 'and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of displeasure.'

This reading of Vernet's work, and it is Vernet's paintings that we are now discussing, describes a work of flexibility and indeterminacy. Diderot is seeing the work as a series of 'happenings' which, though they have a coherence in themselves, have more resonance in groups. On their own, or in incomplete groups they have a sense of 'absence' which has a hermeneutic effect on those present. Diderot's quest for the invention of the labyrinth is echoed in the Encyclopédie. Diderot answers the questions posed by the different interpretations of the landscapes by inventing different ways of talking about them. Different ways of describing space, and different ways of going about describing space. Port-Royal logicians contrasted the narrative 'order of invention' with the systematic 'order of analysis'. Diderot here is offering a presentation of the anxiety prominent at the time between the sequential, linear modes of thought and synoptic or temporally organised ones. Diderot develops his theme of linearity here too in the developmental devices of his criticism, which gradually become less and less 'descriptive' in terms of topography, and more and more daring in the verbal space they demand. The sequential is in the foreground at one moment, the background the next. Diderot is inside the painting, gazing at himself scanning, reading the work of which he is now a necessary part. . Between the foreground and background is the terrain, a new terrain, a scene of gambits and adjustments. Diderot's path, his pèlerinage, takes the form of a fold, an arabesque between these surfaces.

60

The space between the words, the continual and expectant need to involve the reader in the process of selection is a method that Diderot uses to fabricate the empowerment of the reader - as perhaps he feels Vernet has done to him. Whereas in the first site Diderot is seeing the scene 'framed' ready for insertion into a painting, by the seventh site he is inside the work in a spatial sense too. He is reluctant to return the 'picture' as it now has been admitted to being to the frame. He is trying to disenfranchise this frame, to free both the painting , the frame and the view, so that any one part does not have any precedence over the other. The Parergon. As Diderot foresees Film and T.V. in Le Fils Naturel, so he now envisages the series paintings of Cézanne's Mont Sainte Victoire and the evolution of Cubism. Is the *Cicerone* remembering the future as well as perceiving the present as he accompanies the Abbé and Diderot?

Diderot then adds some comments about the relative merits, as paintings, of the various works. The fact that these are, according to Diderot,

of varying quality, is a matter of the moment, of the bodily state, of the state of the soul.

He gives a few examples of how domestic incidents can divert the true direction of genius. How seemingly trivial discomforts can divert the muse.

Chance too plays a role in chess and in all other intellectual games, and why shouldn't it here as well? Diderot then 'closes' his piece. . . . . . .

That's enough about Vernet

He concludes by describing two dream sequences. Firstly though , he lays the foundations for the scene of doubt by discussing the differences between dreams and sleeplessness- [perhaps what we are going to hear isn't categorised properly]. His soliloquy begins with the comment that

No philosopher known to me has successfully described the difference between sleeplessness and dreaming.

Was I sleepless when I thought I was dreaming?

or was I dreaming when I thought I was sleepless?

Who is it told me that one day the veil would be rent, and I'd be convinced I'd dreamed all that I 'd done and really done all that I had dreamed?

These two dreams are superficially different in that one is happy , one is sad. They again use the distancing ploy in that it is obvious that the imagery comes from Vernet, they are 'captured' in Diderot's as nature is in Vernet's paintings. Diderot seems to be hinting at the sublime/inal

In the Encyclopédie, Diderot compares the qualities of wit and genius.

. . . . sound, genuine taste, the sublime in whatever type of art, the moving, the great effects of fear, compassion and terror, noble and elevated feelings, and great ideas resist epigrammatic style and contrast in expression.

and in the Salon,

anything which astonishes the mind, anything which inspires a feeling of terror is conducive to the sublime . . . The night hides the shapes of things, adds horror to their sounds: even that of a leaf in the depths of the forest sets the imagination working, and the imagination troubles the heart, so that everything is magnified.

Diderot seems to be offering up a definition of the sublime as something that 'disturbs' ordered perception. It produces amazement, awe, bewilderment and surprise. This is a fearsome, disruptive thing in its ability to destroy the bases of rational judgement and

empirical reason. It emphasises the spatial dislocation and the passage of experience through a 'darkness'. It attempts to bias our value judgements towards the emotional and against the common-sense/place. If this is to be the case, and Art is about the sublime, it must therefore be 'outside' daily experience, and also, possibly, outside of morality. Diderot himself expressed it as something which

might well be the opposite of everyday morality . . . . . . I am very much afraid that man may be led straight to disaster along the path which leads the imitator of nature to the sublime.

Diderot sees the followers of this doctrine as doomed to misfortune and misery, a precursor of Werther and, nearer home, Dorval.

Diderot links the sublime with his idea of Enthusiasm.

It is impossible in poetry, painting, eloquence or music to produce anything sublime without enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is a violent movement of the spirit by which we are transported into the midst of the objects we are to represent; then we see a whole scene take place in our imagination as if it were outside us [the cave again] : and it is, for as long as this illusion lasts, everything present is annihilated, and our ideas take on reality in its place . . . if this state is not madness, then it is very close to it.

This passage hints at the possibility of the imagination replacing the reality around us, and the ensuing terror that may ensue. In his *Salons* Diderot calls into question the traditional circuitry of creativity - the initial 'vision thing', the consequent rationalisation and ordering of this perception, and the final construction of the art object.

Aperçus désagréables

Chapter 1   Forms

[]   the cardinal number that is the sum of two and one and is a prime number. a numeral representing this number. the amount or quantity that is one greater than two.

[] an amount or portion forming a separate mass or structure; bit. a small part, item, or amount forming part of a whole, esp. when broken off or separated. a length by which a commodity is sold, esp. cloth, wallpaper, etc. an instance or occurrence. Slang. girl or woman regarded as an object of sexual attraction. an example or specimen of a style or type, such as an article of furniture. Informal. an opinion or point of view. a literary, musical, or artistic composition. a coin having a value as specified. a small object, often individually shaped and designed, used in playing certain games. a firearm or cannon. U.S. and Canadian. a short time or distance. Scot. and English dialect. a slice of bread or a sandwich. a packed lunch taken to work, school, etc. (usually pl.) Austral. and N.Z. fragments of fleece wool. to criticise or censure someone frankly or vehemently. (a person) to lose control of oneself; have a breakdown. (of a building, organisation, etc.) to disintegrate. Brit. informal. a cruel or mean person. Informal. something easily obtained or achieved. (often foll. by up) to patch or make up (a garment). Textiles. to join (broken threads) during spinning.

[]   the shape or configuration of something as distinct from its colour, texture, etc. the particular mode, appearance, etc., in which a thing or person manifests itself. a type or kind: a printed document, esp. one with spaces in which to insert facts or answers: a physical or mental condition. the previous record of a horse, athlete, etc., esp. with regard to fitness. style, arrangement, or design in the arts, as opposed to content. a fixed mode of artistic expression or representation in literary, musical, or other artistic works: a mould, frame, etc., that gives shape to something. organised structure or order, as in an artistic work. a group of children who are taught together, esp. with regard to recognised standards. behaviour or procedure, esp. as governed by custom or etiquette. a prescribed set or order of words, terms, etc., as in a religious ceremony or legal document. the structure of anything as opposed to its constitution or content. essence as opposed to matter. the ideal universal that exists

independently of the particulars which fall under it. the constitution of matter. by virtue of this its nature can be understood. a bench, esp. one that is long, low, and backless. the phonological or orthographic shape or appearance of a linguistic element, such as a word. a linguistic element considered from the point of view of its shape or sound rather than, for example, its meaning. a group distinguished from other groups by a single characteristic: ranked below a variety. to come or bring into existence. to make, produce, or construct or be made, produced, or constructed. to construct or develop in the mind.   to acquire, contract, or develop. to be an element of, serve as, or constitute. to draw up; organise. an ideal archetype existing independently of those individuals which fall under it, supposedly explaining their common properties and serving as the only objects of true knowledge as opposed to the mere opinion obtainable of matters of fact.   .   .   .

[] a widely cultivated rosaceous tree, *Pyrus communis*, having white flowers and edible fruits. the sweet gritty-textured juicy fruit of this tree, which has a globular base and tapers towards the apex. the wood of this tree, used for making furniture.

[]   . . . .   *SUPPLEMENT* .   .   . two identical or similar things matched for use together: two persons, animals, things, etc., used or grouped together: an object considered to be two identical or similar things joined together: two people joined in love or marriage. a male and a female animal of the same species, esp. such animals kept for breeding purposes. Parliamentary procedure. two opposed members who both agree not to vote on a specified motion. or for a specific period of time. the agreement so made. two playing cards of the same rank or denomination. Brit. and U.S. dialect. a group or set of more than two. Logic, maths. a set with two members. an ordered set with two members. (often foll. by off) to arrange or fall into groups of twos. to group or be grouped. to join or be joined in marriage; mate or couple. (when tr., usually passive,)

three   pieces   in the   form   of a   pair   [pear]

.... trois morceau en forme de poire / .... three pieces in the form of a pear. Also the title of a
piano piece in seven parts by Erik Satie [Satie. Erik (Alfred Leslie) . 1866-1925, French composer, noted for
his eccentricity, experimentalism, and his direct and economical style . . . .]

They are

        manière de commencement
        prolongation du même
        Morceau 1
        Morceau 2
        Morceau 3
        en plus
        redite

Satie composed this piece in response to Debussy's criticism that his works lacked a 'sense of form'. What exactly did Debussy mean by this? Where and what actually was this scene of formlessness? Was it a quality that Debussy felt that Satie's music lacked in the sense of a 'historical form' [probably its lack of reference to sonata form with its inherent experience of 'development', of the experiencing of time through a series of interlinking episodes which resulted in a 'resolution', and a sense of returning. An example in this case would be that of Les Adieux, whose three movements are entitled Le depart, L'absence and Le retour]. The arrangement of intervals, to the minutiae of chords, of sequences, of 'passing notes', of parallel fifths? Or was Debussy speaking in a more 'philosophical' sense, manner, seeing a lack of a 'raison d'être' a lack of forward momentum that a particular harmonic vocabulary produces, hence therefore the lack of 'form', the lack of forming and its consequent lack of 'goals'. Satie parodies the notion of 'composition' by substituting it with 'organisation'. An organisation of time with an elaborate titling of divisions. Satie attempts to subvert the Kantian view of time as subservient to movement into a situation where movement is subordinate to time, the path of which no conventional figure, whether it be circle or spiral, can mimic. It becomes a single thread, indivisible, stealth-like. Satie is defying the bar-line. Time is no longer related to the movement which it measures, it is related to the time which conditions it. So the very nature of music, that is, succession, is challenged. This renunciation of division produces difficulties in the creation of necessary forms, ingredients needed to create contrast, repetition, reminiscence and memory. But though divisions create forms, these do not in turn necessarily have the qualities of what I will later discuss as what Heidegger might call 'the thingly'.

Debussy's comments on Satie's piece open up a debate about the nature of form. What is meant by 'form' and 'forms', and how form and content or expression relate to each other. The argument can be viewed from various points. Firstly the order of perception versus the order of creation. Secondly the nature of the containing element of the notion of 'form' and the necessary oxymoron of 'formless forms'. Imagine: concrete cube / wax cube : the form is the same but the matter is different. The Theory of Forms talks about classification: and also about definitions. Definitions can operate through comparisons. 'Redness' can be judged in terms of 'blueness 'and 'greenness', but definitions can also be judged in their own terms, as parts of Forms.

Forms can exist or not exist, but not at the same time. The theory of Forms concerns itself with Definitions,

that is, the understanding of a term as distinct from its mere usage. Plato states that nothing in the 'sensible' world is beautiful or, say, large without at the same time having the qualities of ugliness or smallness .

The sensible world is seen in terms of opposites. But these opposites must exist separately, and they must have definitions. Take a word such as 'Satie'. There is no opposite to 'Satie'. But there is the possibility of there not being a 'Satie'. But not at the same time: but perhaps . . . Satie. But Plato would only accept evidence that was 'eternally' true, i.e. not merely the result of observations of the world. Nothing in the sensible world could actually qualify as an object of knowledge. Our experience is founded on information collected by the senses, as Diderot emphasised in Site 2, and Condillac elaborated on in his Traité des Sensations. [1] Plato held the view that humans understood eternal forms before they were born, when our

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[1] Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-80)

> You will understand how easily we are led to make systems if you consider that nature itself has made a system of our faculties, of our needs, and things related to us. It is in accordance with this system that we think; it is in accordance with this system that our opinions, whatever they may be, are produced and combined. [*Traité des systèmes, in Œuvres* Phil. de Condillac, I, p.216]

> Sensations give birth to the whole system of man, a complete system all of whose parts are linked and mutually sustaining. It is a sequence of truths: the first observations prepare the way for those that follow, the last confirm those that preceded them. [*Extrait raisonné du traité des sensations*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p325]

In his *Traité des sensations* and *Traité des systèmes*, one of Condillac's stated objectives was 'to reduce to one single principle all that concerns human understanding'. His approach was to reconcile Descarte's and Locke's philosophies - to achieve a synthesis between Descarte's 'natural', methodical reasoning and Locke's 'natural' sense-data based thought. In doing so Condillac aimed to combine the naturalness of intellectual procedures with the naturalness of the physical world. Logical analysis could function in both mental and material worlds. The mind/body distinction is still maintained otherwise the need for analysis to bridge the gap would no longer be needed.

Condillac's question, a recurring one in the 18th century [see in particular the 'Molyneux Problem' as described in Diderot's *Letter on the Blind*] centred on whether the primary data received by the senses produce by themselves the coherent image of a physical world that we have in our consciousness, or whether some additional organising faculty was required to complete the process.

Condillac's "Statue-Man" was an attempt to create the hypothetical experiences a statue would undergo as its senses were developed one by one. Starting with what he thought was the least informative of the senses, smell, he surmised whether, without innate ideas, reason and reflection can prevail. He went on to discuss the relationship of the senses to each other, and the crucial role of touch and movement in the awareness of the self and the discovery of the outside world. Condillac observed the statue now with its senses and movement. Excited by the prospect of pain and pleasure and steered by the mechanism of association of ideas, the statue-man acquired practical knowledge, formulated abstract ideas and developed a morality. He had the mental capacity of a man, limited only by his lack of a language and contract with humankind. Condillac saw the statue-man as an ideal, a model from which all irrelevant and extraneous factors had been omitted to that the essential features were clearly displayed.

Nature gives us organs in order to show us by means of pleasure what to seek, and by means of pain what to avoid. But there it stops; and it leaves to experience the task of making us contract habits, and of finishing work which it has begun. This is a new view, and it shows the simplicity of the ways of the author of nature. It is not cause for wonder that it was only necessary to make men sensible to pleasure and pain to generate ideas, desires, habits and talents of every kind in him? [*Traité des sensations*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p222]

Condillac's originality is seen in his views on the environmental and physiological origins of personality - that man is the result of the reactions of the sense-organs to the stimuli provided by the physical environment [for Locke, man still possessed a spiritual faculty, reason, which existed independently of the senses, though it could not function without the stimuli they provide. For Hobbes, man was regarded as matter in motion. For La Mettrie [in *L'homme machine*], man was a purely physical being like an animal or a plant and totally dependent on physical sensations gathered by his senses. For Diderot [*Lettre sur les aveugles*], man's ideas are relative to their senses and would be different if they were deprived of any].

The principal object of this work is to show how all our knowledge and all our faculties come from our senses, or, to speak more precisely, from our sensations; for in reality, the senses are only the occasional cause. They do not feel if it is the mind alone which feels through the agency of the organs; and it is from the sensations that modify it the mind draws all its knowledge and all its faculties. [*Extrait raisoné*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p323]

In the Cartesian system reason is capable of development without reference to sense experience - only pure thought is clear and distinct. Passions are seen as disturbances in a rationality that humans suffer as a result of having a body. Descartes' realisation that we are

not in direct contact with the surfaces of things led him to recognise that our perceptions take place within our minds and are made up of ideas, and that ideas are not the same stuff as the physical realities that cause them. In this he was perpetuating the dualism suggested by the 'New Science', and he accounted for our experience of a physical world by a theory of representative perception. Our perception of secondary qualities is caused by the physical attributes of things, but there is no necessary resemblance between them : in other words, the sensations we experience represent physical reality but are not identical with it.

For Locke, Thought divorced from experience did not exist. Reflection could not function without experience. Reflection enabled simple ideas provided by the senses to develop into more complicated ideas, though this was dependent on the mind's innate ability to reason without experience. 'Uneasiness', a sense of discontent, of unfocused desire is the motivator of all actions, the will, the determination to act. Reason is the servant of the will, 'the sensitive soul contemplating its ideas' and suggests the best way to placate this uneasiness, and to imagine the likely outcomes of pain and pleasure. [Descartes puts the will in the service of reason. The will is the source of error, which can only be avoided if the former waits on understanding and refrains from making judgements until the outcome is clear. The will must control the passions, by siding with the rational.]

Condillac saw that empiricism required an analysis of the mind itself and not just a knowledge of external substances and relations. He saw desire as the motivating force behind the whole mind - as the root of both the will and understanding [*Extrait raisoné*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p325]

...... first ideas and experiences are sensations ...... some will be less pleasant than others resulting in uneasiness ...... memory of the pleasant changes uneasiness into desire - to return to a state of pleasure ...... which in turn activates love, hate fear etc. ...... this takes the mind beyond the mere recording and feeling to the heights of reason ...... [*Traité des Sensations*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p228]

While the understanding provides the ideas towards which the will moves, the will selects the ideas that the understanding focuses on. It is a physical need, not a rational logic that decides the association of ideas. Condillac concludes therefore that it is need not logic that is the foundation of reason. This analysis of reason was mirrored in his analysis of the self [or how we get the idea of the self]. The self is not intuitively known - when the Statue comes alive it has no knowledge of itself - it can only be discovered when change has occurred.

"What we understand by this word {I} seems to me applicable only to a being who notices that in the present moment he is no longer what he has been. So long as there is no change, he exists without any reflection

upon himself; but as soon as he changes, he judges that he is the same as he formerly was in another state, and he says {I}" [*Traité des Sensations*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p238]

Condillac therefore rejects Locke's theory that one can perceive without knowing that one perceives. The Statue does not receive anything until it has been endowed with touch and movement. It is only aware of itself through change. The 'self', the { I } is the sum of its movements, its changes : there is not anything outside these sensations and memories. The next stage in the awakening of the statue is the discovery of the non-self, through touch and the revealing of its physical dimensions and limits [edges]. The statue is seen to have sensations, rather than being a sensation.

In *Traité des sensations* Condillac asks if all knowledge is derived from sensations. He confirms that we are aware of the spatial world around us, and are able to fit different sorts of sense - data into a coherent picture of the world. As we see objects, we see them as totalities, we do not see their various separate qualities first and the whole later. Condillac found that none of the sensations of smell, taste, hearing and sight would reveal to the statue-man anything outside himself. Even the sensation of touch, if unaccompanied by movement, would not indicate an outside world. Tâtonnement . . . . . the vibratory continual touching and retouching that establishes experiential research - the 'innocent' study that requires almost no preparation of the soul. Both Condillac in 'Traité des Sensations' and Diderot in his 'Interprétation' describe touch as the beginning of the process of 'distinguishing'. For Condillac the touching had to be continuous. The statue describes 'limit' and 'otherness'. The hand moving across a surface is mirrored by the bodies sensation of being touched. Condillac was interested in the linear logic in sensation. Diderot was not interested in origins (which suggest laws and rigidity) but ways of adapting to a world in continual transformation. This notion of Diderot introduces [as a preface] notions concerned with sententiousness and the Plan, and Deleuze's Fold which will be discussed as length later in the dissertation. For Condillac, movement introduces the perception of space, 'otherness', and solidity. Statue-man can ascertain that there are at least two things in the world, himself and the space around himself. Secondary qualities such as smell, sound , taste, cannot provide any knowledge of the world on their own, they can only function by way of an experience of space and movement. Statue-man's next task is learning to perceive the different sense organs. Through experiences of touch and movement, sensations are seen to be located in the body, not the mind. Different sense-organs would result in different sensations. The final act is the Statue-Man's ability to relate sensation to objects, therefore leaving reality behind. He realises that sensations are in

experience of the world is purely intellectual. He sees Forms as being more substantial than eternal objects, but relates the two notions together in terms of hierarchies, in the sense of the archetype and the copy. These copies are kept in 'space'. A divine artificer copies these in different places, therefore creating many things from the same form [printing / moulding / casting]

Heiddeger restates and then develops Aristotle's Theory of Forms. Take a block of granite: there is a form, the block, and there is the substance, the granite. Form determines the distribution of the matter in space, resulting in a particular shape. But with an object such as equipment [tools, say], the shape is not made by a prior distribution of matter: On the contrary, form controls the arrangement of the matter, and also selects the matter, and its arrangement. The relationship between form and matter is dictated by the usage, the tool-like qualities of the object, and this 'usefulness' is not something that can be added at the end. The 'usefulness' is paramount. A made object is self-contained, but its shape has not taken place by itself, like the granite. The tool, like the art-work, is constructed. But Heidegger then links these two notions by suggesting that art has a 'self-sufficient presencing' that has a similarity with the granite. Tools therefore are half art-work: they have

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objects not in himself, and as sensations are a mass of chaotic feelings, they are also capable of being transformed into a diverse range of utterances.

As many are our needs, so many are our different enjoyments, and as many are the degrees in our needs, so many are the degrees in our enjoyment. In this lies the germ of all we are, the source of our happiness and of our unhappiness. . . .
The history of our Statue's faculties makes the growth of all these things very clear. When it was limited to fundamental feeling, one uniform sensation comprised its whole existence, its whole knowledge, its whole pleasure. In giving it successively new modes of being and new senses, we saw it form desires, learn from experience to regulate and satisfy them, and proceed to new needs, to new knowledge, to new pleasures. The Statue is therefore nothing but the sum of all it has acquired. Why would it not be the same with man? [*Traité des Sensations*, in Œuvres Phil. I, p314]

Condillac made a distinction between the senses, which belong to the body, and sensation, which is a function of the mind. It is sensations that we owe our development to. Condillac's work on the Statue-man announced his departure from total agreement with Locke. Pain and pleasure looked forward to the mind and ultimately understanding [attention] and will [desire]. The nature of the will - passion, love, hate, fear evolve out of desire and experience in the same way that understanding evolves out of attention. Whereas Locke had analysed the mind as a static entity, Condillac looked at the activities inside the mind, specifically between reason and the will, and the will and passion.

thingliness, but they lack the self-sufficiency of the art-work. Tools have a position between 'thing' and work. Eventually, the fold.

To continue with Heidegger. Was Debussy questioning Satie's commitment to the 'thingly'? For Heidegger, Works are 'things'. There is a 'thingly' element in works of art. [colour in painting, stone in sculpture]. But the work is more than the 'thingly'. It has an artistic 'nature': the aesthetic value is superimposed on it by our subjective views of it. The artwork is a thing that is made, but it says something other than the 'thing' itself, it is an allegory, a symbol [gk, *symballein* - to bring together]. It is the 'thingly' feature of the work that the artist 'makes' by his labours. For in the Trois Morceaux there are 'things' that show themselves [chords, durations, timbres] and there is the 'thing in itself' - things which do not appear [progressions, cadences]. Heidegger's 'thing' therefore designates everything that is not nothing. This 'thing', this 'form' is something around which properties are assembled: the core of things. [Gk. *hypokeimenon*]. For Heidegger the core was something at ground level . . the plan. It is these properties such as colour and texture that give things their consistency and quintessence, their sensuousness. This matter is encapsulated in the 'Form'. The Form has a consistency of matter: it is formed matter: it is what we see in something. But this thing-concept applies to nature and tools, not to Art. The thingly element in Art is the matter of which it consists.

The 'mere thing' has its quality of self-containment. 'Equipment' has both the qualities of self-containment and specific use. But the Artwork has neither of these qualities. By its very nature its boundaries lack self-conviction and its lack of 'specific use' is ingrained in its own texture, grain.

Heidegger then asks the question 'With what essence of what thing should a Greek Temple agree?' and follows this with 'Who could maintain the impossible view that the Idea of Temple is represented in the building? And yet, truth is set to work in such a work, if it is a work'

Heidegger paints, he sculpts this Temple before our very eyes, but at the same time as he *builds* this image, he questions its *foundations*, its right to lie on the earth . . . . **This Temple in a building** . . it is not representational, it is not a model, it is not an imitation . . . . . Heidegger separates the building, the form, from its function, its *toolness* . . . . . **a Greek Temple portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle . . . . Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground . . . . The Temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of the air. The Temple rests on the earth.** Then Heidegger adjusts himself. Adjusts his aspect. He resists the notion of the Temple coming to rest on the surface of the earth, but renames the surface, the planetary earth as the *shelter earth,* the earth that creates, supports, gives life to the arising structures and then gives them shelter when they return [to the fold]. The World and the Earth are contestants in this field. The world displays its clarity and openness, the earth conceals, shelters, attempts to draw the world into itself. The Temple straddles both worlds. The frontier bisects it, masking for a time its progress [a place of respite, the customs post?] The rising and the waning of the star-temple creates the unfolding, the foldliness, the foldly, the foldly returns to the fold [ly]. The Temple work standing out there on

this earth opens up a world and at the same time sets the world back again on earth. And whereas in the case of fabricating equipment e.g. an axe, the stone is used, and used up, disappearing into its own usefulness [and the material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists vanishing in the equipmental being of the equipment], the Temple does not cause the material to disappear. It displays it. It allows it to be seen. The Temple is in the earth : rises above it : descends back into it. It promotes, displays the earth : it allows the earth to speak, to be seen. The Temple presses downwards and shows its heaviness to the earth. The earth though cannot be destroyed: the earth is always 'closed up': it is 'self-secluding'.

The Temple. This Temple. The event of the Temple. The Temple in motion. Heidegger talks about motion : rest is the opposite of motion and only what is in [has been] in motion can rest. Rest can include motion : there is a rest which includes an inner concentration of motion, inside of which exist a multiplicity and variety of inflections which produce' events' or 'vibrations' with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples. These do not move to a rational or 'philosophical' plan, but they radiate and disseminate in a topography of experience composed of units that are neither logical or organic, that is, neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality; nor formed or prefigured by those units in the course of a logical development or of an organic evolution.

Chapter 2   copies

On Satie's death his friends visited his apartment. No one had ever been invited there. He had a single room. A bed, a wardrobe and a set of drawers. On the top of the wardrobe were nine cardboard boxes. In each was an identical brown corduroy suit, unworn, unpacked. Satie had worn the tenth for the last twenty years of his life.

Let us use this divagation to initiate the subject of hierarchies. The archetype and the copy. These copies are kept in 'space'. A divine artificer copies these in different places, therefore creating many things from the same form [printing / moulding / casting] Redit . . . . . redire . . . . reduit . . . . [tiny room, {niche/chine}] . . . . cliché, ...overexposure / the trite / the stereotype [from French, from *clicher* to

stereotype; imitative of the sound made by the matrix when it is dropped into molten metal]. [ ] The making of the 'master', either through the cutting [the actual cutting] through of the metal or by the dissolving [etching, dissolution] in the acid. The master is formed, or the form (image) is mastered. Alloy, zinc, lead, leather, rubber, the image if formed through these materials. The developing process [a misnomer: the process only offers a change in circumstance], a process of a chemical development mirrors perhaps Satie's non developmental compositional processes. Both in black and white, blanc et noir, the double negative. As the chemicals attack the paper surface [seen/scene in/of red light] the image comes into physical and visual being simultaneously. The hardness or softness of the grain, [the conduit of the grain as the grain pours through the differences]. This graininess, this complicated process of gradual surface deterioration destroys the naturalness, the absence of time provokes the narrative and lets in all the possibilities of the image. It is limited, it is inside itself, there is no place for itself outside the process. The negative is also a mirror image - there is always the surprise in this, the surprising surprise in renegotiating the image, reliving the distances calculating, placing, distancing the incidents in/of the image. The pleasure of this recalling. Disclosing, unfolding. Strictly speaking in geometrical terms there is the development of a shape - the projection or rolling out onto a plane without stretching or shrinking any element. Against this there is the development of the 'piece' the bringing into play from its initial position on the back rank. And lastly, obsolescent in its waiting, the Old French *desveloper* - to unwrap, to reveal, layer by layer the imitation, the mimicry, the counterfeit . . . . .

The master is formed	the image is mastered.
The form is mastered	the master is imagined

. . . . the transcript, abundance and, later, power, wealth. Abundance translates as copious. Richness as opulence. Copious; copyist; copyright - eventually the exclusive right to copy - a discouragement of meanings, an enjoyment of descriptions and copyings which eventually descend into the banal and the 'stupid'. Objects too have this inherent stupidity. They have no organisation, only order/disorder. They have presence, but they prove nothing. Lists exude authority: the possible privileges resulting from inclusion, the possible disaster of omission. Lists suggest realism, they point metaphor to the extremities, they provide a set of pieces for the 'audience' to move around without any preconditions or expectations. These lists slow down the narrative, at times to the point where the names are becalmed in a mirror image of themselves. Extremes to not meet in some dramatic mêlée, they rather cancel each other out. This attention to details, to minutiae,

categories, parallels those of the abortive suicide who wishes so much to be seen to want to die. Flaubert

allows 'little' metaphors to develop inside these listings 'in the real world distinctions have little force, it is a literary deceit that they do', and it is in these little metaphors that the pairs are born. As time begins to falter, the reader/observer begins to write their own sub-lists, to rearrange things, say, alphabetically [encyclopaedia], temporally, in terms of colour, texture, politics. Listings turn out to be arbitrary in their very earnestness. This splitting up of otherwise rational events deprives objects of their meaning and creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion, justified by pointless acts of organisation. And as we strip away the meaning from the signs we set the objects free and leave openings, fissures, where the [common - place] becomes the emblematic.

Boupéc's vasculum

copy (χοπψ) archetype, carbon copy, imitation, counterfeit, duplicate, facsimile, forgery, image, imitation, likeness, model, pattern, photocopy, Photostat (Trademark), print, replica, replication, representation, reproduction, transcription, Xerox (Trademark). an imitation or reproduction of an original. The imitation or reproduction always has less

authority, legally, visually, socially, economically. a single specimen of something that occurs in a multiple edition, such as a book, article, etc. ◆ copy as in series of articles *copied, made* into a collection, an edition. Limited edition, an end to copying marked by the defacement of the printing plate ◆ [legal] An exact copy of the <u>sense</u>, the <u>meaning</u>. This may well be done in different 'hands' but the wording must be exact. The 'look', paper, ink, watermarking, style, may be completely different. When brought into the world it affects the quality of the 'original'. The 'original' is then renamed the 'first'. ◆ a model to be copied. ◆ model. duplicate, photocopy, Photostat (Trademark), replicate, reproduce, transcribe, Xerox (Trademark). Copy, dummy, facsimile, image, imitation, miniature, mock-up, replica, representation. Archetype, design, epitome, example, exemplar, gauge, ideal, lodestar, mould, original, paradigm, paragon, pattern, prototype, standard, type. Poser, sitter, subject. Mannequin. Configuration, design, form, kind, mark, mode, style, type, variety, version. Base, carve, cast, design, fashion, form, mould, pattern, plan, sculpt, shape, display, show off, sport, copy, dummy, facsimile, imitation, miniature. ◆ Modelling, the act of copying. But also the act of forming the likeness through the fingers, not copying from an existent object, but imitating the vision that the artist already has as a concept. The continual vibratory mediation between that concept and the reality as it unfolds. ◆ A model in the sense of a precedent. A representative form, style, or pattern. Errorless, a model exists in the sense of a mould, a shape empowered by its potential for creating infinity. A model too in its suggestion of perfection (model student), in the sense of a universal model, but also as an icon, a model to aspire to, something that is unique. Model, as in perfection. The ultimate manifestation of a construction, but not a model in the sense of a copy of an object that exists, but a copy of an amalgam of different objects of different scales. An object so perfect that it only exists as a copy. Model, as in perfection. The ultimate manifestation of a construction, but not a model in the sense of a copy of an object that exists, but a copy of an amalgam of

different objects of different scales. An object so perfect that it only exists as a copy. ◆ a representation, usually on a smaller scale, of a device, structure, etc. ◆ a preparatory sculpture in clay, wax, etc., from which the finished work is copied. As in ratios and relationships. The model is rarely a model in all aspects - size, weight, thicknesses. Model often means 'analogue'. Reality is always suspended/ignored so we can celebrate the obvious ◆ a standard to be imitated - convention. social standing, copying good behaviour patterns. A potential 'code' ◆ a person who poses for a sculptor, painter, or photographer. The word 'pose' indicates [through possibly the homonym 'poseur', the superficial and transient. The expectation or suggestion that the 'model' as in 'life model' is itself a stand-in, a substitute for another reality, that being the 'model' in a pose, as distinct from a model who will match the already imagined likeness. The artefact is the real model ◆ Duplicate. corresponding, identical, matched, matching, twin, twofold, carbon copy, clone, copy, double, facsimile, likeness, look- alike, match, mate, replica, reproduction, ringer twin, Xerox, clone, copy, double, echo, photocopy ◆ copied exactly from an original. Identical. Existing as a pair or in pairs : twofold. An exact copy : a double. Something additional or supplementary of the same kind. To reproduce by dividing into two identical parts ◆ Duplication suggests the existence of an exact replica, where the word 'making' is sous rature, a process left out of the imagination so that no imperfections could occur through it. Two exact copies (in the phrase 'in duplicate') : the chromosomes duplicated in mitosis.

[C15: from Latin *duplicare* to double, from duo two + *plicare* to **f**old] ◆

clone a group of organisms or cells of the same genetic constitution that are descended from a common ancestor by asexual reproduction, as by cuttings, grafting, etc. in plants ◆ a person or thing bearing a very close resemblance to another person or thing. to produce near copies (of a person or thing). [C20: from Greek *klan* twig, shoot; related to *klan* to break] ◆ double a duplicate or counterpart. a person who closely resembles another; understudy. an actor who plays two parts in one play ◆ The 'Double' only applies to aspects of the character. In fact it is not the character that makes the double, it is the appearance, though this

appearance can also be said to relate to the character of the person portrayed in the sense that their reaction to another person should involve a physical action commensurate with that of the aforementioned ◆ Ape. Skt. *kapi kampi* from Skt. to tremble, vibrate. reminder, emulate, follow, imitate, mimic, mirror, parrot, repeat, simulate. ◆ 'Aping' encourages the thought of an 'approximation', an inexact copy. A paradox. The notion of the single, exact copy is compromised, opening up the possibility for discourse. *Aping* suggests a derogatory intention, an in-built criticism of copying. ◆ cliché banality, bromide, chestnut, commonplace, hackneyed phrase, old saw, platitude, stereotype, truism ◆ a word or expression that has lost much of its force through overexposure, an idea, action, or habit that has become trite from overuse - that is also true of the word itself [C19 from French, *clicher* to stereotype; imitative of the sound made by the matrix when it is dropped into molten metal]. The making of the 'master'. Either through the cutting [the actual cutting] through of the metal or by the dissolving [etching, dissolution] in the acid. The master is formed, or the form (image) is mastered. Alloy, zinc, lead, leather, rubber, the image if formed through these ◆ parrot copycat imitator, (little) echo, mimic. parrot-fashion. By rote, mechanically, mindlessly copy to repeat or imitate mechanically without understanding. [C16: probably from French paroquet] . . . . . anagram raptor another name for bird of prey. [C17: from Latin: plunderer, from *rapere* to take by force] ◆ echo A nymph who, spurned by Narcissus, pined away until only her voice remained. the reflection of sound or other radiation by reflecting medium, esp. a solid object. the sound so reflected. A repetition or imitation, esp. an unoriginal reproduction of another's opinions. something that evokes memories, esp. of a particular style or era. An effect that continues after the original cause has disappeared; repercussion: Every manifestation dilutes the subject of the echo. Every manifestation also distorts both the content and the direction to the next reflector. Any one reflector will only be a reflector because of the effect of the last ◆ facsimile an exact copy or reproduction. An image produced by facsimile transmission. Xerox, photocopy. A copy as an image produced by light and magnetism. A shadow. To make an exact copy of. [C17: from Latin *fac simile* make something like it, from *facere* to make + *similis* . to copy exactly, to imitate, hence to feign]. Also *simulacrum*. a painted or sculptured representation, an image, hence a spectre or phantom. *Assimilare*. to bring together, to *assemble*, later MF-F *assemblage* ◆ counterfeit copy,

fabricate, fake, feign, forge, imitate, impersonate, pretend, sham, simulate. bogus, copied, ersatz, faked, false, feigned, forged, fraudulent, imitation, phoney. Counterfeit not just in the sense of fake, but also in the sense of the credo, logic being insincere. The purposeful distortion by the author hiding, crouching behind mimesis, challenging the original, forcing the original to justify its stature. Setting up a corridor of indecision between similars. C13: from OF. *contrefait*, from *contrefaire* to copy, from *contre-* COUNTER- + *faire* to make, from Latin *facere*] counterfeiter . To imitate unfairly. [C14: from Medieval Latin c *pia* an imitation, something copied, from Latin: abundance, riches, COPIOUS] . Can the act of imitation itself be unfair? Do some images, ideas have a right to remain pure, unadulterated, or must these have always been counterfeits themselves. Is there ever an original? ◆ Dupe to deceive, esp. by trickery; make a dupe or tool of; cheat; fool. From late EF.F *duperie*, *duper*, to trick. MF. *duppe*, a gamester's victim, from *d'uppe*, F.*hoopoe*, a stupid-looking bird. L. *ulula*, screech-owl ◆ Plagiarism appropriate, borrow, crib [cribbage, *crib. the* discarded store of cards] infringe, lift [elevate away], pirate, steal, thieve ◆ to reproduce other's work with or without their permission and to pass it off as one's own for profit or aggrandisement ◆ commonplace common, customary, everyday, humdrum, obvious, ordinary, pedestrian, stale, threadbare, trite, uninteresting, widespread, worn out. banality, cliché, platitude, truism. dull and obvious; trite remark; platitude; truism. : translation of Latin *locus communis* argument of wide application, translation of Greek *koinos topos*] ◆ list catalogue, directory, file, index, inventory, invoice, leet (Scot.), listing, record, register, roll, schedule, series, syllabus, tabulation, tally. bill, book, catalogue, enrol, enter, enumerate, file, index, itemise, note, record, register, schedule, set down, tabulate, write down. cant, careen, heel, heel over, incline, lean, tilt, tip, [C17: from French, compare Italian *lista* list of names (earlier: border, strip, as of paper), Old High German *lista* border] a liking or desire. [Old English *lystan*; related to Old High German *lusten* and Gothic *luston* to desire] an archaic or poetic word for listen.[Old English *hlystan*, related to Old Norse *hlusta*] ◆ material the substance of which a thing is made or composed; component or constituent matter: raw material. facts, notes, etc., that a finished work may be based on or derived from: enough material for a book cloth or fabric. concerned with physical rather than spiritual interests ◆ table flat horizontal slab or board supported by one or more legs, on which objects may be . such a piece of

furniture specially designed for any of various purposes:a backgammon table; bird table. any flat or level area, such as a plateau. an arrangement of words, numbers, or signs, usually in parallel columns, to display data or relations: to enter in or form into a list; tabulate.[C12: via Old French from Latin tabula a writing tablet] ◆ tableau pause during or at the end of a scene on stage when all the performers briefly freeze.[C17: from French, from Old French tablel a picture, diminutive of TABLE] ◆ tableau vivant a representation of a scene, painting, sculpture, etc., by a person or group posed silent and motionless.[C19: literally: living picture]

Repetition has two gifts. The true repetition of the non-exchangeable and the non-substitutable singularities - reflections, echoes, doubles, and the general repetition of 'cycles', of similarites. Cycles allow exchange and substitution, the easy, legitimate transport of material across the framing. Repetition on the other hand, will not support this economy. Gift, theft, gratuity, purloining [*porloigner*, to put at a distance] : these are words to represent repetition.

All these gifts to repetition are filtered through irony and humour. Irony appears as an art of principles, of an ascent towards these principles and of their consequent overturning. Humour is an art of consequences and descents, of suspensions and falls. By adopting the law, a falsely submissive soul manages to evade it and to taste pleasures it was supposed to forbid. Repetition belongs to humour and irony [1]; it is by nature transgression or exception, always revealing a singularity opposed to the particulars subsumed under laws, a universal opposed to the generalities which give rise to laws.

Repetition is for itself. Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it. Hume, in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, implies the independence of each presentation that One instance does not appear until the last one has disappeared. Hence there is no 2nd, 3rd, or 'the same'. AB, AB, AB, A . . . each AB is separate from the others and each AB is still identical. But repetition does set up an expectancy in the mind, the hint of the possibility of difference. Habit draws

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[1]   According to Marx, repetition is comic when it falls short - that is, when instead of leading to metamorphosis and the production of something new, it forms a kind of involution, the opposite of authentic creation. Comic travesty replaces tragic metamorphosis. However, it appears that for Marx this comic or grotesque repetition necessarily comes after the tragic, evolutive and creative repetition ['all great events and personages occur, as it were, twice . . .the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.']. This is not wholly correct. Comic repetition works by some defect in the 'past properly'.

difference [generality] from repetition. Habit is contraction [to *contract* a habit]. Repetition depends too on contemplation : we speak of our 'self' only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party which says 'me'. Contemplation is always hidden, it has no action in itself, things are done through it. There is the question of difference : Repetition lies between two differences : the repetition allows the passage from one system of difference to another. Repetition demands need. The duration of a presentation is dependent on the natural decrement of its material. Fatigue is a real component of contemplation. Need marks the limits of the variable present. The present exists between two instances of need, and is the duration of a contemplation. Repetition is *inside* need, as need only exists through repetition. Repetition is seen through natural and artificial signs. Natural signs are founded on passive synthesis. They are signs of the present. Artificial signs are those which refer to the past or the future as distinct dimensions of the present, dimensions on which the present may depend. Artificial signs imply active synthesis - the passage from spontaneous imagination to reflective representation, memory and intelligence. But though Repetition is experiences through reflection, Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection.

of re**P**etitions.

P   a intracyclic repetition. The   <u>manner</u> in which the two events repeat one another - or, rather, repeat the same act or event to come.

P   a cyclic repetition, which supposes that at the end of the repetition, everything recommences with the first stage. analogies are drawn between the two phases.

P   plays the role of the signified in relation to the other two. The first two states only repeat something that appears *for itself* in the third stage, where this 'thing' repeats itself.

The present is the repeater : the past is repetition itself : the future is that which is repeated, having subordinated the other two, stripping them of their autonomy.

Hume explains that independent identical or similar cases are grounded in the imagination. The imagination retains the image of the previous case as the new one appears. It is able to gather cases and compress their memory into states of being which give off a particular 'aroma'. The latest B is anticipated to contain the nature of previous Abs - not in the sense of memory or reflection, merely as a synthesis of time. Time in the sense of the repetition of instants, of Deleuzian events [site9] which constitute the present, and where the past belongs to the present, the preceding instants are retained in a 'remainder' , where the future belongs to the present and expectation is anticipated in this remainder. In fact, a state where the past and future are not different instants from the present instants - they are contractions of them. *Aperçus désagréables* is the scene of all these repetitions, their families, rhythms, displacements and disguises, their divergences and decenterings. It is the arena in which they unfold and indoctrinate one another. It does not imitate, it repeats : it repeats all the repetitions : it promotes imitation as copy, art is simulation, simulacra even. Even in the most banal repetition a difference can be found.

Chapter 3   Emblems and Devices

The origins of devices[1] probably date from Renaissance times and were simple messages formed on shields and armour to frighten the enemy and serve as rallying cries and morale boosters. They were also used as ways of recognising military groupings and Roman medals have also been found with similar signs.

......for the Device is nothing else than a symbolic representation of a purpose, a wish, a line of conduct (*impresa* is what one intends to *imprendre*, i.e. to undertake - the express intention of an undertaking, which in itself solicits a challenge) by means of a motto and a picture which reciprocally interpret each other[2]. The defining of the exact nature of the device has always been a scene of argument.

> Many fine talents have considered the devices worthy of their erudite labours, and some of them have expounded them with far too minute and subtle speculations, as if they were toiling over a very obscure passage in Aristotle or as if they were busy over one of the weightiest and deepest sciences: perhaps they laboured therein more than the matter permitted, for the device is, in conclusion, nothing more than an invention of our mind, witty certainly, but slight, and so condensed that usually it consists of the drawing together of one or two objects and as many words [3]

and

> And since poetry and painting are sister arts born at one birth, just as poetry began with the words to explain those fictions, so painting began

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[1] The OF. *devise* has several meanings: *Devise, deviser, devis, from* L. *divido* , VL. *dividare*, meaning 'separate', 'distribute' or 'distinguish'. **Devis** indicated separation, postponement, wish, description or manner, **Devise** indicated separation, division, difference, description, custom , fashion or intention. A device could also be a will or testament.

[2] P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory   p. 11   KTO 1979   [M. Praz Studies in 17th Century Imagery,   p. 58   Rome 1964]

[3] D. S. Russell   The Emblem and Device in France. p. 42   French Forum, 1985   [F. M. Trivulzio   Discourso intorno alle Impresse   Naples 1731]

subsequently to paint many things, which seemed monstrous, but which concealed in themselves many fine secrets ... When I said, then, that the device is a philosophy of the knight, I meant, that just as a philosopher began to cloak with fables his marvellous and divine secrets in order to be understood by some but not by all, so the knight had recourse to the fiction of the device to make manifest his meaning to some but not to all. The one used words, the other things.[4]

An element of surprise was considered essential in the formation of devices. Objects had to be rare, exotic, grotesque, locations unusual and recently discovered, such as, for example, Africa and Ethiopia. Rarity was de rigueur. Phonetic decoration [Mantocore, Catoblepas] was an important feature too, seen especially in the taste for using slightly differing meanings of words[5]. The continual repetition of similar material reduces the complexity of the natural world to a series of exquisitely differentiated surfaces. These gradations or degrees of difference, which the word 'nuance' conveys so succinctly, can be conceived as sufficiently perceptible for cognition, but yet still capable of being understood as the intangible and indefinable quality of 'je ne sais quoi'. This interest in decoration can also be noted in the poetry of Baltasar Gracián and his contemporaries whose aesthetic aims were to produce order out of the chaos of the real world. The poems often contain words connected with precious stones and metals, hard, durable minerals. Decorum[6], the need for clarity and nobility is an opposition. Each must not dominate each other: but this is not the same as balance.

Baltasar Gracián's *'The Mind's Wit'* - *'Agudeza Arte de Ingenio en que Explican todos los Modos y Diferencias de Conceptos'* - (Wit and the Art of Ingenuity. In Which are Explained all Manner and Differences of Conceits) brings together three related concepts of Agudeza, Ingenio and Concepto. Gracián never gives a definition of Agudeza. Perhaps as in the previously cited case of 'subtlety of ingenuity' plus 'art', Agudeza can be taken as 'keenness', 'sharpness', not necessarily of an intellectual nature, but more in a sense of the beauty and elegance which is perceived as the conceit is read Judicio (judgement) is satisfied with truth, whereas ingenio (understanding) is satisfied with beauty. Concepto, the conceit, consists of an agreeable relation between two or more knowable extremes, expressed by the understanding. Comparisons are drawn, terms

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[4]   D. S. Russell   The Emblem and Device in France. p. 42   French Forum   1985   [S.Ammirato Il Rota, ovvero dell' Impress Naples 1562]

[5]   E.W. Bulatkin   The French Word 'Nuance'   pp. 266-271   PMLA LXX 1955

[6]   *Decorum*, decorated, the place [topoi] between decorum and commonplace [C.16th Latin]

brought face to face, the subject with its adjunct or the adjuncts among themselves, until a suitable relationship is found and worked into the context [7].

Gracián's work consists of a series of 'discourses' in which he attempts to categorise Agudeza. The first fifty discourses discuss the nature of Agudeza incompleja (simple wit), the basis of the whole treatise. These are the main classifications of simple wit [8].

Agudeza de perspicacia	wit via perspicaciousness	wit which expresses truth
Agudeza de artificio	wit via artifice	an abstract form of wit
Agudeza de conceptos	wit via conceits	wit which concentrates on the subtlety of the thought rather than the word
Agudeza	verbal wit	wit deriving from puns and plays on words
Agudeza de acción	wit via action	wit through clever and contrived situations
Agudeza de correspondencia	wit via correspondences	wit found in comparisons
Agudeza de contrariedad	wit via opposites	wit produced by antithetical figures of speech
Agudeza pura	pure wit	wit with only one subtle idea
Agudeza mixta	mixed wit	wit in a type of conceit which contains three or four subtle thoughts
Agudeza incompleja	simple wit	wit attained by two or three witty devices within a simple conceit like an epigram or sonnet

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[8] V.R. Foster   Baltasar Gracián   p.30   Boston 1975

Agudeza compuesta	compound wit	wit found in a series of conceits or in an extended metaphor or allegory
Discourses 6-8		look at how awe, admiration, curiosity incite wonderment.
Discourse 5.		juxtaposition of contrary terms leads to wit. Conceits are produced from 'correlation of contraries' which is a type of literary perfection'. La luz con la luz ciega' ('Light seeing with blind light') from the conceit of Juan de Valdes exemplifies the practice of inverting thoughts. e.g. profane love, capricious fortune. Conceits by dissimilarities - Góngora excels at these, - 'desemejanza' sonnet, panegyric epigram sermon emblem, *crisi* and riddle. Paradoxes are 'monsters of truth' because they are structured on opinion not truth.
Discourse 12		sententious similarity. This type of simile is 'a useful morality' The Horatian doctrine of dulce et utile.
Discourse 17		parallel structures. One series of phenomena is juxtaposed with another [aspects of nature / woman's body]. also, transforming one object into its contrary. Ingeniosas transposiciones. (ingenious transpositions)
Discourse 20		hyperbole based on quandaries adages, puzzles and difficult and exaggerated ideas.
Discourse 29, 30.		deal with overstatement and hyperbole. Overstatement brings the concept of the marvellous and fantastic, the glittering. Sententious wit is deemed the most superior.
Discourses 39 & 40		contradictory statements, usually introduced by a question.
Discourse 44		suspense and surprise, the building of tension with anticipated release

3

processes.

surprise, wonder, perplexity, indirect procedure, based on abstract and sophisticated thought

'Compound wit' exists in two modes, and their are two species of compounds. The first species is that which is composed of simple conceits, such as three or four proportions, three or four quandaries, parallels etc., unified amongst themselves, which make their play through correspondence. The second is a compound by means of fiction, such as epics, continued allegories, dialogues, etc.

Adverbs and adjectives were combined in expressions such as 'facilmente dificultoso' - 'easily difficult', and 'valorosamente religioso' 'bravely religious' . Or in other cases two adjectives with no connection were combined (asyndeton), 'soberana callada majestad' - (sovereign silent majesty), 'aquella infinita increada belleza' (that infinite uncreated beauty), - and with compound nouns   in 'iniverso espejo' (universe-mirror). The obsessional nature of this systematising, an analysis which takes on an   effect of embellishment is entwined with its own critique. The use of metaphor is a way of producing a brilliant 'éclat' rather than exploring any underlying depth of argument or of supporting a strong sense of narrative.

Giovio's [9] five requirements for a successful device were

| 1 | that the device should have just proportion between the body (that is, the picture) and the soul (the motto). |

| 2 | that it should not be so obscure as to need the Sibyl [10] for its interpreter, nor so transparent that every mean mechanic might understand it. |

| 3 | that above all it should make a fine show, that is, represent things pleasing to the eye, such as stars, fire, water, trees, instruments, fantastic animals and birds. |

| 4 | that the human figure should not appear therein. |

| 5 | that the motto which is its soul should be in a different language from that of the author of the device, so that the sentiments should be |

9   D. S. Russell   The Emblems and Device in France p. 39   French Forum   1985   [P.Giovio Diagolo delle Imprese   Naples   1574]

11   Sibyl (in ancient Greece and Rome) any of a number of women believed to be oracles or prophetesses, one of the most famous being the sibyl of Cumae, who guided Aeneas through the underworld. Also, a witch, fortune-teller, or sorceress.[C13: ultimately from Greek *Sibulla*, of obscure origin]

somewhat more concealed, and that the motto should be brief but not so much so as to be obscure and misleading.

There was much controversy at the time over the admissibility of various images. Some critics maintained that objects which were not found in the countries of the user should not be used. Torquato Tasso [11], for example, disagreed, but did concede the requirement that the animals, birds etc. chosen for the device should actually exist. Scipione Bargagli [12] insists that there can be no room for mere fiction and that Devices must be capable of explanation and authentication, but adds that if, at a later date the author finds that his material is in fact inaccurate, he should suffer no blame. Tasso also insists that the thoughts behind devices should be 'noble', and that 'not every kind of thought, nor all souls' could be expressed. The authors also had a duty to depict their subjects behaving and appearing in the best possible manner.

In the fifteenth chapter of *Tesauro's Cannochaille Aristotelico, Idea dell' Argutezze eroiche vulgarmente chiamate Imprese* he reinforces this and gives the example of Louis XII's device as a perfect example.

Louis XII's porcupine device [P. Giovio, *Dialogo dell'Imprese*, 1574, p. 26]
                'A living and flying arsenal . . . . . so that if you were to see a living porcupine
                wield his horrible weapons with such art, you would remain astonished and
                dismayed'

11   D. S. Russell   The Emblems and Device in France   p. 40   French Forum 1985
        [Ercole Tasso Della realtà e perfezione delle impresse   Bergamo 1612]
12   D. S. Russell   The Emblems and Device in France p. 40   French Forum   1985
        [Scipione Bargagli Schietto accademico Intronato]

Tasso [13] disagrees

First of all it is not based on a perfect metaphor of proportion. For although man and the porcupine are beings of a different nature, nevertheless the action of wounding is no property of likeness between truly analogous kinds, such as serenity of the sun and the serenity of peace, sharpness of the sword and sharpness of wit; but it is the property of the same physical nature: like wounding with an arrow and wounding with a sword. Moreover the property of wounding near and afar is not a quality proper to the porcupine, since the same motto may be written about the javelin, the arquebus, and above all Archimedes' engine, which (as we said) wounded near and afar. So that one may have painted that very engine celebrated by Livy, with the same words Eminus et Cominus. Finally, a great defect lies in the body of the device, since it does not represent a noble object, which could worthily be applied to the person after the fashion of metaphors. Since the French name of the animal is *porcespic*, i.e. porcupine, and Claudian himself gives this description.

os longius illi
assimilat pocum, mentitæ cornua setæ

it did not seem very dignified to make this metaphorical proposition: King Louis is a porcupine, just as one would say : Achilles is a Lion.

The name 'Emblem' [14] was first used by Alciati [15] who saw emblems as an attempt to develop a modern equivalent to the hieroglyphs [as they were at that time wrongly interpreted as ideographic rather than phonetic]. Miedema found that the original Greek meaning of '*Emblema*' was 'mounted or inserted piece'. In Classical Latin it was a technical term which referred to inlaid decorative work such as mosaic [16]. Authors such as Lucilius, Cicero and Quinitilan used the word to characterise speeches with complex arguments, and

13   D. S. Russell   The Emblems and Device in France   p. 73   French Forum   1985[Emanuel Tesauro Il Cannocialle Arostotelico Venice 1655]

14   Hessel Miedema   The term *Emblema* in Alciati   Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 31 (1968) pp. 234-50

15   Henry Green   Andrea Alciati and his Books of Emblems   London, Trübner & Co.   1872

16   D. S. Russell   The Emblems and Device in France   p. 76   French Forum   1985   [F. Budé   Annotationes ad Pandectas 1508]

later as decorative rhetorical embellishments. In 17th century France 'emblème' was used to mean 'pièce rapportée' . Alciati defined the relationship between Emblems and epigrams as . . . . . .

Emblems are things (representations of objects) which illustrate a conceit:

Epigrams are words (a conceit) which illustrate objects (such as a work of art, a votive offering, a tomb).

Russell, writing in 1985 defines emblems as,

'a way of presenting and communicating moral commonplaces, doctrinal principles. political propaganda, alchemical recipes, philosophical ideas through the combination of discursive text with a psuedo-ideogrammatic code of a non-linguistic nature' [17].

Other commentators' definitions stress the differences in importance they give to each facet of the Emblem. Heckscher and Wirth's definition states

'In the emblem one is dealing with the combination of the word of the lemma with the picture of the icon which produces an enigma, the resolution of which is made possible by the epigram' [18].

Liselotte Diekmann's definition is more flexible,

'The picture is not an illustration of the text, nor the text an explanation of the picture: their purpose is the mutual elucidation of an idea [19].

Schöne's definition is broader than Heckscher and Wirth's:

the function of the individual parts of the emblem is a 'dual function of representation and interpretation'.

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[17] D. S. Russell   The Emblem and Device in France. P.164 French Forum,   1985

[18] P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory KTO 1979   [see Reallexikon zur Kunstgeschichte Vol 5, Coll.95 Stuttgart 1959]

[19] see Comparative Literature, IX (1957), P313

A Greek manuscript of the *Hieoglyphica*[20] was a great influence on the Florentine humanists led by Marsilo Ficino, a contemporary of Botticelli. Alciati published his first book of Emblems, *Emblematum Liber*, in 1531. It was illustrated with woodcuts and was reprinted in Paris in 1534, in Venice in 1546, and in Lyons in 1551. This later edition incorporated the large decorative borders which characterise many Emblem books. Pierio Valeriano published *Hieroglyphia sive de sacris_Aegyptiorum aliarumque gentium literis* in 1556. Valeriano's book shows how hieroglyphs were combined to the symbolism of medieval bestiaries and lapidaries, and of the *Physiologus* (Epiphanius) a collection of symbols suggested by animals. The use of emblems also spread as collections of proverbs and maxims such as Cato's *Moral Distichs* and Erasmus's *Adagia* were published.

Early emblem books were anthologies of short, memorable, and often highly condensed sayings describing some commonplace fact of experience, presented in a new visual format. The message often presented itself as a wise saying or admonition intending to provide guidance. The messages are not complex in their ambitions and are 'fragmentary' in their relationships with each other. The books have a feeling of 'manuals' and textbooks. The function of the book was to portray its format. The books were very popular as 'pattern books' for decorative work, and the bilingual ones were used for language learning. Many extant copies have had pages removed, and many too have had pages annotated, so they seem to have been used very much in everyday life. Later 17th century books tended to have a greater sense of unity or suggestions of a narrative running through the pages, and the surviving ones are usually intact.

The emblem, a combination of graphic and text, has a three-part form.

inscriptio
pictura
subscriptio

The *subscriptio*'s function is to resolve the enigma produced by *inscriptio* and the *pictura*.

The *inscriptio* is a short heading, in Latin, Greek or the vernacular which quotes classical authors, the Bible or proverbs. It often manifests itself as a maxim or challenge. The inscriptio can also anticipate the pictura by naming the image. It can therefore contribute to, or become part of, the pictura, though some critics claim that an inscriptio that merely names the pictura does not fulfil an emblematic function. This tension between meaning and function of the inscriptio is part of the art form of the emblem, it is a defining characteristic. This is seen in an exchange of letters between Jöns and Schöne on this matter:

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[20]   Horopollo or Horus Apollo   circa II-IV A.D.

Jöns

With respect to the heading, the motto, also called "lemma" or "inscriptio", Alciatus [21] often places over the picture only a simple heading such as 'In adulatories' with the chameleon or 'Imparilitas' with the falcon flying high above geese and ducks, instead of using a maxim. Headings of this kind, however, still contain an abstract meaning and thereby stand in a relationship of tension with the picture, that is, with the object represented. It is different with emblems, where Alciatus names the object of the heading.

Schöne replies:

'When Jöns defines the 'formal law' of the emblem as 'a relationship of tension between the pictora and meaning, deriving from the tendency towards enigma,' he assumes (together with *Heckscher and Wirth, V, 88ff.*) that the emblem addresses to its reader/viewer an (unspoken) riddle, concerning the relationship of the aphorism communicated by the motto to the subject actually shown in the picture, and he assumes further that the subscriptio solves this riddle: 'Between the heading and the picture existed a more or less hidden relationship in terms of meaning, which the epigram clarified.' Where the motto now names the subject portrayed in the picture and supplies no explanation, he sees 'the dissolution of the specific art form of the emblem'

At force here are two parallel tensions. The relationship between the inscriptio and pictura, which is solved in the subscriptio, and the riddle of/inside the pictura itself.
The content of the *pictura* can include for example, Egyptian hieroglyphs, classical cameos and sculptures, Roman coins and medallions, medieval bestiaries and herbiaries, works of Renaissance artists, the Bible and classical mythology, poetry, history, biology, fables, anecdotes, proverbs, the observation of nature and human life.

There is no doubt that the picture is the central and primary incident in the Emblem, though the reader's perception of the relative importance of the three parts does not necessarily coincide with the emblemist's own order of importance or order of creation. In many cases the emblemist would have been stimulated by

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[21]   P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory   p.44   KTO press 1979   [Andrea Alciati
        Emblematum Liber   Augsburg   1531]

the particular abstract qualities inherent in the image, in others by the inferences that could be drawn, the possibilities of secret meanings, satire. The *pictura* depicts what exists or that which it can only possibly exist.

Schöne asserts that the picture is the central feature in the emblem, what he calls 'the priority of the picture'. This is true whether the emblemist places the *subcriptio* above or below the *pictura*, and even gains priority over the interpretation of the *subscriptio*. This opinion is very much taken from the view of the reader, but the emblemist too seems to have been often stimulated by a picture in the first case, seeing in it possibilities to refer beyond itself. There are accounts of both the epigram or the picture being the original point of departure. 'Facticity', as mentioned in regards to devices, was a continual arena of debate and argument. Schöne puts forward this list of potential subject matter

1. Nature, as verified by observation
2. Nature , not verifiable by observation, and 'untrue' in the scientific sense, e.g. exotic creatures whose existence was believed on the basis of received tradition.
3. Classical History
4. Classical Mythology, legend and allegory, believed on the basis of authority of the ancients.
5. Biblical information, including the miracles of the Old and New testaments, whose truth is a matter of faith and revelation.
6. Hieroglyphs and hieroglyphic combinations with little or no basis in reality, but with the status of hidden wisdom.

At that time, biblical accounts would have been treated as facts, but the case for including legends, mythology and allegory is less convincing. Facticity, though, was able to include hieroglyphics and images of a 'constructed' type - headless people, combinatory images and visual constructions which had symbolic meanings.

20

Dux, Vitam, bonus, et pro lege, et pro grege ponit.
Hæc veluti pullos sanguine spargit avis.

This emblem by Rollenhagen [22] depicts a Pelican feeding her young with her own blood, having ripped open her own breast. In the background groups of people collect Christ's blood in cups as he hangs from the cross. The epigram 'pro lege et pro grege' refers to the Prince who gives his life for his people, but the crucifixion scene in the *pictura* has a Christian meaning. The pelican must have been a well known sign for Christ's redemption in the early 17th century.

Scholars disagree on the exact nature of the *subscriptio*'s function. Schöne sees it as primarily interpretive.

. . . . Finally under the pictura there appears the subscriptio which explains and interprets that which is portrayed in the picture, and frequently extracts a piece of practical wisdom or a rule of conduct: for the most part an epigram of varying length, replaced in many emblem books by a prose of greater length. [23]

. . . . . The *subscriptio* can also participate in the *pictura* if the *inscriptio*'s epigram merely describes the picture or what is represented in the *pictura*.

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22   P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory   p. 38   KTO press 1979
     [Gabriel Rollenhagen   *Selectorum Embelatum Centuria Secunda*   Arnheim, 1613]

23   P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory   p. 38   KTO press 1979
     [Schöne, A   Emblematik und drama im zeitalter des Barock   2nd Ed. München 1968]

In a criticism of this Emblem by Wolfgang von Hohburg [24], Schöne writes,

. . .the *scriptiones* are fundamentally involved in the representation of the *res pictae*. The first two verses of the epigram describe what the following pair interprets: . . Here and in all the emblems the (Latin and Greek) *subscriptio* depicts the same thing that the *pictura* presents to the eye. On the other hand, with the plant emblems, the descriptive verses of the *subscriptio* make clear for the first time that which is referred to in the interpretative verses - certain characteristics of the plant's form, for instance its smell or taste and other qualities, possibilities of its technical, practical uses and especially often its medical effect.

The 'typological' mode is only one method of categorising Emblems. The 'mode of thought', or symbolic function of the Emblem can also be used as a criterion. The relationships between pictura and scriptura suggest three broad categories, the typological, the hieroglyphic and the allegorical. The subscriptio of Alciari's emblem 'Concordia' has the following text

crows are a peaceful and united species

The sceptre refers to the political power of the Prince, whose power in turn depends on the unity of his subjects. Alciati urges the Prince to take heed of this.

24   P. M. Daly   Emblem Theory   p. 38   KTO press 1979
[Hohlburg   Lust- und Arzney-Garten des Königlichen Propheten   Davids pp. 687]

Concordia.

Corniam mira inter se concordia uite est,
  Inq; uicem nunquam contaminata fides.
Hinc uolucres hae sceptra gerunt, q; scilicet omnes
  Consensu populi stantq; caduntq; duas:
Quem si de medio tollit, discordia praeceps
  Aduolat, er scamregua sua trahit.

The rectangle can be thought of as being a mirror in which the Prince would do well to contemplate his attitude to himself and others, and to compare them with the truth of the emblem which refers to virtues expected of the ideal Prince. The flock of birds has two functions. In a purely visual senseit links the central motif which is drawn in a flat, two dimensional style, with the three dimensional space suggested by the landscape. They symbolise unity and civil order. Daly points out the different ways that the same motif can be treated in typological or hieroglyphic conventions. This combination of sceptre and crow is described as 'inorganic' which he explains as 'not given in nature or the world of man'. They do not occur in any classical setting either. It is an invention created to convey the possibility of an idea. The combination of the crows and sceptre contribute to a 'frisson' which ripples across the page. This frisson is all the greater when the two objects have a neutral relationship to each other. The greater the divergence from similarity or opposition as other images are introduced, (which would create its own 'interest place'), the number of possibilities of interpretation increase, so eventually images must be introduced to tie down the meaning, to narrow the options for interpretation. This produces a continual referencing between the single motifs that are at the same time trying to discomfort the subscriptio.

pictura

CONCORDIA

subscriptio

Cornicum mira inter se concordia uitæ est,
Ihtȝ uicem nunquam contaminata fides.
Hinc u lucres has sceptra gerunt q scilicet omnes,
Consensu popul: ftantȝ; caduntȝ; duces.
Quem si de medio tollas dicordia præceps,
Aduolat & secum regia fata trahit.

A ✦

Erasmus was very critical of devices like the anchor and dolphin, since there was no natural relationship between the two objects. They were called artificial , and the term 'trespass' was used to describe them. The combining of natural objects was also frowned upon. The device of a tortoise with wings and a motto 'Amor Addidit' (love hath added them) was treated with repugnance, as were other 'fanciful' chimeras. Whereas poets were to be allowed a flexibility in their 'picture space', authors of devices were expected to be strict observers of truth, and to respect the inherent 'truths' of these qualities, and not to try to push them to their limits of their perceived potential. The perception of their sense had to be centralised in their own 'topio'. The author was not allowed to create interest in the device by seeking to sensationalise his material. In what could be called the 'allegorical mode', existing pictorial generalisations were used to illustrate general truths. T here is no dispute between text and picture. Classical personifications were often used to function as an allegory to illustrate a concept.

In uictoriam dolo partam.

Aiacis tumulum lachrymis ego perluo uirtus,
Heu misera albentes dilacerata comas.
Scilicet hoc restabat adhuc, ut iudice graeco
Vincerer, & caussa stet potiore dolus.

Andreas Alciatus *Emblematum liber*   (Paris 1542)

This emblem depicts a woman, 'Virtus' tearing her hair while sitting on the grave of Ajax. Virtus laments the victory of deceit over virtue. Classical motifs can be used in two ways. In a typological situation, the figure or incident must express several different meanings, but in an allegorical situation, the figure or incident, though particular and individual, must live in a truth of their own and represent an archetypal expression of personal experience known to mankind.

PRINCEPS SVBDITORVM
incolumitatem procurans.

Icuij quoties conturbant aequora fratres,
Tum miseros nautas anchora iacta iuuat,
Hanc pius erga homines Delphin complectitur imis,
Tutius ut possit figier illa uadis.
Quam decet haec memores gestare insignia reges,
Anchora q̃ nautis, se populo esse suo.

Andreas Alciatus, *Emblematum liber* (Augsburg 1531)

This image reinforces the notion that dolphins are man's benefactors. More natural than the Paris edition, but there is a contradiction between the pictura and the inscriptio - the latter referring to the dolphin's entanglement with the anchor as an aid to fixing on the sea-bed.
Whereas the Augsburg picture described the action in a realistic manner, the Paris version of the same scene is far more abstract and artificial, a tendency associated with the hieroglyph.

PRINCEPS.

Princeps fubditorum incolu-
mitatem procuráns.

Titanij quoties conturbant æquora fratres,
Tum miferos nautas anchora iacta iuuat.
Hanc pius erga homines Delphin cóplectitur:imis
Tutius ut possic figier illa vadis.
Quã decet hæc memores gestare insignia Reges?
Anchora quod nautis, se populo esse suos?

Andreas Alciatus, *Emblemato* (Lyons, 1551)
Illustration 16

Andreas Alciatus, *Emblemata* (Lyons, 1551)

More complex emblems have combinations of images and texts which blend different modes of thought. A first example is the one where the central motif is interpreted by a secondary image [see Concordia]. In several Emblem Books [25] the same central figure is in all the emblems, but each has a different motif, or set of motifs in the background which alters the sense of the subject in each emblem. Though these were not necessarily assembled in a particular order in the book, there must be the semblance of the beginnings of narrative, even if it is by default.

[25] for example, Pieter Hooft's Emblematum amatoria , Amsterdam 1611

E M B L E M A X V.

Dum tempus habemus operemur bonum ad omnes.

Galat.6.9.

Als wir nun Zeit haben/ so lasset uns gutes thun an jeder-
man.

Secla volant, abeuntque dies, operemur oportet
Cuique bonum, donec temporis hora vacat.

E 5   RE-

Daniel Cramer, *Decades quatuor emblematum sactum* (Frankfurt, 1617)

In the foreground of the *pictora*, the hourglass denotes 'time', the book 'the book of life' - life's actions - , the Heart represents the 'soul'. This constitutes an hieroglyphic arrangement of allegorical elements. The background is the sun, symbolic of power and life, the cloud suggests the transitory nature of man's time on earth, and the night sky with the stars and waning moon symbolise the passing of time and approaching death. The relationship of background to foreground is that of differences of perceived and available time, the expansion and contraction of time working through different agencies whose relationships and certainties between each other are irrational and chaotic. The subscriptio translates the pictures into words and extends the meaning by advising man to occupy himself with good works. Images placed in these 'backgrounds' - the word stands for the placement of the material in relationship to illusionistic space, not to the relative importance of meaning - often have a structural part to play, not only in their pictorial qualities (space etc.) but also in the transfer of meanings between the typological and the hieroglyphic.

There was a much greater similarity between the two forms in Italy than in France. The French device developed from military insignias and rebuses. Their messages owed more to the tradition of bestiaries, fables, and illustrated proverbs than to the classically inspired Italian version. The differentiation between these two forms was a popular field for intellectuals of the time to exhibit their powers of rhetoric, a typical mannerist trait affected by complex rules and observation of decorum. Bouhours [26] noted three principal differences

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26   D. S. Russell   The Emblem and Device in France. p. 44   French Forum, 1985
        [Dominique Bouhours   Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d' Eugene, (1734)   pp.348 - 372]

I   The Emblem can accommodate all kinds of subjects in the illustration, whether they be fabulous beasts, personifications, mythological heroes or allegorical composites, whereas all humans and unnatural creatures are excluded from the body of the device.

2   The text of the Emblem has a complete meaning and carries the entire meaning of the emblem; the motto of a device, on the other hand, may not provide any information that can be found in the illustration; it may not mention the name of the figure; it does not, therefore, contain the complete meaning of the device, and, indeed it may not contain *any* meaning.

3   The device deals with particular ideas, while the emblem is applicable to everyone.

Differences between Emblems and Devices can most easily be seen in three areas. Devices rarely contain human images, and describe limited fields of moral types, to be emulated or avoided, expressing moral exhortations of a specific kind but through the impersonal (vous, nous). They rarely express a particular idea concerning an individual or group. Emblems generally describe some aspect of Man and are usually expressed in the third person singular.

To an extent each of these was written for different audiences. Emblems were considered to be for 'ordinary' people, and were thought useful for disseminating the moral guidelines which were considered necessary (by the readers of devices) for such people to function in a given society. They were directed to the viewer, political in their dogmatising ambitions, and relied upon striking, clear-cut unambiguous signaling. They were pedagogic too, for example in their use of Latin. Devices, on the other hand were designed to be much more 'exclusive'. They flatter the receiver into thinking of them as a 'secret', a privacy given away, and a 'bond' forged between them and the donor . Devices deal in thought and are the extensions and articulations of the individual. They encourage a cultural apartheid in their desire only to be translated/understood by the 'educated'. Any hint of preaching or sententiousness would have seemed superfluous to such educated, and by assumption, moralistic society. Instead, the Device claimed a privileged position in its portrayal of the heroic, the role model of the intellectually mobile. The emblem has its title as a text, to be the spirit of the image, and the device contains the motto which gives only to its creator, who with a secret conception brought forth the picture.

The Device is always pure metaphor - there is a comparison between two things of different species which are linked through the genus of a single, prominent quality. Emblems work in a much more generalised,

symbolic way. Often, for example, the circumstance of a single figure will be expected to interpret the entire human condition. [synecdoche].

The possibilities inherent in the Emblem are that a single sign can expresses a complex of meanings. Pictorial expression is simultaneous, whereas verbal expression has a time lapse inside it. In descriptive passages, metaphors and narratives cannot be grasped in an instant - the reader must wait to the end to perceive and analyse the whole. This period of cognition can also heighten the power of the work in that it constructs a 'double frisson', and the suspense waiting for the solution as the solution is being solved.

Chapter 4 Figure/discourse

In *Driftworks*[1], Lyotard talks about the importance of

F

ormal experimentation as a foundation of critical activity. The searching for,

and eventual [hopeful] discovery and release of **F**orces and **F**orms hitherto
repressed through the imposition of order and meaning. This may be thought
of as another airing of the beautiful/sublime debate, but Lyotard is operating
in a different space, and is concerned to make the point that the study of
aesthetics is not a second division activity in relation to, say, the political, but
is the battering ram which opens the door to the cave [Lyotard may be
alluding to Plato here] in which the political may be confronted. So critical
discourse too follows in the wake of art, eagerly anticipating the fissures and
footholds which a subject as 'open' as art is bound to provide. Lyotard takes
this argument further, and he makes the claim that Art, or at least some Art,
has moved beyond the critical phase of art.

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[1] Lyotard   Driftworks   Semiotexte, Columbia University 1984. Ensuing references to *Driftworks* and *Discours/figure* appear in Geoffrey Bennington's *Lyotard, Writing the Event* pp.56 - 102

'the most modern trends in art place critical thought and negative dialectics before a considerable challenge. . . . . . . it is the end of all critique'.

In '*Discours, figure*' [D/f] Lyotard introduces a dialogue between two different spheres - that of language, in the sense of communication and discourse, and that of form, in the sense of colour, design and painting. Language is described as being 'washed-up', old, and limited by its own historico-philosophical tradition: limited to that which can be read and given meaning inside a closed linguistic system. The nature of the medium to some extent controls/anticipates the message. Nothing new really happens. There is repetition of its own identity. It is stereotypical in nature and lacks qualities of suspense and danger.

Lyotard sees the figural as much freer concept. Less restrained by philosophical traditions or linguistic laws, the figural is much more aggressive and nihilistic towards itself. It is free of the demands of meaning, of verisimilitude even. It is able to bypass the narrative which so eagerly enchains the discursive. Lyotard claims that things 'happen' in the figural. There is less of the expectation of the demonstration of meanings and their communications, more of the notion of feelings and their expression in the form of intensities. This is a situation in which the figural is constantly

displacing itself. Something indeed akin to Deleuze's notion of the Fold and its relation to the 'event' and to Humes' notion of extension. In short, the figural dispenses with the discursives' 'addressee'. It replaces it with the kinetic.

Initially, Lyotard seems to suggest that the discursive is now an inferior medium and that any new developments are bound to happen in the world of the figural: that knowledge is to be replaced by the ability to live in a world of disruption, transgression and heightened intensity. Described in another way, being on the outside of the curve. On the outside of the Fold. Stretched, struggling to compensate speed for reductive radius.

But Lyotard then remixes his arguments. Now the discursive is not dead. But to live, to blossom, it must listen to the figural, to understand how the notion

of the figural as a critique can open up and remove its cataracts so that it can be *seen* working inside the discursive. There can be a movement from the discursive to the figural. Lyotard sees the figural as being inside the discursive. This 'inside' may rest totally inside, as in the veins of marble. The figure therefore is both inside and outside of the discourse.

As to emphasise his notion of the figural as a figure of/for freedom, Lyotard's definition of 'figural' changes as he writes. At the beginning of D/f, the figural is characterised in visual terms, encouraging the precedence of the sensual over the linguistic. Later, Lyotard sees the figural in terms of a libidinal drive, and finds connections in his own work to those of Freud. Lyotard is describing this 'figural' as something difficult to locate, difficult to determine, something that in itself is difficult to enter into critical discourse with { here, imagine a footnote. . . ◄◄. 'A good book, in order to let truth be in its aberrancy, would be a book in which linguistic time itself (the time in which signification unfolds, the reading time) would be deconstructed; a book the reader could start anywhere, and read in any order. A book to graze in (and one that would also be free from the literary genre of the aphorism: I say this in thinking of Nietzsche, who was too inclined to that genre). The present book is not that good book. It remains within signification. It is not the book of an artist: deconstruction does not operate directly within it, but is *signified* '. Lyotard talks inside his own speech . . . . writing . . . . . *mauvaise foi.* ►►| } due to its unquantifiable nature and indeterminate position.

So long as the philosopher does not make himself equally into a painter, Lyotard is saying, he must remain in the orbit of language, of the structural unconscious. But speech is still capable of the effort of inflicting on its very language the transgression of spacings, the mobility, the profundity that characterises the referential aspect of discourse.

"It

will no

doubt seem

odd to you to be

referred to whom nature

has deprived of the faculty of hearing and

speech, in order to obtain from him true notions on the formation of
language"

Diderot, in his essay *'Letter on the Blind'* recalls an incident with a deaf-mute, who having no direct access to music, he takes to see Father Castel's[2] "Clavecin Occulaire" which displayed coloured ribbons corresponding to each note of he scale. It shows the man something to what music can be compared, but (like notation), not what music *is.* He draws some wrong conclusions from this. The discourse in colours led him to believe that , like words, each note had its own meaning. Though he was wrong, he had certainly understood some thing of the overall structure (semiotics). Faced with his deafness, the man "philosophises". He produces meanings and solutions that are both possible and necessary.

> 'each Nuance of the instrument was the equivalent of the letter of the alphabet, and with the aid of the keys and the agility of the fingers, he could combine these letters to form words, and sentences, and eventually a whole discourse in colour.'

Diderot's letter is addressed to Charles Batteux [3]. The Port-Royal *Logic* of 1660 had claimed that the French language had the most natural and therefore logical word order[4]. Batteux claimed the reverse, that the strict French of the seventeenth century hampered free expression. Latin and Greek were the freest in that they allowed the writer to order the words in the most persuasive way. Diderot shows the terms "order" and "inversion" can have different meanings and references - historical, empirical ontological. French does not invert, in the sense that the order is always the same, Latin and Greek do invert - *Alexander vicit darium* and

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Louis-Bertrand Castel (1688-1757) . An article in *Mercure de France* (1725) "my aim is to make a blind man judge of colours, and the deaf to judge of sounds". While maintaining the importance of the theoretical over the practical, he made one instrument employing strips of paper and another which used coloured glass lit by candles. a version of this instrument was shown in London in 1757

[3]Charles Batteux   *Lettres sur la phrase française comparée avec la phrase latine* (1747)

[4]Louis de Laboureur   *Advantages of the French language over Latin* (1669) " the ancient Romans thought in French before speaking [writing] in Latin"

Darium vicit Alexander are both correct since the subject and object are marked by their case endings. French is devoid of such markings and relies on a standardised order to distinguish between subject and object. Diderot lets suppose that there was a "primitive" or "natural" order in sentence construction. He agrees with Condillac that temporary subjective interests can determine word order and talks about an "ordre scientifique" and an "ordre didactique" based on the mind's views when language was wholly formed. There is then a "natural order", stemming from the sensualist way in which things are perceived, that received qualities (colour, form etc.) are logically prior to any abstract substances they wish to qualify. From this point of view the substantive has to come before the adjective, since there has to be a substance which supports incidentals like colour, form, texture etc. So genetically adjectives precede nouns : logically the opposite should be so. The French would therefore seem illogical, with the noun coming before the adjective. [ordre d'institution]

Diderot "dissolves" the problem. Thought has no sequential order : all sequential discourse is a fallacy. Direct and inverted order is a problem of proper representation of thought by language only in *mimetic terms*. He is talking about the reversibility of représentant and représentée, and of language and thought.

> It is necessary to distinguish thought from expression in all discourse in general: if thought is rendered with clarity, purity and precision, that is enough for familiar conversation: joined to these qualities word choice, along with measure and harmony of the rounded sentence, and you have the style appropriate for the lectern; but you will still be far from poetry . . . . . . In poetry, there passes into the discourse of the poet a spirit which moves and vivifies all the syllables. What is this spirit? I've sometimes felt its presence; but all I know of it is that it alone causes things to be *said and represented* all at once, that at the same time that the understanding grasps them, the soul is moved by them, the imagination sees them, the ear hears them and that discourse is no longer a mere concatenation of energetic terms which expose thought with force and nobility, but more still a tissue of hieroglyphs heaped one upon the other which paint it. In this sense I could say that all poetry is emblematic.

Æntr'acte.

Diderot saw the idea of the deprivation of the senses as a way of exploring rifts between language and logic.[5] Metaphor, "expressions heureuses", and guesses occupied the stage as frequently as logic and order. Diderot intimates that by deliberately ignoring or suppressing his antennae, his 'happy guesses' can see further and understand more deeply.

Diderot imagines a group of five people each of whom only possess one sense. Each treats each other as being mad. He sees this as an allegory of the world "each has one sense only but passes judgements on everything". In additions to the Letter on the Deaf and Dumb he imagines whole sects or factions of the single senses : a sect of the eye, a sect of the nose, a sect of the palette, of the ear and of the hands.

These sects would all have the same origin, ignorance and self-interest; the spirit of intolerance and persecution will soon have crept among them. The Eyes would be condemned to the petites-maisons (lunatic asylum) as visionaries; the Noses would be regarded as imbeciles; the Palates shunned as insupportable, with their caprices and false delicacy; the Ears detested for their curiosity and arrogance; the Hands despised for their materialism; and if some superior Power were to second the honourable and charitable intentions of each party, the entire nation would be exterminated the next instant.

In Letter on the Deaf and Dumb the problem is portrayed as the difference between simultaneous unity of complex thoughts and the linearity of discourse. The creation of languages required breaking up [of thought into its components]; but seeing an object, judging it beautiful, feeling an agreeable sensation, desiring possession in a single instant of the mental state . . . . Diderot could comment, Ah! Sir, how our understanding is modified by signs; and what a cold copy is even the most lively discourse on mental events.

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[5]   "it is necessary to distinguish thought from expression in all discourse in general . . .
Diderot remarked that the regularised French of Louis XI I I and Louis XIV was a most logical of languages, and for that reason it was unsuited for poetry. Ideas and experience come in entireties, but language is sequential, and a treatise proceeds in an orderly and logical sequence. Language differs from gesture, for the former packs many meanings into one instance. Diderot considered that poetry lay nearer to mime and gesture than logic and grammar and in his hieroglyphic conception of poetry foreshadows Mallarmé's notion of words outstripping meaning - that is to say, attracting a meaning to themselves retrospectively.

Complex ideas and states of mind exist in a synchronic instant. They are like a single picture. Language can paint this picture too, but since language is syntactic, it is always too late, there is always a deferral of ideal expression, its mental object having moved on even before language can lay out its syntax. 'Ordinary' language is a figurative modification of the idea. Needing too many words to describe things long gone, left behind by the mental "tableau mouvant" that it tries to catch up with and to represent. Ordinary language tracks [traces] the kinetic that it is asked to represent.

This reversal of thought and language is not abstract. Diderot concludes that this whole argument about the priority of thought (as signified) and language (as signifier) was false in that language can and does precede thought. Thought itself has no particular order, so any consequent re-ordering is a mis-representation of a mental state. Because inversion is a matter of correct representation of thought by language. In mimetic terms language or thought are not the only model for mimicking each other. A language may contain so many representational elements that its use would precede thought. Thought would re-present the ideas in barely - spoken words, a reversal of représenté and représentant.

It happens sometimes that many ideas are attached to a single expression. If energetic expressions like these were more frequent, instead of language continually trailing behind intelligence, the quality of ideas rendered at all at once could be such that language would be forced to chase after it.

pro-lego-menon

"Et des fleuves française les eaux ensanglantées
Ne portaient que des morts aux mers épouvantées"[6]

And the bloodied waters of France's rivers
[bore] only the dead to the horrified seas

In his analysis of the verb "portaient" Diderot comments that the first syllable lets one imagine the waters swollen with corpses contained in the dyke and in the second syllable one can "see" the dyke bursting, allowing the bodies to flow out to sea. The fury of the seas are made [visible] in the word "épouvantées", the third syllable emphasising their vastness. Diderot uses the term "hieroglyph" [In the eighteenth century

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[6] From Voltaire's *Henriade*

hieroglyphs were still thought to be ideogrammatic, not, as it turned out, phonetic] to refer to an ideal "rapport" as distinct from a mimetic copy. He also infers that the hieroglyph comes between the abstract idea and the object itself. The hieroglyph's illegitimacy, this temporal veil, is an symbol of this deafness, this muteness.

Diderot concludes his letter by telling Batteux that he is

"concerned more to form clouds than dispel them, and to suspend judgements rather than to judge".

The state of the mind [âme] in an indivisible instant was represented by a multitude of terms which linguistic precision required, and which distributed a total impression into parts: and because these terms were pronounced in succession, and were comprehended only as they were pronounced, one was led to believe that the state [affections] of the mind which they represented existed in the same succession; but this is in no way true. The state of our mind is one thing; quite another thing is the account we give of it either to ourselves, or to others: the total, instantaneous sensation of that state is one thing; another thing is the successive and detailed attention that we are forced to pay in order to analyse it, to manifest it and make ourselves understood. Our soul is a moving picture, a model according to which we are constantly painting : we employ a great deal of time rendering it faithfully but it exists in entirety and all at once: the mind does not proceed by measured steps as does expression. In Poetry a discourse is no longer merely the linking together of energetic terms which present a thought with force and nobility, it is also a tissue of hieroglyphs, piled one upon an other , which paint it. I might say, in this sense, that all poetry is emblematic.

This system of referencing, this reflective notion is also called into question, challenged by both sight and language. This is not to draw or paint as such: it is to draw and paint with, and in, words. Merleau-Ponty called this 'hyperreflection' or 'surreflexion'.

We are catching sight of the necessity of another operation besides the conversion to reflection, more fundamental than it, of a sort of *hyperreflection* [*sur-réflection*] that would also take itself and the changes it introduces into the spectacle into account. It accordingly would not lose sight of the brute thing and the brute perception and would not finally efface them, would not cut the organic bonds between the perception and the thing perceived with a hypothesis of inexistence. On the contrary, it would set itself the task of thinking about them, of reflecting on the transience of the world as transience, speaking of it not according to the law of the word-meanings inherent in the given language, but with a perhaps difficult effort that uses the signification of words to express, beyond themselves, our mute contact with the things, when they are not yet things said.[7]

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[7] Merleau-Ponty   *The Visible and the Invisible*   trans. Alphonso Lingis   Evanston: Northwest University Press 1968

112

◄◄   'To paint with words' destroys the very language system that it refers to. Gone is the importance of each word. Arrived at are the figural and the metaphor, relationships and exchanges. Initially though, Lyotard compares Merleau-Ponty's idea of hyperreflection with that of dreams.

'the one like the other, of course, supposes language, but disordered language: each, of course, supposes the invariable intervals of the linguistic table, but these intervals worked on and forced to undergo distortion, vibrating up to the point of disjunction. To undo the code without, however, destroying the message but on the contrary delivering meaning, that is, semantic reserves, is to accomplish a set of operations Freud named the 'dream-work'.

'I am in the habit', Freud continues, 'of describing the

element in the dream-thoughts [he does indeed say 'thoughts'] which I have in mind as a "fantasy". I shall perhaps avoid misunderstanding if I mention the "day-dream" as something analogous to it in waking life'. [8]

A footnote to this sentence reads "*rêve*", "*petit roman*", - "day-dream", [continuous] "story". Freud reflects that hysterical symptoms are constructed from fantasies about memories, not of memories themselves. He goes on to make a correlation between fantasy and secondary revision and waking (pre-conscious) thought and the material of perception. Lyotard describes this as

'a quasi-pulsational ordering which obliterates the difference between the given and the anticipated and jams proper reception'. . . .

He links secondary revision to '*pseudein*' - cheating, deceiving.

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[8] quoted by Lyotard in   'The Dream-Work does not Think'   Oxford Literary Review Vol.6 No1 1983

'If I look around for something with which to compare the final form assumed by a dream as it appears after normal thought has made its contribution, I can think of nothing better than the enigmatic inscriptions with which the *Fliegende Blätter* has for so long entertained its readers.

They are intended to make the reader believe that a certain sentence - for the sake of contrast, a sentence in dialect and as scurrilous as possible - is a Latin inscription. For this purpose the letters contained in the words are torn out of their combination into syllables and arranged in a new order. Here and there a genuine Latin word appears; at other points we seem to see abbreviations of Latin words before us; and at still other points in the inscription we may allow ourselves to be deceived into overlooking the senselessness of isolated letters by parts of the inscription seeming to be defaced or showing lacunae. If we are to avoid being taken in by the joke, we must disregard everything that makes it seem like an inscription, look firmly at the letters, pay no intention to their ostensible arrangement, and so combine them into words belonging to our own mother tongue.'

Lyotard describes some of the examples of *Ratselhäfte Inschrift* [Enigmatic Inscriptions] which were contemporary to the Interpretation of Dreams. Some have no pictorial matter, the passage from the manifest to latent text takes place through displacement of the phonic reality of the original statement.

Integram addi coenam gymnasium ista nix vomia galanta in trina

In de Grammatiken am Gymnasium ist a'(auch)nix vom Jaga-latein drinna!

Lyotard analyses the content of these inscriptions as consisting of the latent text - the solution of the enigma, the manifest text - the text of the inscription, and, lastly, the illustration. This analysis has striking similarities to Schones' description of the emblem.

Lyotard sees three 'scenes' in which these figural and discursive elements engage. Firstly there must be a **Unity of space**, where the the linguistic signifier and the figure are inscribed in the same pictorial space. Secondly a **Unity of meaning** , where both refer to the same civilisation. And lastly, **a Unity of culture** when the signified of the manifest text can be related to the scene. Lyotard illustrates this with two examples . .

Räthselhafte Inschrift.

DIANA ISTA UNDA
SAEPE
ISTE DAT
ROMA:

VERE R...
SIT SINE...
T...

(Auflösung in nächster Nummer.)

This illustration presents the qualities of unity of place, but [because the inscription is Austro-German instead of Latin] there is no sense of unity of culture or unity of meaning, though there is the implied notion of a cultural dimension in the relationship of the scene to the latent text. The 'hidden' [erased] text, has the nature of the 'voice-over' rather than a report.

115

Räthselhafte Inschrift

SOCRATES ENSI AC ANSER LIMAC
MANLI GERE SIS MIRA NE DEXTRA

(Auflösung in nächster Nummer)

This plate satisfies the conditions of Unity of place and unity of culture, but lack lacks meaning - the 'Latin' text is nonsensical.

Lyotard used the example of the Austrian peasant pronouncing the text '*novas plasma*' and hearing *'No, was Blas'ma?* The manifest text is the graphic notation, imitating another language, of a statement pronounced in dialect. The revision becomes a phonic analysis of the text and is the impulse behind the creation of a phonic imitation of this in another language.

Lyotard gives another example

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The dreadful breath of winds infatuated him
ασεν αργαλεωυ ανεμων αμεγαρτος αυτμη
lasen argaleon anemon amegartos aütme
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The syllables of the name Agememnon are disseminated through other words. Lyotard compares these repetitions and inversions to the anagram [which, like Heidegger's *tools,* allows no remainder] and the canon and fugue. These 'texts' must be capable of standing alone, and have a degree of resonance, assonance, consonance [the *thingliness*] inside their timbre. As in the case of emblems, there is a necessity of the unity of place joining scene and inscription.[1]

> 'By the simple placing of the inscription, we pass from linguistic space, that of reading, where one hears, to visual space, that of painting, where one looks.' The eye no longer listens, it desires'.

The inscription therefore will remain a 'graphic' until it is 'heard'. But the image also casts a spell on the text in the sense of what Lyotard calls a 'deception', but what could also be called a 'hesitation', an unwillingness for each function to either submit to the other or to consolidate its own independent status and place. This inscription signals the move from the linguistic space, the space of reading, which is the space where one hears/understands, to the visual space, that of painting, where one looks.

dream-thoughts	-	solution of enigma
manifest content	-	apparently meaningless description
image	-	considerations of figurability

Placing the text inside the work frustrates its own understanding. The word is seen as an image just prior to being read, producing a vibration, a momentary refocusing as the focus is moved too far one way, then too far the other. These oscillation through the site [sight] of perfection gradually settle on the median, in a process akin to that of an automatic camera. But the typography and the image are both composed of lines.

> This enigma is not that of some 'pure' vision or figure, but of the line, which can close into the formal identity of the letter, or open into the deep space of the visual.

Lines as in joined up dots or a loci of the path of an idea on a surface. Lyotard points out that this area of ambiguity and hesitation gives rise to what he calls the 'pseudo-coherence', the 'pseudo-legibility' and the 'pseudo-intelligibility' of the dream, qualities which show that while the figural is infiltrated by the discursive, the figural, with its daydreams and reveries, also distorts the 'virginal' text.

Lyotard divides the figural 'hesitations' into three categories

Both Lyotard and Merleau-Ponty espy a place of linguistic instability where the very certainties of language, its repeatability are distorted and rendered inoperable. But to undo these certainties without destroying the message, to undo these events without destroying the meaning, is to enter a place in which Freud's calls the 'dream-work'. This is a place where meanings can exist which cannot be expressed completely in the linguistic code. Meanings that are neither completely figural or completely discursive. This suggests a place of transgression, of indecision and of excess. Excess in the sense of lack of rules, an absence of controls, of rules. To formulate, or to reformulate would only move this barrier, it would never puncture, transgress it. It would only formulate another set of rules. How to exceed language while still using language.

As D/f develops, the figural begins to be a centre of disturbance in both the discursive, and in itself. A new space, figural space. It is never seen directly. It is experienced through subtle disturbances in surfaces. The figure of the figural has become a problem area, a scuff

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mark. Perception distances from its very self. The object is never attained, it is always therefore an object of desire. This desire transforms itself into a sign for disruption and intrigue. It takes on a 'life' of its own. It permeates everywhere and everything, and is therefore unbounded. The figure develops

118

itself from a form into a force. This force returns energy to the linguistic, it recharges the linguistic event with energy discharged from another order.

'the figure presents itself as an incoherent *trace* that defies reading, that is not a letter, and that can only be understood in energetic terms. The figure is supported by displacements, condensations and deformations. This means that *before* its incorporation into the order of language [for example, as a rhetorical form], the figure is the mark on the unities and the rules of language of a force that treats these unities and rules as things. It is the trace of work[*travail*] and not of knowledge achieved through signification. Through this work, what is realised is desire.'

Lyotard is suggesting that no aesthetic theory could account for the disruption that desire is capable of creating. He is also suggesting that there is the possibility here of the application of rules in an anti-aesthetic pattern. For Lyotard the key passages are these quotations from the Chapter entitled 'The Dream Work' in Freud's 'The Interpretation of Dreams'
The dream work' does not think, calculate or judge in any way at all; it restricts itself to giving things a new form [transforming things] and '*It is the dream work which creates that form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming – the explanation of its particular nature.*'

This linking of form with transformation suggests an idiom which displays change, dispersion and displacement instead of completion, unity and integrity. 'Work' and 'Form' are linked together and 'form' is then developed into a notion of 'transformation', change, dispersion and displacement . . . . . .
. . . . Lyotard's three levels . . . .

I   figure/image
A situation where more than one object occupies the same planar space, or the same object occupies two different spaces simultaneously.

2   figure/form

The disjunction of the unseen, underlying structure of the scene. The golden section, the fibbonaci serie, the structure, the machinery of the piece. Not, for instance, the 'portrayal' or mimesis or desire, but the physical remains of desire - the archaeology of desire.

3   figure/matrix

Figure/matrix is a term which describes itself, its own activity inside itself. It can never be an image or a discourse, it does not have a set of qualities that can be arranged in opposites for the convenience of analysis. Not only is it not seen, but it is no more visible than readable. It does not belong to plastic space, nor to textual space either; it is difference itself, and as such, it doesn't at all like being put in the form of an *opposition,* which is what its spoken expression would demand, or in the form of an image or form, which its plastic expression would suppose. Discourse, image and form all miss it equally because it resides in all three spaces together. The works of any individual are never more than the offshoots of this matrix.

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This matrix can be deduced, but never seen.
Define this Matrix  .  .  .  .  .  Substance -
Situation - Environment -  in which something
has its origin, takes form, or is enclosed .
.  .  .  .  .  or printed, moulded, cast.
Stereotyped. Set out in rows and columns
organised rather than composed, clichéd and
eventually signed for.
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Lyotard introduces the rebus[9] as an example of a disturbance between figure and discourse. In a rebus the figural is present not only in the image, but also in the form. The rebus is limited in ambition by its requirement to be decoded. The spatial structure must have been originated as a concept in the solving of the enigma. In the rebus the discursive elements can become part of the image. The nature of the rebus gives rise to a self-inflicted disappointment, and therefore, on solution, to a self-decreed gratification. It is   a private

[9] rebus : a puzzle consisting of pictures representing syllables and words; in such a puzzle the word 'hear' might be represented by H followed by a picture of an ear. Also, a heraldic emblem or device that is a pictorial representation of or pun on the name of the bearer.
C17: from French rébus, from the Latin *rebus* , by/with things. Also *reify* to invest with reality and *reification* , to make property of.

cheating mechanism, a self-generated arena for gaming. The 'dream-work' though is different : it is not conceived with an a priori notion of a solution.

Lyotard then goes on to contrast the rebus and the dream-work with 'art objects'. He starts by contrasting the notion of a poem and a rebus or dream-work. The poem has similarities with the rebus in that it is a conscious 'creation', with clear-cut objectives - at least in the mind of the creator, but the poem, as a mode of expression, is not an 'image', and in fact encourages a common/ground/place/law for the figural and the discursive.

> Even more than the dream, poetry is interesting not for its content, but for its work. This work does not consist in externalising, in images, forms in which the poet's desire, or ours, is accomplished once and for all, but in reversing the relation of desire to figure, in offering the former, not images in which it will be fulfilled and lost, but forms (here poetic forms) by which it will be reflected as a game, as unbound energy, as a process of condensation and displacement, as primary process, discourse is not poetic because it seduces us, but because, beyond this, it lets us see the operations of seduction and the unconscious: lure and truth together; end and means of desire. Our poetic pleasure can greatly exceed the limits fixed by our fantasies and we can do this strange thing: learn how to love. The pleasure of the game reverses the game of pleasure.

While the reaction to the memory of the dream-image can only be neutral, the conscious reaction to these images must awaken critical faculties, which may feel the dream as a sequence of unordered and contradictory happenings which crave for organisation and a narrative structure to allow them to appear 'normal' in a conscious world. As desire threatens the order of things, Lyotard contemplates the repercussions of desire and repression, of discourse and figure. He questions how we going to find the critical judgements to judge these differences.

Phantasy cannot be liberated since it contains within itself its own . . . . . but this artist is someone who *expresses* his phantasies. If the relation of the artist to the <u>work</u> is *only* that of expression, the work interests only himself or people who have complementary phantasies

and thus recognise themselves in it. Art and phantasy do not have a direct relationship therefore, in this sense, the artist does not produce, outsides, interiors, systems, elevations and Plans, but is someone who struggles to deliver *in* the phantasy, *in* the matrix of figures whose place and owner he is, a construction in which these many repetitions and signatures are Capable of re-engaging with themselves in a narrative and figural arena, a space where [pre-echo] narcisistically, these can review each other as they unfold there standing in front of each other.

Chapter 5   **P P P**

there are things to consider here

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firstly, I do not have leprosy,  I am not blind
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¹Once the glass has been removed, they slipped a thin film under my eyelids and over my eyelids they laid walls of cotton wool. I was not supposed to talk because talking pulled at the anchors of the bandage. 'You were asleep', the doctor told me later. I was asleep! I had to hold my own against the light of seven days - a fine conflagration! Yes, seven days at once, the seven deadly lights, become the spark of a single moment, were calling me to account. Who would have imagined that? At times I said to myself, 'This is death. In spite of eveything it's really worth it, it's impressive.' But often I lay dying without saying anything. In the end I was convinced that I was face to face with the madness of the day. That was the truth: the light was going mad, the brightness had lost all reason: it assailed me irrationally, without control, without purpose. That discovery bit straight through my life.

In La Folie du Jour [2], the narrator is at one embodied and disembodied. The
voice is trying to determine what life may be involved with it: but for the moment
there is only a sense of distance and light.
Light itself is the madness of the day,

◀◀ { histoire de la Folie . . . . In the seventeenth century the perception of
madness changed from that of transgression or difference to a physical-moral condition.
The subjective reason that drove this new thinking deligitimised and outlawed all forms
of behaviour which did not harmonise with this autocratic rationality. Foucault hints
that if other configurations (right and wrong, true and false), other oppositions had
taken root modern 'reason' might be different. That reason conceals an alternative and

speechless/voiceless past. } ▶▶

an unrelatedness into whose ambience the voice [we speak 'of' the voice] is
uncontrollably caught up. The irregular movements, sudden changes of tempo,
hysterical outbursts are dissipated inside the text, leaving a wake of flotsam
folding and unfolding at the mercy of the contest between tide and current, but at
the same time having a momentum of its own, perhaps a consciousness to
choose the easiest, or perversely , the most testing direction to follow. Through
the tone of the writing the subject is dissipated or speaks as if [comme si] from
an absentee, the voice estranged or made remote to itself [castrato]. The voice
achieves a passivity that asserts itself, even through a trauma so severe the
content does not survive. Blanchot is also concerned with the author/reader

2   Maurice Blanchot   La Folie du Jour tr. Lydia Davies

relationship - any work of art is anonymous . . . the creative force of the work effaces the presence of the author.

efface/from French *effacer*, literally, to obliterate the face; deface/ sous rature *'under erasure'* . Derrida's phrase for a word that may be inaccurate or inadequate, but necessary. A word can be left in and at the same time crossed out. This must be graphic - it cannot be oral. It also introduces a temporal aspect. The sous rature can be seen together but cannot be conceived at the same time

In Derrida's view of language the signifier is not directly related to the signified. There is no one -to- one set of correspondences between them. In structuralist thought a sign is seen as a unity . In Derrida's view, word and thing or thought never become one. The sign is a structure of difference. Half of it is 'not that' and the other half 'not there'. Signifiers transform into signified and vice versa. For Derrida the structure of the sign is defined by the 'trace' - the footprint, track, imprint . Signs cannot be a unit bridging an 'origin' and an 'end'. The sign must always be seen as *sous rature* - always being inhabited by the trace of another sign. Words, sentences, these all contain traces. But reading is a temporal process and language is unstable. Nothing is ever fully present in signs. Language does not fully present a person or argument. Signs are always dispersed and divided. Meanings are always dispersed and divided: ideas are dispersed and divided

too. In other words, there is nothing but writing (and reading), ◄◄ rewriting (and

rereading) ►►| Erasing the palimpsest □ **Pensée. The beautiful, the tulip substitute [tip] the beautiful is left out, sous rature, but inherently there. This is art, it has beauty, but it has given its beauty away in terror of the sublime.**

encourages the reinscriptions, the displacements, □

□ □

the rereadings, the rewritings. But all along, these are always 'knowing' erasions. They are in effect *pretended* erasures . . . "he wanted... without really wanting" . . . . the artist pretends . They are more a smearing . Introducing the double pretence . . . "*as if* he wanted" . . without really wanting, *"as if* . [comme si], in virtue of a fancy". The impress of fiction is the second (but always already before the first) step (into its own trapless trap) of writing into painting, of painting into writing, of writing into writing, of painting into painting. . . . . to introduce is to seduce. To seduce the text, of course, not the reader. To deviate the text from itself, but just enough to surprise it again very close to its content Here an "alleged" introduction deconstructs, *smears* the reworked/rewritten original". T he act of smearing disfigures the "idea" the "concept".

To be aware of the work is to be unaware of the author. The author should only be significant in his oeuvre. But the oeuvre is only present in terms of a single work . . . . the essence of literature is to escape any essential determination. It is never already there, it needs to be rediscovered each time. Otherwise the institution of art has priority over the work - art becomes a repetition of the institution.

. . . . . . and again Repetition . . . behaving in a certain manner, in relation to something unique which has no substitute. But there is also the interior repetition, the echo, the tremolo within itself. Repetition internalises itself, the subject becomes the object. The qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalencies contrasts with the qualitative order of the non-substitutable. Cycles and equalities are contrasted with reflections, doubles and echoes. With the former terms can be substituted and exchanged. The qualitative order only legislates for gifts or theft. The object belongs to the order of laws. Laws only determine the relationships between the subjects ruled by them, they do not define the content of the subjects themselves. The subject of the law discovers its own powerlessness to repeat. The constants of one

126

law might be the variables of another. If repetition is possible, it is a miracle, it is against the law, it is a transgression. Erasing the law [PONCER] with irony, a law of principles for overturning principles - with humour as its consequence [U -PON] its descent {into madness?} . Ultimately a question of will and freedom of expectancy - repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it[3].

Refrain

◄◄

Hume implies the independence of each presentation. One instance does not appear until the last one has disappeared. Hence there is no 2nd, 3rd, or 'the same'. AB,

AB, AB, A . ◄◄ ►►| ||

►► ◄◄ . Each AB is separate from the others and each AB is still identical. But repetition does set up an expectancy in the mind, the hint of the possibility of difference. Expectancy encourages habit. Habit draws difference/generality from repetition. Habit is contraction [to *contract* a habit]. To act is never to repeat. continuity - there is no continuity apart from habit contemplation We speak of our 'self' only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party which says 'me'. Contemplation is always hidden, it has no action in itself, things are done through it. Difference. Difference lies between two repetitions. Repetition lies between two differences. The repetition allows the passage from one system of difference to another. The duration of a presentation is dependent on the natural decrement of its material. Fatigue is a real component of contemplation. Need marks the limits of the variable present. The present exists between two instances of need, and is the duration of a contemplation. Repetition is *inside* need, as need only exists through repetition. Natural signs are founded on passive synthesis. They are signs of the present. Artificial signs are those which refer to the past or the future as distinct dimensions of the present, dimensions on which the present may depend. Artificial signs imply active synthesis - the passage from spontaneous imagination to reflective representation, memory and intelligence. Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection.

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3   Hume   A Treatise of Human Nature   1740

▶▶▌

There are three stages in cyclical conceptions: The intracyclic repetition, that is, the manner in which the two events repeat one another - or, rather repeat the same act or event to come. Secondly, a cyclic repetition which supposes that at the end of the repetition everything recommences with the first stage. Analogies are drawn between the two phases. Thirdly, in this case, finally, the 'thirdly' plays the role of signified in relation to the other two. The first two states only repeat something that appears *for itself* in the third stage, where this 'thing' repeats itself. The present is the repeater the past is repetition itself .
 the future is that which is repeated, having subordinated the other two, stripping them of their autonomy   .
The present, therefore concerns only the content and the foundation of time, the ground, and the order, the totality and the final end of time, including the repetition of the repetition. Again, Hume explains that the independent identical or similar cases are grounded in the imagination. The imagination retains the image of the previous case as the new one appears. It is able to gather cases and compress their memory into states of being which give off a particular 'aroma'.

The latest B is anticipated to contain the nature of previous ABs. Not in the sense of memory or reflection, merely as a synthesis of time. Time in the sense of the repetition of instants which constitute the present. The past belongs to the present - the preceding instants are retained in the diminution. The future belongs to the present - expectation is anticipated as a diminution. The past and future are not therefore different instants from the present instants - they are contractions of them. **PPP** is the scene of all these repetitions, the rhythms, displacements and disguises, their divergencies and decentrings. It is the arena in which they unfold and indoctrinate one another.

Blanchot argues that nothing exists prior to the work, that every work of art is a reinvention of the practice of art. Blanchot also writes about the significance of solitude in that it refers to the way that a work of art and the processes leading up to its creation cuts itself off from others. Solitude

signifies the failure to interpret the work, to achieve a sense of 'essence'. Its inability to be perceived 'at a distance', this instability undermining the possibility of finding a point [the point]. The receding, the opening up of the space in which the thing happens, the creation of that 'space', in which the work **PPP** itself no longer inhabits the ultimate absence of 'the work' itself. The ultimate 'distancing' .The smoothing out and eventual elimination of the 'object' itself. Poncer v. tr.; conjug. *placer* (XIVe; fig., 'rendre plus pur' v. 1280; de *ponce*) ¨1[0] Décaper, polir au moyen d'une substance abrasive (pierre ponce, poudre de ponce). V. Décaper, frotter, polir ¨ 2[0] (1622). Reproduire (un desin) au moyen d'un poncif (1[0]) _ *Dessin poncé* (n. m. *Un poncé*), obtenu par ce moyen de reproduction. ¨3[0] (1723). *Techn.* Marquer (une pièce de toile) avec une encre spéciale. The slippery surface resistant to any more questions. In this silence now the voice is heard "what is a work and what is the work?

is read as separate, isolate, distinct. Solitude refers to the uniqueness of the works 'space'.

.... secondly, the homony/homophone.
firstly........................a supplement

Poncif   [posif]. *n. m.* (*Ponsif,* 1551; de *poncer*). u 1[0] *Techn.* Feuille de papier à dessin piqué qu'on applique sur une surface en y passant une ponce (2[0]) pour reproduire le contour du dessin. *Reproduire un dessin avec in poncif.* V. Poncer (2[0]) u 2[0] (1832, adj.; de "dessin fait selon des procédés conventionnels").Fig. et *cour.* Thème, expression littéraire ou artistique dénués d'originalité. V. banalité, cliché, lieu (commun). *Les poncifs acedémiques, romantiques.* 9 ANT. *Original, personal.*

the double supplement, the double homophone, /obia

The process

thought

packaging

erasing

▶▶   record   ▶▶   play   ❚❚   erase

◀◀   and so on   ▶▶❙

the im/perfect palimpsest, in that there isn't one. There is no antecedent, only a veil.

The nature of the homonym: penser/poncer/panser. [**PPP**] also *pansée*. In English. The lights illuminate literally, and illuminate [with reason], good reason, the meaning and the sequence. The inevitability. The rhetoric. The sense that there must always be the next . . . . [art . . .work . . .] The getting nearer and nearer to the near. the augmentation, the hyperbation - kept in check [cheque/false - economy - of means, of execution]. And there is the recognition that the blindness is not necessarily that of the sight. [*palimpsestus* parchment cleaned for reuse, from Greek *palimpsestos*, from *palin* again + *psestos* rubbed smooth, from *psen [poncer]* to scrape { rature}]. Blindness is an absence that enables one to know what sight is.

Blindness is an instance of a truchement[4] - an interpreter, a spokesman, a representative that *causes* understanding between differing or opposing parties. Having no language of its own, the "truchement" causes meaning in one idiom to be comprehended in another medium - what in Greek was called *metaphorein*, to carry over from one to the other. Blindness is this *metaphoricy* itself and can only be signalled through other metaphors of light and dark. De Man talks of a reader who " has to undergo the explicit results of a vision that is able to move towards the light only

because, being already blind, it does not have to fear ◀◀ S U B L I M E ▶▶❙
         the power of this light. But the vision is unable to report correctly what it has

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4   James Creech   Thresholds of Representation

perceived in the course ▶▶| of its journey"[5]. Diderot takes up this question of the figural and the metaphoric in his essay Letter on the Blind for the use of those who can see. . . . . . Holmes opens with the argument that the marvels of nature prove the existence of a Creator. Saunderson [Professor of Mathematics and Optics at Cambridge University - and blind from birth] replies that these were not created for his benefit, that those beauties could only be proof to those who could see them. To have proof of a God he must touch him. He asserts that Holmes is using language as a metaphor, using phrases such as - "seeing the truth", and, one becomes "enlightened", problems grow "clear" or are "illuminated". This idea of "Nature" and "Beauty" and the "Sublime" and "Art" are very much linked to the division between the falseness that we can see and the truth to which we are blinded. Between Saunderson's words Diderot saw a relationship between sensory deprivation and linguistic metaphor. Saunderson's speech was full of "expressions heureuses".[◆◆P◆◆◆◆◆ONC ◆E◆R◆◆◆][expressions proper to one sense, touch P O ◆◆◆R for example, but metaphoric to another, such as sight , resulting in a double image - the true image and the reflection, the metaphor. For Saunderson there was always surplus of words over 'ideas' because he used visual words without being able to perceive their referents. For the foreigner or the writer there is a surplus of ideas over words [as in peintures and nuances [nuages]]. It is this breach between idea and language, this truchement that produces metaphors.

Diderot takes these ideas forwards in this discussion centred around the 'Molyneux' problem'[6]. His proposition was - 'if a person blind from birth were suddenly to see again,[7] were shown a cube and a cylinder, would s/he, just by looking at them, be able to tell the difference?' Diderot asked to be present at an operation, but this was refused. Diderot decided that more would be gained by questioning another blind person who had not had their sight restored, but had a philosophical and /or scientific training. Diderot's implication is that one should try inwardness and introspection as much as outward observation and, in a word, do without eyes. Diderot's letter is in the form of an allegory, the paradox of blinding oneself in order to see better as in Democritus

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5 De Man *Blindness and Insight*, p.106

6 First raised by William Molyneux, a doctor friend of Locke's

7 Cateract operations were just starting to be performed

blinding himself in order to think better. There is an emphasis on substitution run parallel to a work preoccupied with how a blind person finds substitutes for sight.

Vision produces the possibility of seeing perfectly and yet seeing "nothing". Between objects and the retina there is a "nothing", a "truchement" a "difference", that enforces accuracy, but because we see only representations that are different than what created them, "sensations have nothing that resembles objects essentially", we must patrol this space, backwards and forwards, in the act of continual comparison [simile], of the precise conformity between an object and its representation. Diderot saw blindness as a metaphor for this space between object and image and with the language of veils, blindness and ignorance. The lowering of the literal veil (blindness/cataracts) had no effect on the figurative one (blindness/ignorance).
Diderot's interest in blindness [reflects] his belief that vision represents itself perfectly. His other conviction, that Language can represent anything and everything manifests itself in the Encyclopaedia - a work intended to represent and explain all knowledge - structured as a dictionary of the French language. "A nation's language is a picture of the nation's knowledge".

It refers to the way the work 'speaks'. Blanchot speaks about the work as being about how the author's silence takes shape/manifests itself. Silence . . . .deaf and dumb becomes the form of the author's speaking. Another source of fascination is the image. Blanchot does not automatically accept that the image is an unproblematic reflection of the object .

Blanchot's images do not necessarily arrive from the seen. Blanchot writes 'Speaking is not seeing.' They escape mimesis. They escape the embrace of original and copy. He opens the possibility of the discussing inside the frame in the same breath as outside the frame. Residue within the One . The double character of vision. The desire to see and not to see is resolved in terms of trauma: the over-the-edge scene of the near-blinding, the desire to see past the visible, the propositioning of the visible to fill the role of veil. Blanchot writes that Narcissus[8] is not narcissistic. This contradicts the

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8   **Maurice Blanchot**   The Gaze of Orpheus, tra. Lydia Davis

common reading of Narcissus being unable to love another because of his own self-love. Blanchot shows that his inability to love another is because, not recognising his own image, he cannot relate to another since he has no relationship to himself. Narcissus tries to eliminate the 'blind spot', to have a relationship with the image without any mediation such as time or space.

> . . . . the image is a way of understanding the object through distancing or objectifying. Blanchot is interested in paradox. The image is brought to book by distancing . . . this indeterminacy. Blanchot separates the image from meaning and relates it instead to ecstasy.

Blinding, distancing, terror. Burke[9] links distancing with infinity and the possibility of terror. The arrival of spatial perspective and the distancing in the narrative points to, figurally, an infinity representing the unknown and the borderlines between objects and illusionistic space. To perceive an object is the same thing as to perceive its bounds. This infinity identifies the possibilities of the space for terror. Burke connects infinity with repetition and madness, Terror and torture. When repetition ceases it has created an elicit echo whose diminution lasts long after its need has expired. It has its own infinity, independent of others. But this echo must have some end, a finite end - it must always bow eventually to the laws of rhetoric . . as Burke points out . . . 'No greater in the manner can effectually compensate for the want of proper dimensions.' Is this the echo that creates the multiplicity of images that are heaped on each other to create the sense of emotional turmoil that is a necessary condition to/of the terrible? This unknowing, this, if necessary, unlearning that needs to take place to effect the condition of the sublime. The sublime is dangerous, it is terrible, fearful - in so far as fear is an apprehension of pain, the pain and fear that robs the mind of rational thought. The blinding light, the cutting of the veil steals out pleasure and submits us to pain. The blinding is out of control. It acts against our will, throwing us against the wall. Breaking the glass: the subliminal act consummated in halo - gen. PANSER [pãse]. *v. tr.* (*Penser de* 'prendre soin de', 1190; lat. *pensare* 'penser'. V. **Penser**) ¨1[0] (XVe).

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9   Edmund Burke   A philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful

Soigner (un animal domestique, et *spécialt*, un cheval) en lui donnant les soins de propreté. V. **Bouchonner**, brosser, étriller; **pansage**. ¨2⁰ (1314, *penser de* 'soigner'; 1680 *panser une plaie*). Vx. Soigner, traiter (un malade). '*Je le pansai, Dieu le guérit*' (attribué à Ambroise PARÉ) à *Spécialt. et mod.* Soigner (qqn. unr partie du corps) en appliquant un pansement*. *Panser la main, le pied de qqn.* V. **Bander** - *Panser un malade un blessé.* à Fig. '*La femme est faite pour panser les plaies, non pour les aviver*' (L. DAUD). V. **Calmer**. à HOM Penser; pensée.

Death. Forgetting. Waiting. Finality. Are also key concepts in Blanchot's work. He writes about the impossibility of experiencing the experience of death. Waiting is the event that becomes impossible when it finishes, forgetting is caught between the given moment and the wanted moment. Blanchot does not attempt to reconstruct the experience of dying, he writes about the impossibility of the experience of death. He points out ways in which finality does not occur - or at least cannot be experienced. The 'last' word always calls for an explanation - thus for more words. Chance is present in his works, especially in connection with death. As chance gives rise to uncertainty and intermediacy, time can move backwards or forwards, [◄◄ ►►| II ►► ◄◄] events may or may not have taken place, or, through chance, a moment happens. Blanchot raises the question of writing as an event, and its relationship with indeterminacy.

In his later works Blanchot develops a type of moment form, an open architecture, free to be decided by the reader, giving him/her the greatest level of meanings.

. . . . and thirdly

... Derrida entertains the curious hypothesis of a 'programming machine' . It is a notion related to the metaphor of 'multiple reading heads', (record, playback, erase) [and fast forward, fast rewind]

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⏪

◀ intending to suggest that we read simultaneously what there is in front of us and also, in the process, a potentially infinite range of intertextual meanings and illusions, some of which may very well obscure or efface the meanings of the 'words on the page'. In *Otobiographies*, Derrida discusses the textual 'machine' in terms of a regulatory system, one that somehow programmes in advance the possibilities of aberrant reading . . . .what is it about the texts of Nietzsche, Hegel , Heidegger which give rise to many contrasting interpretations/ . . .[mimetic perversion, as Derrida suggests] , or are there latent properties in the text and structure of the text which warrant / encourage this? In 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', Derrida discusses the models and metaphors to which F reud had recourse in describing psychic drives and desires. The *Mystic Writing Pad*, a device involving a stylus and waxed paper which enabled inscriptions to be preserved in a latent or invisible form long after they had been apparently erased from the surface. Derrida suggests that F reud was thinking of the unconscious as a kind of 'writing machine'. Psychical content will be represented by a text whose essence is irreducibly graphic. The structure of the psychical apparatus will be represented by a writing machine. Derrida asks not 'is the psyche a kind of text?' but, 'what is a text and what can the psyche be if it can be represented by a text?'[10] This exceeds the classical opposition of self-present speech and written signs. Freud is forced to consider the possibility of writing before speech - what can be described in a language of traces, differences, subliminal marks and inscriptions.

'It is with a graphematics still to come , rather than with a linguistics dominated by a phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself destined to collaborate'. Freud inverts the received order of priority between conscious and unconscious thought. The differential character of writing makes it possible to hold back, to postpone or to conserve that which would be exhausted in the moment of immediate perception. This would fall outside any possible means of representation. Pure perception, Derrida says , does not exist. We are written only as we write, by the agency within us which always keeps watch over perception[11] . The subject of writing [i.e. the subject who writes] is a

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10 Derrida Writing and Difference p. 199
11 Ibid. p. 226

system of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world.[12]
Freud tries to explain memory in the manner of the natural sciences. He writes "a
main characteristic of nervous tissue is memory - a capacity to be altered by single
occurrences". He explains the simultaneous as firstly a permanence of the trace and
the virginity of the receiving substance, and secondly as the engraving of furrows in the
perennially intact bareness of the perceptive surface. Freud puts forward a concept of
contact barriers and *breaching*[13]. *These he describes in terms of the figural and the
metaphoric - the breaching, the tracing of a trail, the opening up of a conducting path.
Violence, the terrors, are inherent in this scene. In Freud's* essay 'Piece of Wax and the
three analogies of Writing', he describes an analogy between a writing apparatus and
the perceptual apparatus. Freud considered writing as subservient to memory, an
auxiliary, external memory which is not memory itself.

the first analogy

"If I distrust my memory - neurotics, as we know, do so to a remarkable extent, but
normal people have every reason for doing so as well - I am able to supplement and
guarantee (*ergänzen und versichern*) its working by making a note in writing
(*schriftliche Anzeichnung*). In that case the surface upon which this trace is preserved,
the pocket-book or sheet of paper, is as it were a materialised portion (*ein
materialisiertes Stück*) of my mnemonic apparatus (*des Erinnerungsapparates*), the rest
of which I carry about with me invisible. I have only to bear in mind the place where
this "memory" has been deposited and I can then "reproduce" it at any time I like, with
the certainty that it will have remained unaltered and so have escaped the possible
distortions to which it might have been subjected in my actual memory".[14]
A sheet of paper preserves indefinitely but is quickly filled.
A blackboard (slate) can be erased, but this does not preserve.
All traditional writing surfaces have only either of these properties.
"an unlimited receptive capacity and a retention of permanent traces seem to be
mutually exclusive".[15] Auxiliary apparatuses - spectacles, cameras, ear-trumpets, are
deficient when it comes to memory. Freud anticipated that the answer (to his dreams)

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12   Ibid.   p. 226-7
13   "Breaching" (Bahnung, lit. pathbreaking) - the opening up of a path (Bahn)
14   Ibid   p. 227
15   Ibid.   p. 227

to this problem would involve two systems or organs of the mental process - 'A double system contained in a single apparatus.: a perpetually available innocence and an infinite reserve of traces".

The Mystic Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of which is firmly secured to the slab while its bottom end rests upon it without being fixed to it. This transparent sheet is the more interesting part of the device. It itself consists of two layers which can be detached from each other except at their two ends. The upper layer is a transparent layer of celluloid; the lower layer is made of thin translucent waxed paper. When the apparatus is not in use, the lower surface of the waxed paper adheres to the upper surface of the waxed slab.

To make use of the Mystic Pad, one writes on the celluloid portion of the covering-sheet which rests upon the wax slab. For this purpose no pencil or chalk is necessary, since the writing does not depend upon on material being deposited upon the receptive surface. It is a return to the ancient method of writing upon tablets of clay or wax: a pointed stylus scratches the surface, the depressions upon which constitute the 'writing'. In the case of the Mystic pad this scratching is not effected directly, but through the medium of the covering-sheet. At the points which the stylus touches, it presses the lower surface of the waxed paper on to the wax slab, and the grooves are visible as dark writing upon the otherwise smooth whiteish-gray surface of the celluloid. If one wishes to destroy what has been written, all that is necessary is to raise the double covering-sheet from the wax slab by a light pull, starting from the free lower end. [16] The close contact between the waxed paper and the wax slab at the places which have been scratched (upon which the visibility of the writing depended) is thus brought to an end and it does not recur when the two surfaces come together once more. The Mystic Pad is now clear of writing and ready to receive fresh inscriptions. [17]

The Mystic Pad can be thought of as depth without bottom, an infinite allusion ,a stratification of surfaces. It connects infinite depth in the implication of meaning and the skin-like essence of being, the absolute absence of any foundation.

second analogy

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[16]   The standard edition notes here a slight infidelity in Freud's description. "The principle is not affected". We are tempted to think that Freud inflicts his description elsewhere as well, in order to suit the analogy.

[17]   Ibid.   p. 228-29

"If we lift the entire covering sheet - both the celluloid and the waxed paper - off the wax slab, the writing vanishes, and, as I have already remarked, does not appear again. But it is easy to discover that the permanent trace of what was written is retained upon the wax slab itself and is legible in certain lights"[18]

"This is precisely the way in which, according to the hypothesis which I mentioned just now, our psychical apparatus performs its perceptual function. The layer which receives the stimuli - the system Pcpt.-Cs - forms no permanent traces; the foundations of memory come about in other, supplementary, systems.[19] Writing supplements perception before perception even appears to itself [is conscious of itself] "Memory" or writing is the opening of that process of appearance itself. The "perceived" may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it.

The blackboard or the paper is an abstraction, a perceptual layer.
The Mystic writing pad represents the unconscious . . . "I do not think it is too far-fetched to compare the wax slab with the unconscious behind the system Pcpt.-Cs."[20]
The becoming-visible which alternates with the disappearance of what is written would be the flickering-up (*Aufleuchten*) and passing away (*Vergehen*) of consciousness in the process of perception..

third analogy
The first and second analogies concern themselves with the space of writing, its extension and volume, reliefs and depressions. There is also the time of writing - the wax slab has a temporal quality - the three analogies of experience - permanence
 - succession
 - simultaneity

"But I must admit that I am inclined to press the comparison still further. On the Mystic Pad the writing vanished every time the close contact is broken between the paper which receives the stimulus and the wax slab which preserves the impression. This agrees with a notion which I have long had about the method in which the

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18 Ibid.   p. 230
19 Ibid.   p. 230
20 Ibid   pp. 230-31

perceptual apparatus of our mind functions, but which I have hitherto kept to myself."[21]

Freud links the withdrawal or removal of the pen with the fading of consciousness. He compares this to the feelers [antennae] which the unconscious would stretch out to the external world, and the subsequent retraction of these upon discovering a threat to the unconscious. . . . . the note ends

"If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the mystic writing pad while another periodically raises its covering sheet from the wax slab, we shall have a concrete representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind"[22]

. . . . and fourthly

. . . Derrida's 'Envois' which make up the first half of the Post Cards consists of (love) letters (or postcards), the fragmentary inscription of forbidden love, which identify neither their author nor their addressee . They are intense, passionate, elliptical, elusive, impenetrable. They undermine our confidence in our ability to read by refusing to indicate how they are to be read, when they are coded to avoid a possible censor, when they are ironic, when they allude to 'reality'. They blur the boundaries between fact and fiction. And in all these ways they constitute textual performances (performatives) of desire.[23]

☐　　☐　　☒　　☒☐

. . . The 'Envois' are full of gaps. They may be the remainders of a recently destroyed correspondence. Destroyed by fire or whirlwind, by the terrors. Names withheld, identities confused, ciphers introduced to protect the anonymity of the participants. Fifty two typographical spaces mark ellipses within the texts. Who can say what is

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21　　Ibid.　p. 231
22　　Ibid.　p. 232
23　　Belsey　　Desire　　p. 68

deleted, censored or repressed? The existence of this correspondence assumes the

separation of the lovers.

The love letter demonstrates the impossibility of communication as the transmission of immediate, transparent meaning. Meaning and truth are differed, disrupted by time differences and intervals which interfere with transparency. No letter can reach its destination. Much of the correspondence concerns a lost letter, which was 'true'. It was returned to the sender, never opened, but continues to haunt, even dominate the relationship.

. . . . .writing with a knife . . . . There is always a remainder, left unwritten, *off the card* . . . . they sometimes fail to arrive, cards *enframe* . . . . . the posting interrogates the effect of the letter . . . . . the message and the signature are both meaningless, but readable, but the message is poverty-stricken to all but the recipient. Its message is open to all as it is posted*dynamic* [the message is posted*static*] . In this message - camouflaged in the sense, is the censorship, the deletions, blanks and disguises of writing,[though there is no code that is secret] addition . . . . . repression, veils, conceals, blinds the recipient and the author. Umbrella Umbra, ambre solaire, factor 8 [facteur 8] Le Facteur. And back ◀◀ to the postcard. Writing is by definition 'posthumous' - it lives on [post] natal

. . . . A written sign is proffered in the absence of the receiver. How to style this absence? One could say that at the moment I am writing, the receiver may be absent from my field of present perception. But is this absence merely a distant presence, one which is delayed, or which, in one way or another, is idealised in its representation? . . . . A writing that is not structurally readable - iterable -beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing. . . . . imagine a writing whose code would be so idiomatic as to be established and known, as secret cipher, by only two 'subjects'.

Could we maintain that, following the death of the receiver, or even of both partners, the mark left by one of them is still writing?[24]

This is a review of the background, environment, ambience . . call it what you will of/for my work penser/poncer/panser. There are still some questions about how these are absorbed into the work. In Barthes' Sollers Writer there is a footnote on page 30[25]. On the same page, Sollers quotes Wittgenstein's remark that.
'The limits of my language are the limits of my world', and adds 'These limits are grammatical in so far as I want to remain within communication - but I know that I shall really achieve communication only if, by a breaking movement that has no return, I am also the person who denies these limits, who by this meaning reaches the pulsation of meaning.'

In **PPP** drama and poem are words that are very close together. They are 'doing', 'making', 'playing'. In the *playing* the doing takes place within the story - the action is used to form the narrative. The subject of the drama is the beholder. In the *poem*, the making is done outside the story, by the technician, the poet.

PPP is the record ⏮ ⏭ ⏸ ⏩ ⏪ of an event, the event being 'itself' a record ⏪ of an event ⏩. To an extent it is not consecrated - it is subject it to his own creation - but in so doing contributes to its creation. It is also a game about rejection ⏮ - sous rature - where we must try to stop ourselves ; just as we begin to 'read' it. The ⏸ is the author of two separate actions, separated by time, the action itself and the writing it down - remembering , narrating. There is no

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24   Derrida   Signature Event Context   trans Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman
25   Tel Quel, 20.   See p.13 for the remark about Foucault (If Foucault can write that 'man, today, has truth only in the enigma of the madman that he is and is not', this is because this enigma is henceforth that of a ceaseless contestation, of a region at one and the same time present and absent, in relationship to which it behoves the world to feel its limits, and man himself [le sujet] to turn back again towards an image of himself which is no longer the falsely disquieting one of the mirror)

'bad faith'. the narrator is completely absorbed in telling the story. **PPP**

encourages these two **II** 's to come together, so that the psychology between them disappears.

The narrator no longer has to bring together what he <u>did</u> in the past and is <u>saying</u> now. The telling of the story cannot be entrusted to a personal pronoun. It is narration itself that speaks the "it" of literature, not of a person. The two persons of the narrative

are separated merely by their order. In **PPP** the order is ordained and not ordained. Only the beholder can intrude. By reading, by looking. Too closely. Too close a reading provokes a refusal to inherit readability. An act of denial, a casting off of the natural acceptability of the old texts. A cleaning of the palimpsest, a refusal to let it read 'palimpsest'. It transfers concepts of *subject, reality, expression, description, story, meaning* to the figural. It calls into question the role of representation in writing. As writing has modelled itself on painting - stories, descriptions, portraits, **PPP** casts around for the eschatological - what happens when the thought (or the desire) of a particular goal goes beyond the present moment, beyond immediate calculations. It refers you to the idea of a much more distant goal than a tactical or strategic one: a goal

that the writer perceives in his solitude. **PPP** casts writing out, substituting

instead the "feature", moving backwards and forwards **▶▶** **◀◀** from the page to the canvas [object]. Instead of the "voice" there is this movement, this action, the continual movement which negates the role of author. It is no longer possible to put a person behind the writing. You cannot "see" the author. You are blinded. The imagery has left the writing, the writer and the reader the same. They are lost in a mirror of mirrors in which it is impossible to see the mirrors. The movement creates a no-go area, a frontier-land lawlessness,, a scene of a place so bleak that no palimpsest can survive. A land scoured even of a real language, what language there is nourished

by cracks, stains, breaches, gaps, chasms. **PPP** is half spoken word, half writing [writing which is spoken - the exact opposite of spoken words written down]. The discourse is set in motion by contacts, by relays. The words, the sounds, the letters reflect the physical qualities of the voice. but not the "expressive" . **PPP** frees itself from its author. 'By detaching my name I free (discontinue) myself'. Composition, rhetoric, development, memory (length). Has none of these [but a secret plan? a

game?] . The text sets out, it cannot "get there". The author does not wait to see the effect of what has been uttered : he does not keep watch over the reader. Something to do with the sublime, with Burke's notion of terror . One Terror for the seeing is the blindness. The madness of the day, the blindness of the day. The irrational nature of the outrageous terror. How do the word and the image fair under the terrors? Tell me.

poncer   panser   pensée   [penser

]

Drawing on Borromini

Fold I

Gilles Deleuze in his book 'the fold - LEIBNIZ AND THE BAROQUE' sees the notion of the fold as both a structural and metaphorical supplement to what he describes as the Baroque. He writes of 'Identical traits existing as constants within the most diverse environments and periods of time, the proliferation of mystical experience, the birth of the novel, a fragility of infinitely varied patterns of movement' as the main strands of enquiry that he will follow dealing with this subject.

He continues . . . 'the Baroque could be located in the protracted fascination we experience in watching waves heave, tumble and atomise when they crack down on an unfolding line being traced along the expanse of the shoreline. The curls and wisps of colour . . the depths of a tile of marble'. He paraphrases Proust . . . 'when we follow the ramifying and dilating branches of leaves piled in the concavity of the amber depths of a cup of tea'. Deleuze suggests that the 'experience' of the Baroque encompasses the idea and the physicality of the fold, the significance of the qualities the materials, and celebration of displacement and the worship of the non-parallel. These three items, the fold, the material and displacement will be the concepts I will be concentrating on in this work.

Detail of a door frame

Deleuze does not see the Baroque as a style, but more as a function which produces endless folds which arrive from all directions and which exist in many styles. The Baroque does not invent things, it twists and twirls them, over and over on top of each other, to infinity. These folds flow without any definite plan and stretch out indefinitely. Matter is amassed according to a first type of fold, and organized according to a second. These conceptual imaginings are mirrored in a more prosaic description of what Wölfflin sees in architectural terms as 'Baroque tendencies'

146

San Carlo   aerial view

widening of the floor / matter handled in masses or aggregates /

fewer perpendiculars / low and curved stairs that push into space

flattening of pediments / matter spilling over into space /

rounding of angles / limestone producing a 'spongy' surface /

vertical forms /

To recap. . . . . Deleuze suggests that the 'experience' of the Baroque encompasses the idea and the physicality of the fold, the displacement and the worship of the non-parallel. These three notions, the fold, the material and displacement will be the concepts I will be concentrating on in this work. This work requires as Heidegger might say, a temple. My temple [and I am already breaking the rules by introducing mimicry] will be Borromini's San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane. This Church was Borromini's first major commission. The order of the Discalced Trinitarians acquired the site in 1611 and building of the Church commenced in 1638 and the interior was finished by 1641. Due to financial problems the facade was not completed until 1682. In 1667, the year of Borromini's death, the ground floor only was complete. The building was completed by Borromini's nephew, Barnardo. One of Borromini's aims was to move away from a plan that developed from the motif of the Greek cross - a central area with associated secondary localities, to a concept of a space which seems continuous, flowing. This desire was partly fuelled by the Council of Trent's desire to stress the importance of the Holy Sacrament, which suggested a more intimate, theatrical space than a cross or oval supplies an answer to. It is here that Borromini constructed an elaborate geometric construction which provided so much comment and controversy at the time.   Though Borromini was bound by the various geometrical conventions of the day, his novel ways of combining these produced a novel and challenging architecture.

As the Renaissance rejected the Gothic's dependence on the technical possibilities of the arch and returned to the neo-Platonic orders of symmetry and proportion, Borromini began the movement away from the tyranny of the plan. Whereas the Renaissance architects had renounced the flying buttress and other Gothic qualities such as showy decoration, excessive height and the elimination of the wall in favour of stained glass, the Baroque architects now moved away from the Renaissance occupation with the barrel vault and essentially vertically supported masonry. The walls of San Carlo consist of bays, niches and straights which combine to form a wall of movement. The columns, for instance, are set into the walls so that although they still perform strong supportive roles they never interrupt the horizontal flow. The walls are treated in a sculptural manner, and there is evidence to suggest that Borromini had studied at length Michelangelo's staircase in the Sistine Chapel's Laurentian Library. The altar too is 'furniture', a separate case : it is not allowed to arrest the circular motion. Borromini's drawings were lost for a number of years, and were only discovered in Vienna in 1935. Indeed Borromini was extremely secretive with his drawings, and only supplied masons with essential measurements. As it had been the basic tenet of architectural practice from Brunelleschi to Alberti that all buildings were constructed from geometric relationships, there has always been controversy over Borromini's plan of San Carlo. That this should be so is precisely due to the 'flowing' nature of the elevations, and without Borromini's drawings, there are difficulties in discovering the geometrical logic behind the plan with 'only' the building itself as evidence.

detail of façade of San Carlo

detail

project plan for San Carlo Alb.172 I

149

sketches of façades

This centering on notions of curvature suggests to Deleuze a connection with Leibniz's theory that the curvature of the universe is prolonged by three concepts - the fluidity of water, the elasticity of bodies, and the moving spirit as a mechanism. He gives a description of the universe which is compressed by an active force that endows matter with a curvilinear or spinning movement. This compression forces matter into the 'negative' space surrounding it, producing a maelstrom of vortices inside each other, each dividing each other towards infinity. Matter is spongy, porous, without emptiness - 'holes' contained within other 'holes'. The totality of the universe is a 'pond of matter in which there exist different ponds and waves.'

Leibniz's philosophy acknowledges myriad connections and series of concepts that are not held in a prescribed order or unifying system. Multiplicity and variety of inflections produce 'events' or 'vibrations' 'with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples'. These do not move in a 'spiral [philosophical]' manner, but they radiate and disseminate 'in a geography of experience', so that we can imagine the movement of light and sound as 'folds' of 'ethereal matter' that 'waft and waver'.

. . . . bending, folding ; anticlines, synclines - Deleuze invents the term *geophilosophy* to describe a conceptual activity of 'absolute deterritorialisation'. He describes this in figural terms, as 'activity sliding on the surface of the world, as in a wave. A 'surfer'. The Geophilosopher rides the crest of turbulence, on the shoulders of the wave that diffuse the energy into the atmosphere'. It is a development of Leibniz' s discourse on chaos, a portrayal of a subject swirling in a maelstrom of spatial doubt. This ensuing anxiety defines the individual body, and its elasticity and bending motions produce extension. The subject lives in and reacts to its own development as a series of folds.

From contemplating the natural world, Deleuze moves his attention to the application of these concepts in Art. He conceives of artworks composed of units that are neither logical or organic, that is, neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality; nor formed or prefigured by those units in the course of a logical development or of an organic evolution.

Deleuze rejects the existence of chaos, but describes what he calls Leibniz's 'approximations to chaos'. This would be the 'sum of all possibles,' that is, all individual essences insofar as each tends to exist on its own account. Leibniz's own thoughts were a synthesis of the Cartesian idea that matter was a continuous,

150

homogeneous quantity, and that of the Atomists who conceived the world as being made from a combination of solid atoms surrounded by empty space. Various combinations give rise to the variety of the world. Their problem was to explain *cohesion* - why and how particular atoms attracted each other, the Cartesians' problem was to explain why the world consisted of different physical parts. Descartes' division of reality into two categories, *thought* (consciousness, as in beliefs, emotions, theories, perceptions) and *extensions in space* (shape, size, movement) and their manifestation in *modes* mirrors Leibniz's *individual substances* and *dependent existences* and the division of reality into collections and properties such as *mental* and *semi-mental.* In a physical sense, Leibniz's chaos would/might amount to depthless shadows, a vision at one with the Baroque, with its niches and protrusions and differences between interior and exterior space.

In a psychic form, chaos would be the undifferentiated saturation of the senses, a world where all information was of equal significance. Deleuze develops this argument further by linking Leibniz's theories of chaos to those of Whitehead's notion of the idea of *extension*. Whitehead's theory of *extension* is explained in a figural sense as the imagining of an object being so stretched so that it merges with its neighbouring object, and so on, so that the these objects can only be defined as being categories of each other.

This has a connection to the concept of the fold and its dependence on the alterable, the changeable, the fickle, the flexible, the unstable, the unsteady, the vacillating. *Extensions* are always in movement. There is always change and modification. Components are taken out and others substituted. Permanence must always evolve from a state of flux, a hardening of the magma. Deleuze asks, 'is it the same flow, the same thing, or the same occasion?' The Object can be thought of as something passing through time, constantly gaining or losing material, or something that is unchanged by time, true or valid for all time, immutable.

This constitutes an infinite series. It is a vibration with the potential to cover every wavelength, every harmonic, and every visual and tactile coordinate. Any point in time or space occupies a point within this series. These vibrations are themselves composed of elements that have particular properties of size, and occupancy of space.

Details of recessed columns

151

Or timbre for instance, in terms of tint, tone, translucency, defraction. These also can enter on their own infinite series created out of their own unique qualities. They are measured in *intensities*. A third quality, one that mediates the indefinite or the demonstrable is the nature of the *individual* - one that has parts, and is a part, and whose parts have inherent features, and whose individuality is at the same time one of those parts. [dog = legs + body + ears + 'dogness'].

Whitehead sees the individual as a creative force, manifested through a growing together of initially separate parts or organs. It has collected and grown these through a *prehension* of the need for those qualities. Prehension signifies individuality , the person, the individual. 'The eye is a prehension of light'. Deleuze goes on to say that echoes, reflections, traces, prismatic deformations, perspective, folds are prehensions that somehow anticipate 'psychic life'.

The problem is not how to finish the fold, but how to continue it, how to bring it to infinity. It is not only because the fold affects all materials that it thus becomes expressive matter, with different scales, speeds and different vectors (mountains and waters, papers, fabrics, living tissues, the brain).

This essence rather than reality manifests itself in the expectancy of a repetition, an absence, change in the object repeated, but a change 'slant' in the expectation of someone contemplating it. But repetition sets up an expectancy in the mind, the hint of the possibility of difference in the manner in which the two events repeat one another - or , rather repeat the same act or event to come.

The illegitimacy of the façade also questions the exact state of play at the end of the repetition - whether or not that at the end of the repetition, everything recommences with the first stage. There is a third happening in the repetition, the appearance of the *'for itself'*. The first two states only repeat something that appears *for itself* in the third stage, where this 'thing' repeats itself.

This continual dividing that Deleuze talks about can be discussed in temporal terms too. The present is the repeater, the only presence that can accept/include action. The past is repetition itself, fixed, only offering itself up for distortion. The future is that which is repeated, having subordinated the other two, stripping them of their individual freedoms and directions. But as the Baroque façade continues its

indefinite progress [or at least journey] across its own façade, pixel by pixel, reliving and reforming its own visage as it does so, the imagination retains the image of the previous case as the new one appears. It is able to gather cases and compress their memory into states of being which give off a particular 'aroma'. Not in the sense of memory or reflection, merely as a synthesis of time - time in the sense of the repetition of instants which constitute the present. The nature of the past and the future is also alive in the present   - contained in the contractions of their own diminution. The façade is the scene of all these repetitions, rhythms, displacements and disguises, their divergences and decenterings. It is the arena in which they unfold and indoctrinate one another.

Fold 2

plan (plæn) n.

a detailed scheme, method, etc., for attaining an objective.
a proposed, usually tentative idea for doing something.
a drawing to scale of a horizontal section through a building taken at a given level. Compare
ground plan, elevation
an outline, sketch, etc
(in perspective drawing) any of several imaginary planes perpendicular to the line of vision and
between the eye and object depicted.
to form a plan (for) or make plans (for).
to make a plan of (a building).
to have in mind as a purpose; intend.[C18: via French from Latin *planus* flat]

contrivance, design, device, idea, method, plot, procedure, programme, project, proposal,
proposition, scenario, scheme, strategy, suggestion, system. blueprint, chart, delineation,
diagram, drawing, illustration, layout, map, representation, scale drawing, sketch. arrange,
concoct, contrive, design, devise, draft, formulate, frame, invent, organize, outline, plot,
prepare, represent, scheme, think out. aim, contemplate, envisage, foresee, intend, mean,
propose, purpose.

The definition of the word *plan* contains contradictions inside itself. On the one hand there is the notion of *the detailed scheme, method, etc., for attaining an objective*, and on the other hand the notion *of the proposed, usually tentative idea for doing something*. Instead therefore of the 'definition' being a place of unquestioned stability and unquestioned authority, is becomes a place of conflict and discrepancy. Plan A. Plan B. This discrepancy suggests to me a line of enquiry that I will later be applying to San Carlo, and eventually to my own visual commentary on the building and its relation to these ideas.

Initially this notion rotates around the sententious – the litigious, quarrelsome need for the plan to control the building – as if supplying the foundations weren't enough, there is this unspent desire to control 'all the way up'. The Baroque will always go against this nature, so the first floor will always be a place of conquest, indecision, and temper. There is a frontier between plan and action. Somewhere there [out there, beyond the locus] is the place where plans become action. This must also be the place, the same place, where there is a leakage backwards : where actions in themselves reinvent themselves as plans.

There is a drama unfolding here . . . . .

The plan of the plan   /   the onset of a repetition   /   the difference in temporal activity between planning and 'the plan'   /   The plan as in the scene of manners, the construction of a rhetoric of servility that its very sententiousness destroys   /   the plan as both a 'static' force and a 'dynamic' force   /   can anything be purely a 'plan' ? Can it stay as a plan indefinitely?   /   planning begets the 'plan' , which returns to the idea to planning   /   The notion of frontiers and the parergon, the notion of the frame around the plan which protects and at the same time negates the plan itself   /
          The construction of a plan as the result of 'the work'. e.g. the 'plan' is in a sense a conclusion [the introduction / preface argument]   /
          the plan therefore is figural too. It is seen to follow, and therefore takes on a historical and critical nature which a true 'plan' could never have.

The plan is an aesthetic. It has no interface with action. [But it must have some historicy, it must have the kernels of other plans.] There can never be a 'new plan'. A plan will have as part of its own plan a palimpsest.

. . . . *Viewing the plan*

It is a blank, not part of the thing itself, but the thing itself can not exist without it. The art, the 'thing', points back to the plan. Plan. a proposition : a sentence [sentenced, convicted].

The presence of the plan : the ongoing repetition needed to continually keep the plan 'planning' . The plan, and the planning, may develop into cliché. The plan as a stupidity : a faux-naïf expression of an intent which is at once limited in its scope - namely, its extent of movement from the topos.

The perception of the plan inside the art object. The notion of the plan as a sublime in which the rendering is its deterioration. This rate of descent of death. But the necessity of the 'next'. Planning for the plan. The 'plan' can never begin. There is no 'before the plan'.

The plan as an arena of conflict between the demands of <u>composition</u> and <u>organisation</u>

 . . . . The plan assumes a sense of continuance, an unfolding of an idea. The repetition inside the plan escapes, egresses in the form of the fold, which in turn generates alternative plans, lets in the idea of the baroque . . . . These lines constitute the 'planning'. They are not a plan, in the sense of a blueprint, but they do communicate the information that will be discussed, and at the same time leave the possibility of the plan being something that may evolve with the material, that at any one moment in time the plan, as it then exists, will be different from any other plan that previously called itself by that name, for word Plan contains contradictions inside itself

In Leo Steinberg's 'Borromini's San Carlo Alle Quattro Fontane'[1], he reviews attempts to account for the unusual ground plan of the main Chapel. Various historians had formulated geometric theories as to how the chapel had been conceived and designed. The Church is ovular in shape, and most of these observers assumed that the oval was the primary structural unit of the chapel. Burckhardt saw San Carlo as a combination of elliptical, semi-circular and irrationally projected spaces. The forces pushing out from the central oval suggest no particular shape themselves. There is no attempt to formulate any reason for the resultant shapes, Gurlitt seems to suggest that the shapes are realised a priori and the lines of force are akin to some sort of 'will'.

Cornelius Gurlitt[2] saw the plan as an oval opening on to four curved exedrae or chapels. Characteristic of the arrangement is the fact that there is hardly a straight line in the ground plan.

Weingartner sees St. Carlo's plan as 'an oval with intrusive diagonals'. The primary force in the structure is a perimeter, a membrane under pressure from an exterior force demanding a say in the form of the inside. The membrane suggests an airlock, separating the pressure of the inside from the pressure of the outside. The differing textures of these atmospheres negates the role of a frontier. There is no frontier, no place of indecision, doubt, uncertainty : but there is still, there still remains, the conquered ground, the gain line of vulnerability. The Geophilosopher, the surfer, shifts this turbulence just further along the wave.

Joseph Weingartner's[3] theory suggests an Exterior Oval Contracted in the diagonals. This implies that an oval perimeter yields to a force of contraction, so that a three sided pier is drawn out of the wall.

1	Leo Steinberg	Borromini's San Carlo Alle Quattro Fontane	Garland 1977
2	Cornelius Gurlitt	Geschichte des barockstils in Italien	Stuttgart 1887
3	Römische Barockkirchen p.132		Munich 1926-31

Munoz [4] and Guidi [5] see the plan as a single ellipse, semi-circular at the ends, but with flared side niches joined to the main body with short straight wall sections. This a very generalised idea. There are no explanations for the positioning of the entrances to the Chapels or indeed any of the columns. The 'power forces' seem to offer only a generalised [hopeful] solution, a cry for the intervention of some 'mystical' force.

Stretched Oval with Swelling flanks. Based again on a primary oval.

The entrance and the apse are semicircular, but the body of the chapel is not circular. The straight sections linking the circles have no geometric life to them. There is a heresy here, disguised as a hierarchy. Fasolo attempts to subvert the oval in favour of the orthodoxy [from Gk. *hairesis,* a choosing of the circle], and to introduce an entrance to the outer chapels which is geometrically homeless and serves only to ingratiate the circles with their absent ovals.

Three interlocked circles. Fasolo's [6] interpretation sees the entrance and apse as semi-circles, though in fact the curvature of the lateral walls is not circular.

4	Antonio Munoz	Borromini in Biblioteca d'Arte Illustrata	1921
5	Massimo Guidi	Borromini	1922
6	Vincenzo Fasolo	Architettura e Arte Decorative	1939

This concept involves a basic rhombus [from Greek *rhombus*, something that spins; related to *rhembein*, to whirl] which is penetrated by two circles and ellipses. The distance between circle and ellipse is equal to the side of the column. Steinberg writes, 'The error in this interpretation is in the entrance and apse: they are semi-circles, not three-quarter-circles. This solution introduces an element of the kinetic. The plan is a construction rather than the geometric evolution of a concept, an assembly of available resources, objets trouvés rather than objets de vertu. The result of an attempt at the picture of a solution rather than an observation of a solution.

A Lozenge with Axial and Lateral Niches. The primary form is portrayed as a diamond, penetrated by ellipses and circles. Brinkmann, introduced by Sedlmayr [7]

The primary element of the ground plan is a rhombus initiated at the entrance on the long axis. The elevation preserves only the middle portions of its four sides, while its points are rounded out into large niches. The lateral niches, blurred by their decoration, form segments of ovals, whose short axis reaches from the wall to the centre of the rhombus, while the niches at the entrance and choir are segments of elliptical figures that touch the other imagined ovals. The oval reigns everywhere - in the main dome, in the fill of the pendentives, in the floor mosaic. The niche over the semicircle appears as a closed spatial unit, encouraging the viewer to visualise its completion in order to gain a clear sense of its curvature. There is a sense of two volumes penetrating each other, the one over the rhombus and the one over the ellipse.

Brinckmann [8] gives what is in fact a different view - Five Interpenetrating Ellipses Interlocked with a Diamond.

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7   Sedlmayr   Belvedere   p. 65   1925

8   A.E. Brinckmann   Jahrhunderts in den romanischen Landern   p. 76   Berlin 1915

The longitudinal arms of the cross are half as wide and twice as long as those of the short axis. This problematic tampering with the basic iconographic materials is further magnified in the lack of a geometric equation for the bevelling of the outer corners. Pevsner here seems to be accepting the effect of the facade before the event of the plan has been completed

Domed Greek Cross, or Four Tangent Ovals. This solution, by Pevsner is based on a modification of the Greek Cross.

Hempel's solution is similar to Brinckmann's interpenetrating diamond, although in his drawing, which is a combination of oval and Greek cross, the rhombus can't completely fit. Hempel's solution is interesting in that it is not really an attempt at a solution, it is more of a creative reconstruction of the problem.

Hempel's Interpenetrating oval and Cross   Diamond with Undulating perimeter.

Wittkower writes 'The geometric basis of the final design is still the diamond pattern of the two joined equilateral triangles, and the undulating perimeter of the building follows the rhomboid geometry'. This is not a particularly clear or concise description. Wittkower's description follows Hempel's concept of the rhomboid as the primary, though concealed form, which is shown as a fusion of three structural types. Wittkower sees the building as a series of disconnected complexities which show some elements of unease with each other.

Wittkower's notion of the diamond with undulating perimeter

Lastly,
'The plan at first glance appears to depend on a series of interlocking ovals yielding an irregular interior space enclosed by an undulating surface. However, when the viewer looks upwards into the dome of the building, it seems that Borromini may have intended him to sense a relationship between San Carlo and a Renaissance church. The same central domes and the four flanking domes are there, but now they are constructed in such a way that they appear to have yielded to pressure from two sides. The result spatially is a sense of flow and fusion between the compartments instead of the emphasis on the clearly defined units which was characteristic of High Renaissance building.'[9]

The diversity of approaches in these readings, and the discrepancies inside each of them indicate something of the character of the building. All the interpretations have a common factor. There is always a reliance on a 'primary form'. This 'primarity' can manifest itself in two ways. There may be

9   Helen Gardner   Art Through the Ages   pp. 399-400   Yale   1959

a physical form which due to its size, position or compositional identity dominates the work. Alternatively, the 'primarity' may be in the configuration of an overwhelming concept, an abstract concept which, due to its very nature dominates the structure. But either of these is then challenged by secondary structures which complicate and enrich the former. Little if anything is left over from this schematic confrontation.

Not all interpretations are hierarchic. Forms can evolve simultaneously. Concepts can form in which different ideas can be of equal value as the imagination evolves. In San Carlo, Borromini intertwines three geometric constructions. The oval,

which will locate the dome, the location of the octagon - which will in turn locate the support system, and the fixing of the points of entrances to the four chapels are notions which can only exist together, and in support of each other as they are invented. Moving outwards from the Chapel's centre, the plan reads as an octagonal star facet whose stem ends describe an oval :

moving inwards the chapel reads as an oval modified by a cross with an octagon defining its centre. The resultant oval prefigures the oval of the dome. The objectives of the geometric construction are threefold. The discovery of the oval, which will locate the dome, the location of the octagon, which will in turn locate the support system, and the fixing of the points of entrances to the four chapels.

View from the Lantern

Temporally, the dome[10] becomes the first fixed element of the building, but there is no resultant masonry that [supports] illustrates these calculations. Certainly the two triangles which form the rhombus, and the tangentially derived circles do not coincide with any physical structure.

Of the main constructional devices, the two equilateral triangles and their inscribed circles, the resultant oval and the rectangle, only the oval is eventually imbued with any physical form. The oval has a general part to play in the general oval-ness of the church as well as being a specific functional

[10]   The circumference of San Carlo's dome equals the diameter of the dome of St. Peters - 186 palmi. This is no coincidence. Borromini scaled down the size of the whole interior to create this coincidence after he had commenced with the plan of San Carlo.

device. The geometrical construction of this oval therefore takes place not on the ground, the *low*, but at the level of the oval, the *high*.

The plan can now be thought of as being *between* the high and the low. Parts of the plan can also exist at different levels. The plan now has volume, *real* space inside itself. Different elements of the plan - the oval, the cross, the octagon - can be imagined to have different degrees of influence at different heights. This creation of independent levels of influence gives rise to the notion of alternative foci of stress and repose which alter the shape, the 'grain' of the work.

What is the basis of this argument between the high and the low? Structurally the high is always indebted to the low. The plan is always *the* Plan. It is always the disciplinarian. The foundations will always be present at the discovery of the building, from the present forward to antiquity. It always has an authority in that is recognised as the signature of the building where any storey [*historia*, picture, and the Latin narrative {story}] plan would seem counterfeit and a location for a scene of deceit. It is this indebtedness to the ground plan, this continual grievance [the tear stain running down the facade] and jealousy between the two that results in the distrust and lack of confidence which manifests itself in their mutual surveillance. This surveillance is the epitome of contemplation, it has no action in itself, it is always hidden [veiled], it has no action itself, things are done through it. An interpreter, a spokesman, a representative that *causes* understanding between the low and the high. Having no language of its own, the "truchement" causes meaning in one idiom to be comprehended in another medium - what in Greek was called *metaphorein*, to carry over from one to the other.

As Deleuze sees the Pyramid as an 'event', so can Borromini's *action* of in/venting be thought of as an e/vent of pleating, a folding of pushing back, of the opening of a hole, of creating a *texture* of possibilities. For it is the way the material is folded that constitutes this texture. This supporting event, the supporting, the mutuality inside [the folds of] the supportive, shifts inside itself, vibrates - but not as in a state of flux though - they are always separate, their dependence in their separateness. They shift inside the fold, and as they do so [need to do so], they become the gauze of the fold, the secondary and

164

the main event at the same time. Counterpoint, invention {making up the falsehoods, the f*abrications*} [the three part *invention*]. Retrograde. Inversion. But like any invention [*chromatic / fantasy*] the repetition always alters the narrative. Moving outwards from the Chapel's centre, the plan reads as an octagonal star facet whose stem ends describe an oval : moving inwards the chapel reads as an oval modified by a cross with an octagon defining its centre.

. . . the resultant oval prefigures the oval of the dome. The dome enters the plan. The event of the plan. The objectives of the geometric construction are threefold. The discovery of the oval, which will locate the dome. The location of the octagon - which will in turn locate the support system. And the fixing of the points of entrances to the four chapels. These holes belong to the same pictorial vision. The fold pushes backwards into the four side chapels [where it is refolded, repeated, reverberated by the conches]. The manner of this folding creates the consistency and grain of the building. The nature of the thing is defined less by its distinct psyche or temper than by the style which makes them inseparable inside their folds. The manner of the folding distributes the light, disseminates the colours and the concavity and convexity of the trembling textures which give the forms their coherence. The nature of the event is present too in the nature of the variance of these textures, those layers, strata, densities which form and reform the fold. But the fold is never repeated exactly, for the nature of the fold is only a temporary conceit, and even the same conditions are themselves conditioned by the effect it produces. Hystereris/ *husterosis / husteros* - the coming is always deferred.

From these hesitations rises the façade. Pure theatre. But not pure in any way in terms of *itself.* Pure in its striving for the higher ground, the higher point, which surveys the folds below, and contemplates their origins, and can only accept these in terms of explanations, not secrets, not composite parts, but in a projection, a miss[vei]le.

San Carlo also pre-exists in terms of a concept before and during its geometric construction. The geometry reinforces and makes redundant the concept as it is drawn.

the fold . . . . bending or be bent double so that one part covers another . . . . . . to fold a sheet of paper, so covering the [previous]/[subsequent] and therefore destroying the narrative's filament. Indeed, moving the narrative from the horizontal to the vertical – later, the scene of the spectacle.

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

. . . . . . bringing together and intertwining arms, legs, etc. . . . : she *folded* her arms . . . . . or as if *folded* in . . . . . . *folded* in one's arms . . . . . a bend (in stratified rock) or (of stratified rock) that results from movements within the

earth's crust that produces such structures as anticlines and synclines . . . . a
piece or section that has been *folded*: a fold of cloth . . . . . . a mark, a
crease, or hollow made by folding . . . the *fold* in an undulating terrain . . .
.*folding in*: protecting, cradling

The Baroque invents . . . . . .

invention too as in the making up of falsehoods deceits, deceptions, dissimulations,
inveracities (rare) mendacities, perjuries, prevarications, untruths, lies, misstatements, stories
(eventually, as we have seen, storeys), untruths, fibs, fictions, and fabrications. *Fabrication*.
The inventing of the fabric of the building, its fabrication through its physical making, and at
the same time of its making, the fabrication of its own rhetoric, conceit and repetition. The
narrative of its being. As the now-invented leaks its own artifice, the Baroque confirms,
legalises, the artifice/artificiality in the-thing-invented, its 'two part invention' - the
counterpoint of plan and elevation, of interior and exterior.

The inside and the outside

The infinite fold separates or moves between matter and soul, the façade.

This face itself hides a duality , a bogus [two faced] pretence as the dupe of
the interior, its 'bold face' giving rise to doubt in its 'surface dressing'. The
façade demands that 'reflections', 'echoes', 'doubles', and 'souls' overcome
'equalities', and 'cycles'. There is no 'exchange system' in use - 'theft' and '*gift*'
are the only currency. Doors and windows - folds within a fold. Jean Rousset
defines the Baroque as the severing of the facade from the inside, and talks
too of the risk of 'explosion' caused by interior decoration. The façade always
thrusts itself forward while the interior internalises.

and the closed room, the outside and the inside.

The Façade of San Carlo

inflection - the word is changing within itself too. This inflection has its own inside and outside, its own façade and i/anteriority. This scene of modulation of the fold's voice in pitch or tone or timbre [*grain*] helps to deflect the fold, to encourage its curving around, its curvaceousness, its progress from *inflectere*, to curve round, to *flectere,* to bend] and from concave to convex or vice versa, continually stopping to emit *points of inflection,* stationary points on a curve at which the tangent is horizontal or vertical and where tangents on either side have the same sign.

168

Interior of San
Carlo

This line of inflection is actualised in the soul but realised in matter, each one on its own side. Such is the Baroque trait: an exterior always on the outside, an interior always on the inside. An infinite 'receptivity', and infinite 'spontaneity': the outer façade of reception and the inner rooms of action. Up to now Baroque architecture is forever confronting two principles, a bearing principle and a covering principle. Conciliation of the two will never be direct, but necessarily harmonic, inspiring a new harmony: it is the same expression, the same line, that is expressed in the elevation of the inner song of the soul, through memory or by heart, and the extrinsic fabrication of material partitions, from cause to cause but, justly, what is expressed does not exist outside its expressions.

The high and the low

The perfect accord of severing

Initially, '/, inside the initial, the initialness of the initial - Already the fold is awakening. The initial, the capital offence, answerable by the guillotine/ hymen/ scoring,/ 'knowing the score' [*ARTFUL*] neither eventful, in the sense of quantity, *full* of events - the repetition of events is *the* event, but *the* event is always upstaged [in the full spatial meaning] by the next event. Previous to the severing is the marking out, the decisions made each side if the cut, the imaginary   stories that unfold (without drawing to attention *that* word) with each notion of the action. Cutting nor non-cutting, cutting or non-cutting wherever, this scoring, [scoring out - deleting or cancelling by marking through with a line or lines; cross out] previous to the fold, but suggesting and demanding a territorial assessment followed by the mapping out, the scoring such as in the full score, with all the parts appearing on separate staves vertically arranged. Scoring, cutting also harbours a grievance. What is the basis of this argument between the high and the low? Structure-wise the high is always indebted to the low. The plan is always *the* Plan.

Crypt

For the lower has in turn its guilt complex. The hierarchy of low and high with its complementary law and punishment. The resolution of tension is achieved through the division into two levels, the two floors being of one and the same world (the line of the universe). The façade-matter goes down below, while the soul-room goes up above. The infinite fold then moves between the two levels. But by being divided, it greatly expands on either side: the fold is divided into folds, which are tucked inside and which spill onto the outside, thus connected as are the high and the low.

View of
Lantern

As Deleuze here describes Baroque 'tendencies', I now want to revisit the scene of these arguments and to see how the underlying questions and anomalies discovered in [out of] the structure of San Carlo by Steinberg can

find an egress, some form of relief, in a new construction of my own invention. In other words how these findings by Deleuze out of Leibniz can re-fold themselves and regenerate the 'event', The object of this new work will to act as a 'panser', a bandage, a surveillance.

Fold 3

To restate /refold Deleuze

Deleuze sees the notion of the fold as both a structural and metaphorical addendum to what he describes as the Baroque. He writes of 'Identical traits existing as constants within the most diverse environments and periods of time, the proliferation of mystical experience, the birth of the novel, a fragility of infinitely varied patterns of movement' as the main strands of enquiry that he will follow in dealing with this subject. He continues . . . 'the Baroque could be located in the protracted fascination we experience in watching waves heave, tumble and atomise when they crack down on an unfolding line being traced along the expanse of the shoreline.

Leo Steinberg's analysis of San Carlo suggests to me that the possibility of Borromini's reluctance to disseminate his 'plans' may well suggest the possibility of gaming in his desire that his [paper] plans would not be common knowledge, and that the structure itself, the stone, would not itself mark out the true origins of its geometry. So from the very beginning [before even the preface/introduction had been written] there has existed some thought of a sense of mystery – Deleuze's 'proliferation of mystical experience' – a notion that he connects with the notion of narrative.

Beyond the block of stone there is the sentence, the discourse of the building [the building *of*]. Borromini's first contact with architecture was in his work as a mason, originally when working on St. Peter's. The shaping and smoothing of stone so as to allow them to meet each other in exactitude. Also, in fact, the meeting of geometry and the real world – marked figurally by the 'irrational angle' of the intersection between Via delle Quattro Fontane and Via Venti Septembre at Quatre Fontane. Here before the geometry materializes, the purity of a geometric construction is compromised by geography . . . is this too touched by Deleuze's geophilosopher? It is the street that initially gains the controlling interest. The worldly interrupts the Holy. Circumstance challenges order. The pure line of the draughtsman and the action of the builder. The drawing [the scene of the artist] is enlarged/translated, with all that entails, to that of the full-scale plan [the scene of the mason] The first act is to create the foundations, to move in the opposite direction to heaven. The building can then rise, and San Carlo rises as a double. The outside and the inside. The Plan and the elevation.

The hymen of the exterior contrasts with the moulding of the interior. Of marble and stucco. Of precomposition and improvisation. For the inside the structure needs only to be a rough approximation. There is the stucco, the skin to be added, the material that will compensate if

173

necessary, and will 'point', articulate the geometrical form of the art object. As San Carlo rose, the arabesque nature of the 'spaces-in-between' were improvised. The resolution of the complex three-dimensional curves, in many cases not to be repeated, were undoubtedly arrived at 'in the building of'. So in San Carlo's, Borromini's improvisatory geometry was mirrored in its forming. Indeed, the surfaces suggested in the plans were possibly constructed through improvisation. So San Carlo even as it rises from the ground begins to compromise its own plan, to see itself in the form of a narrative escaping from the sententiousness of its plan. But for the narrative [itself] to exist [to be built] there must be some notion of a plan, there must exist a hierarchy of instances. Perceiving the building is not just 'following the story', but is also about recognising its construction, 'arranging' the structures vertically and horizontally, inventing metaphors between these two, and also between those other two, the inside and the outside.

These instances sow the seed of 'being', of again, the 'thingliness', the seed of the narrative - something that will come to fruition later in the convention of a 'functional unit'. Everything about/in the building is functional - even if it were seemingly to strive for the opposite. But these blocks are not necessarily 'structural blocks'. They do not necessarily coincide with a material - the stone, the stucco, but may coincide with other forms - psychological forms - behaviours, intentions, emotions. The language of 'standing' is not the same as the language of articulated language. The 'standing stones' form a narrative : they are independent of linguistic units – intersections, constructions, lengths. Indeed, the two languages don't necessarily need to share the same 'points' in metaphorical or geometrical senses. At the commencement of the gaze of San Carlo there are created, through necessity, the Functions, the cardinal

points, which inaugurate or conclude an uncertainty, a space, a relationship of spaces. They do not necessarily appear 'dramatic' but entail some uncertainty. There is some 'risk' in these spaces. The spaces can be decorated – but this 'decoration' must not force a change of direction. These are in effect catalysers. As Cardinal functions move the narrative on: catalysers effect the surface, the qualities of the stone/stucco. Further factors bearing on the [apparent] 'movement' of the stone are 'indices', the pointers, signallers which diffuse and disseminate the 'psychological state', and create the gift of 'identity' and 'atmosphere'. It is in their gift too to invite the activity of deciphering, of development of its own interior critique. And in the centre, central to requirements are the animants, the agents of the sententia, who locate the thing in time and space, bring knowledge, serve to authenticate the referent. These

Functions, Catalysers, Indices and Animants organise and charge the space and surfaces that are San Carlo.

The animants bring forward the question of syntax. How are the different units put together to form a narrative? What are the rules? How do they relate to each other? The nature of the narrative causes a confusion between consecution and consequence, temporality and logic. There is a problem with time here. Between time as a reality - the tale must be rooted in temporality - and another time, the contrast between a concept such as tragedy (defined by the unity of action), and one of historical narrative (plurality of actions and the unity of time). It is this folding that allows logical time and chronological time to coexist, to produce a new sense of time that is expanding and contracting inside its own momentum. The re-construction of San Carlo aims at a structural description to the chronological illusion of its own narrative, in the sense that time only exists as a semiotic system - true time is mimetic. San Carlo's narrative functions as a series of sequences. These sequences portray themselves as 'points of choices' . Places, spaces, times, durations where choices are made. Views expressed. Decisions made. A scene of tension, of boundaries, of edges. These sequences are always [...] framed. Named, Signed and of course copied and counterfeited. But these stones must have no antecedent and no consequent. Sequences are moments of 'risk' - the narrative can take off in various different directions. Several sequences can be woven in to each other - they move in counterpoint. These only halt when there is a break in a higher level, where they draw their meanings.

There can be actions [forms] without characters[stone] - but not characters [stones]without actions [forms]. Later, the character - who might only have a name - acquires a place, a position in the structure, later a psychology constructed from their function and position [importance] in the building [of] . The stones [characters] are essential tools to carry 'action' in the narrative - can there *be* narrative without 'characters'? . . . but . . . these 'characters' cannot be classified or described in the sense of 'persons'. They are participants rather than beings. And these participants must, as part of this game, submit themselves to rules. Firstly to those of derivation – of relationships and hierarchies, and secondly to rules of action – the transformations of these relationships. Stones are [cast] in opposites - Donor/Receiver, Helper/Opponent. The definition of the stone is always judged in relation to the participation in a sphere of actions - desire, communication , struggle.

175

San Carlo, the cross, the meeting point of donor and beneficiary. I : you.

The narrator, the listener/reader. Is the author the narrator? To what extent does Borromini 'donate' San Carlo? Who is the donor of the narrative? For the narrative emanates from the person[author] [Borromini], but there is an endless interchange between the 'personality' and the 'art'. What Borromini is attempting is to construct a rift between the narrator as an impersonal consciousness, knowing everything of his characters, limiting his narrative to what the characters know or observe as if the characters were the senders of the narrative. Narration receives its meaning from the world around it. Outside of narration there are other systems - sociological, economic, ideological, and other elements, historical facts, behaviours etc. San Carlo gives these stones a 'situation' - a space in which their narrative is consumed. But Borromini constructed a very modern space for his Church – one where author meets narrator, where a play exists within a play, an epistolary space of endless palimpsests.

. . . there are two processes involved in Borromini's building. Articulation and segmentation produces units, and integration gathers these units together to form meanings. There is a duality here - of articulation and form, and integration and meaning. The form of narrative is displayed in two powers – the expanding and amplifying [folding] of its signs over the length of the building, and the inserting of 'expansions' into these distortions. These may seem 'outside the frame', but an attribute of narrative is the ability/need to include 'deviations', where the units of a sequence are broken up by the insertion of units from other sequences. A situation where parts of the narrative radiate in different directions. Situations seemingly existent/reactive may be separated by other events in the narrative. The building therefore begins to assert its own 'time' [event] . It begins to exist in its own time, its own invented time, its own ' logical time', as distinct from a 'real' time outside its frame. But these time zones can never be completely separated, there is always a passageway between them, each of them is capable and has the responsibility of gifting time to each other. This suspended time, this . . . . . . 'suspense', is a form of distortion too, a folding in on itself and a subsequent ejaculation of its spirit [gifting birth]. In these sequences there is room/time for - delay and renewal - anxiety and pleasure, the 'yearning', the 'pleasure' of the eventuality . . . . 'a game of structures made by representing order as fragility'. This separation also results in 'gaps', which can be filled with . . . . 'waiting'

 A feature of the Baroque is the fragmentation of intention between the lower level and the

higher level. The reasons for these fractures [ ] are often complex and consist of many incidents on many levels, which in turn need an organisation to enable them to relate together. . . . . an Isotropy – a multi-directional unity of meaning, a quality instilled [in the stucco] which gifts itself, its Isotropy, to the level below. The architecture of Isotropy is not' regular' - simple-complex -classical therefore, but already Baroque in its intentions. The Isotropy carries within itself the dyslexia, a self perpetrating co-ordination , a seeming lack of 'muscular co-ordination', resulting in instability, erratic movement, a trembling which augments itself into the two levels, the high and the low, the perfect accord of severing. It is the 'surfacing' of these various units from different levels at different times that gives the building its forward momentum, its imagination, its narrative freedom, its ability not to be 'hemmed in' by its own language. The fold therefore traces the building's narrative from the

phone, the merest detail, to the rhetoric of the cupola, and then traces a return path through

all its little sentences. It is this fold , this Force which constantly redirects the paths of

geometry and narrative to split and collide between these two storeys. The creativity of/in San Carlo's language is therefore situated between two codes, the linguistic and the translinguistic. The 'Art Work' is a matter of statements of detail where imagination is mastery of the code. San Carlo's narrative therefore does not 'represent' but presents a

continuum of Events not necessarily in a mimetic order. The 'reality' of a sequence lies in the logic of its construction. The origin of a sequence is the need to vary repetition, to escape the Platonic copy and cliché. The excitement of the narrative is not in the 'action', but the

discovering of the veiling of the form (and the fractured temporal relation between the

two) inside its very own mimicry. The sequence is not the observation of reality but the substitution of repetition with variety – the impossibility of repetition and cliché that is created by the gravitational imposition of the fold. San Carlo's narrative demonstrates how this imposition displays a higher level of meaning than the content of the story – the stones,

the plan, the form, eventually, the work.

Let us consider in more detail the notion of this word, this word in itself, the Form. Plato would only accept evidence that was 'eternally' true, i.e. not merely the result of observations of the world. Nothing in the sensible world could actually qualify as an object of knowledge, for experience is founded on information collected by the senses. It was Plato's view that humans understood eternal forms before they were born. He sees Forms as being more substantial than eternal objects, but relates the two notions together in terms of hierarchies, in the sense of the archetype and the copy. These copies are kept in 'space'. The artist, craftsman, architect copies these in different places, therefore creating many things from the same form [printing / moulding / casting].

Heidegger in his essay 'The Origin of the work of Art', restates and then develops Aristotle's Theory of Forms. Take a block of granite: there is a form, the block, and there is the substance, the granite. Form determines the distribution of the matter in space, resulting in a

particular shape. But with an object such as equipment [tools, say], the shape is not made by a prior distribution of matter: on the contrary, form controls the arrangement of the matter, and also selects the matter, and its arrangement. The relationship between form and matter is dictated by the usage, the tool-like qualities of the object, and this 'usefulness' is not something that can be added at the end. The 'usefulness' is paramount. A made object is self-contained, but its shape has not taken place by itself, like the granite. The tools, like the art-work, is constructed. But Heidegger then links these two notions by suggesting that art has a 'self-sufficient presencing' that has a similarity with the granite. Tools therefore are half art-work: they have 'thingliness', but they lack the self-sufficiency of the art-work. Tools have a position between 'thing' and work.

For Heidegger 'Works' are 'things'. There is a 'thingly' element in works of art. [colour in painting, stone in sculpture]. But the work is more than the 'thingly'. It has an artistic 'nature': the aesthetic value is superimposed on it by our subjective views of it. The artwork is a thing that is made, but it says something other than the 'thing' itself, an allegory, a symbol [gk, *symballein* - to bring together]. It is the 'thingly' feature of the work that the artist 'makes' by his labours. For in San Carlo there are 'things' that show themselves [lengths, spaces, materials] and there is the 'thing in itself' - things which do not appear [proportions, relationships]. Heidegger's 'thing' therefore designates everything that is not nothing. This 'thing', this 'form' is something around which properties are assembled: the core of things. This 'core' was something at ground level . . the plan. Something already there, something approaching the sententious. It is these properties such as colour and texture that give things their consistency and quintessence, their sensuousness. This matter is encapsulated in the 'Form'. The Form has a consistency of matter: it is formed matter: it is what we see in something. But this thing-concept applies to nature and tools, not to Art. The thingly element in Art is the matter of which it consists.

	Specific use	self-contained
mere thing		*
equipment	*	*
artwork		

Heidegger asks a question

'With what essence of what thing should a Greek Temple agree?'

and follows this with

179

'Who could maintain the impossible view that the Idea of Temple is represented in the building?
And yet, truth is set to work in such a work, if it is a work'

Heidegger paints, he sculpts this Temple before our very eyes, but at the same time as he *builds* this image, he questions its *foundations*, its right to lie <u>on</u> the earth . . .
This Temple in a building

. . it is not representational, it is not a model, it is not an imitation . . . . . Heidegger separates the building, the form, from its function, its *toolness* . . . . .
a Greek Temple portrays nothing.
It simply stands there in the middle . . . . Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground .
. . . . . . The Temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of the air. The Temple rests on the earth.

Then Heidegger adjusts himself. Adjusts his aspect. He resists the notion of the Temple coming to rest on the surface of the earth, but renames the surface, the planetary earth as the *shelter earth*, the earth that creates, supports, gives life to the arising structures and then gives them shelter when they return [to the fold]. The World and the Earth are contestants in this field. The world displays its clarity and openness, the earth conceals, shelters, attempts to draw the world into itself. The Temple straddles both worlds. The frontier bisects it, masking for a time its progress [a place of respite, the customs post?] The rising and the waning of the star-temple creates the unfolding of the foldliness, the foldly, the foldly returns to the fold [ly]. The Temple work standing out there on this earth opens up a world and at the same time sets the world back again on earth. And whereas in the case of fabricating equipment e.g. an axe, the stone is used, and used up, disappearing into its own usefulness [and the material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists vanishing in the equipmental being of the equipment], the Temple does not cause the material to disappear. It displays it. It allows it to be seen. The Temple is in the earth : rises above it : descends back into it. It promotes, displays the earth : it allows the earth to speak, to be seen. The Temple presses downwards and shows its heaviness to the earth. The earth though cannot be destroyed: the earth is always 'closed up': it is 'self-secluding'.

The Temple. This Temple. The event of the Temple. The Temple in motion. Heidegger talks about motion : rest is the opposite of motion and only what is in [has been] in motion can rest. Rest can include motion : there is a rest which includes an inner concentration of motion, inside of which exist a multiplicity and variety of inflections which produce 'events' or

'vibrations' with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples. These do not move to a rational or 'philosophical' plan, but they radiate and disseminate in a topography of experience composed of units that are neither logical or organic, that is, neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality; nor formed or prefigured by those units in the course of a logical development or of an organic evolution.

⏮

refolding Deleuze

[Deleuze] sees the notion of the fold as both a structural and metaphorical addendum to what he describes as the Baroque. He writes of 'Identical traits existing as constants within the most diverse environments and periods of time, the proliferation of mystical experience, the birth of the novel, a fragility of infinitely varied patterns of movement' as the main strands of enquiry that he will follow in dealing with this subject. He continues . . . 'the Baroque could be located in the protracted fascination we experience in watching waves heave, tumble and atomise when they crack down on an unfolding line being traced along the expanse of the shoreline.

⏩

'Before starting
work   I   walk
around   it
several   times
accompanied by
myself. '

Between 1890 and 1898 Erik Satie lived at 6 Rue Cortot : "in a wardrobe." Satie was also a collector . . . . After his death his wardrobe was found to contain 84 handkerchiefs besides 12 identical velvet suits and dozens of umbrellas[1]. He lived for the last 27 years of his life in an apartment in Arceuil.

[BEDROOM, BACHELOR'S.   Always untidy, with women's whatsits left around.

Smell of cigarettes. There must be some bizarre things hidden away there. [2]]

Satie created *Musique d'ameublement* [Furniture Music] as music that was not to be listened to, and to distinguish background music from "serious" music. He said,

> "You know, there's a need to create furniture music, that is to say, music that would be a part of the surrounding noises and that would take them into account, as masking the clatter of knives and forks without drowning it completely, without imposing itself. It would fill up the awkward silences that occasionally descend on guests. It would spare them the usual banalities. Moreover, it would neutralise the street noises that indiscreetly force themselves into the picture." Satie elaborated on this idea in a note to Jean Cocteau: "Furniture music for law offices, banks, etc... No marriage ceremony without furniture music... Don't enter a house which does not have furniture music."

Furniture Music's premiere was a disaster. People insisted on actually *listening* to it. Satie was furious; he and fellow composer Darius Milhaud urged the audience to take no notice of the music and to behave as is it did not exist.

> "The music...wishes to make a contribution to life in the same way as a private conversation, a painting... or a chair on which you may or may not be seated."

Milhaud later recounted:

> "It was no use Satie shouting: 'Talk for heaven's sake! Move around! Don't listen!' They kept quiet. They listened. The whole thing went wrong."

---

[1]   There are many versions of this story. It is interesting to note that in every account of this the numbers of umbrellas, wardrobes, suites differ.
[2]   Gustave Flaubert *Dictionary of Received Ideas*

◄◄   Agudeza - wit deriving from puns and plays on words - 'La luz con la luz ciega' - 'Light seeing with blind light' - Gongora's conceits by dissimilarities : his 'parallel structures' describe series of phenomena juxtaposed with another, with hyperbole created from quandaries, adages, puzzles and 'difficult and exaggerated ideas,' expressed in phrases such as 'facilmente dificultoso' - 'easily difficult', and 'valorosamente religioso' 'bravely religious' .

►► Or in other cases two adjectives with no connection were combined (asyndeton), aperçus désagréables - and with compound nouns in 'Furniture Music'.

This nature, this style makes an effect of embellishment , in effect refolds itself in its own critique. The 'event' of the metaphor is the equivalent of Gongora's 'éclat'

Materials

Of marble

off stucco

STRUCTURAL BLOCKS

Functional units

Heidegger too paints : he sculpts this Temple before our very eyes, but at the same time as he *builds* this image, he questions its *foundations*, its right to lie <u>on</u> the earth . . . .

his Temple in a building   . . it is not representational, it is not a model, it is not an imitation . . . . . Heidegger separates the building, the ƒ??? ??? ?unction, its *toolness* . . . . . a Greek Temple portrays nothing. It simply stands ???? in the midd??? ??? ??? the building rests on the rocky ground . . . . . . The Temple's firm towering ??? ??? ??? ??? ??f the air. The Temple rests on the earth. Then Heidegger adjusts h?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?f the Temple coming to rest on the surface ?? ??? earth, but ??? ??? ??? ??? *shelter earth*, the earth that ??????? supports, gives life to t??? ??? ??? ??? ??r when they return [to the fold]. The World and the Earth ??? ??? ??? ??ts clarity and openness, the earth conceals, shelters, attemp??? ??? ??? ??? ??raddles both worlds. The ??????? ??? masking for a ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? s post?] The rising and the waning of the star-temple create??? ??? ??? ??? ??ly returns to the fold [ly]. The Temple work standing out th??? ??? ??? ??? ??me time sets the world back ??? ?? on earth, and whereas in ??? ??? ??? ??? ??stone is used, and used up, disappearing into its own usefu??? ??? ??? ??? ?? suitable the less it resists vanishing in the equipmental being ??? ??? ??? ?? material to disappear. It disp??? ?t, ?t allows it to be seen. ??? ??? ??? ??? ??nds back into it. It promotes, displays th?? ??th : ?t allows the??? ??? ??? ??? ?s downwards and shows its heaviness to the earth. The earth ??? ??? ??? ??? ?'closed up': it is 'self-seclu??ng. The Temple. This Temple. The ??? ??? ??? ??? ??eidegger talks about motion. rest is the opposite of motion ??? ??? ??? ??? ??est. Rest can include motion . there is a rest which includes ??? ??? ??? ?? of which exist a multiplicity and variety of inflections which pro??? ??? ??? ?? infinity of harmonics or submultiples. These do not move to a ration??? ??? ??? ?? they radiate and disseminate in a topography of experience composed of units ??? ??? ??? ??? ?r organic, that is, neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality, ??? ?? or prefigured by those units in the course of a logical development or of an organic evolution.

After this lengthy and self-denigrating introduction ▶▶ there is something here that needs to be made clear. That speaking well is useful, and further, that it is an art and a virtue. The work's duty is to instruct, using facts and arguments, to move and to delight his audience. An element of charm.

Charm. Charming. Derrida uses this word [in translation] in White Mythology[3]. 'At times some truly diverse images that one had considered to be quite opposed, incongruous and non-cohesive, will come together and fuse into one charming image' . Are the 'incongruous' and non-cohesive *charmed* into coalescence? *Charm, charme, carmen* [L. song], *canere* [L.singing]. The 'sweet song'.Lyric, lyric[al].Lied.

The demonstrative. Let us interrogate matters of space and time. Is it? What is it? Of what kind is it? The answers to these questions must also stand the test of praise and censure, in this life and the next.

On conjecture - is the subject of our deliberation 'possible or likely to happen?' - and who is speaking? Who is s/he speaking to? What is s/he saying?

The legitimation : statement of facts, the instruction : the proof, the confirmation of our propositions. The possibility of refutation, the overthrowing of these arguments or even the peroration the hyperbole in these arguments.

And these conjectures and legitimations are seen through decoration the cosmetic [from Greek *kosmetikos*, from *kosmein* to arrange, from *kosmos* order] and the enhancement [from

---

[3] Derrida   White Mythology p. 265

Vulgar Latin *altiere* unattested, from Latin *altus* high]. But this **f**lourish is contained in its own

space, its own locus, inside its own f(old)rame of what is decorous of decorum lest the decor and the decorum produces moments of uncertainty. Inside this quest for paraphrase and complexity in word choice and length, and to the parallel quest for obscurity in the choice of examples.

But 'nature's" quest would always seem 'unnatural ' in its gluttonous desire for multiplicity and growth and proliferation. Obscurity is how nature pictures [in Diderot's terms] itself to us. There is a nervousness in the relationship between the natural, the unnatural, reason and decorum. They speak behind our backs : the display is never quite what it seems. Decorum, far from being the topos in which this rhetoric can flower, blossom out [as the heliotrope does], begins to act as a fence, a frontier around and through which the 'work' earns its diplomatic immunity.

Rhetorica ad Herennium (circa 86 B.C.), an anonymous text thought for many years to have been written by Cicero, suggests that the author must speak 'as if to secure the agreement of is audience', and further suggests that the orator must include a consideration of the Deliberative, or political; the Forensic, or legal; and the Epideictic, or the display of virtuosity. These are the five essentials attributed to the orator.

inventio	*invention*	the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing.
dispositio	*arrangement*	the ordering and distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be assigned.
elocutio	*style*	the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter invented.
memoria	*memory*	the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words and arrangement.
pronuntiatio	*delivery*	the graceful regulation of voice, countenance and gesture.

The generation and discovery of 'ideas' was considered in two ways. From the Greek concept of the place or topic (*topos*) and the Roman *locus* came the notion of the 'region of the argument'. Each topic is akin to a 'place' to look for or develop ideas. Cicero inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty [of memory] must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax-writing tablet and the letters written on it.[4] In *De oratore*, Cicero sets out his thoughts on artificial memory.

'Consequently (in order that I may not be prolix and tedious on a subject that is well known and familiar) one must employ a large number of places which must be well lighted, clearly set out in order, at moderate intervals apart; and images that are active, sharply defined, unusual, and which have the power of speedily encountering and penetrating the psyche
. . . . the ability to use these(images) will be supplied by practice which engenders habit, and (by images) of similar words changed and unchanged in case or drawn (from denoting) the part to denying the genus, and by using the image of one word to remind of a whole sentence, as a consummate painter distinguishing the position of objects by modifying the shapes.
Memory for words, which for us is essential, is given distinctness by a greater variety of images (in contrast to using the image of one word for a whole sentence of which he has just been speaking); for there are many words which serve as joints connecting the limbs of a sentence, and these cannot be formed by any use of similitude - of these we have to model images for constant employment; but a memory for things is the special property of the orator - this we can imprint on our minds by a skilful arrangement of the several masks (singulis personis) that represent them, so that we may grasp ideas by means of images and their order by means of places.'

The commonest mnemonic was a building. Quintilian gives this explanation [5].

'The building has to be remembered in terms of the movement through it. Each room [or feature therein] is to be memorised. The important images in the speech are then designated a place memorised in the building. The orator is then, while speaking, able to call up these images as he makes his imaginary journey through the building. '

This ensures too that the images are called up in the correct order. In the ancient world, devoid of paper and printing, memory was a vital quality.

| 4 | Cicero | De oratore, | II lxxxvi, 35,1- 4 |
| 5 | Quintilian | Institutio oratorio, | XI, ii,17-22 |

'There are two kinds of memory, he continues, one natural, the other artificial. The natural memory is that which is engrafted in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. The artificial memory is a memory strengthened or confirmed by training. A good natural memory can be improved by this discipline and persons less well endowed can have their weak memories improved by the art.' [6]

Ad Herennium is the main source of the classical art of memory in the Latin and Greek world. Its lists of rules for 'places' and 'images' and discussions of 'memory for things' and 'memory for words' inform most work on this subject up to the Renaissance and beyond. The term *Locus* was used to refer to places place easily grasped by the memory. Individual images were termed *forms, marks or simulacra* . As regards to Loci, it was deemed essential to have a large number of places which could form a series and be remembered in that order so that it was possible to move backwards or forwards from any particular loci. These loci become a permanent concept, [cantus fermus], since they would be used over and over again for different sets of images. To aid the memory, every five/ten/fifty spaces would have a particular characteristic. Rooms could not be too large so that the object is lost, or too small so the object overpowered its room: not so brightly lit so that they glittered and dazzled, not too dark so that shadows obscured the objects. Ad Herennium divided images into two kinds.
Firstly, 'things' *[res]*, the memory for objects, which constructed images reminiscent of arguments, a notions or 'things'. 'Words' *[verba]* was a memory for words that had to find images for every single word. Ad Herennium goes on to summarise the types of image that were most suitable. The commonplace is ruled out, as were situations that occurred daily. Images should be selected that were 'active' [*imagines agentes*]. They may be beautiful or ugly, highly decorated or brutally stark, comic or grave, though they would as usual have had to subject themselves to the censor of decorum. The psychological nature of the object, the subconscious and conscious properties of the objects, their history, and their emotional properties became increasingly important, and begin to destabilise the otherwise stable notion of the topos.

Ramus saw Quintilian's artificial memory system as cumbersome, and rejected artificial memory as a part of rhetoric, leaving only repetition or learning by rote. He set out instead to develop what he considered a better system of artificial memory. This was done by arranging everything into a 'dialectical' order, which he conceived as having three tiers,

the General,
dichotomised classifications, and

---

6   Ad Herennium   III xvi-xxiv

special and individual cases.

A

A1   A2

A1a   A1b   A2a   A2b

This order easily falls into a visual format. It has a 'shape' which is memorable, in one sense similar to Quintilian's palace, but very different in the sense that it is the 'schema' that is being memorised, not the objects themselves. Ramus therefore opens up the idea of an aesthetic of memory, in which the rhetoricians' sense of decorum, of manners, and of containment can be fulfilled and displayed in a memory system of division and composition. As the act of art is concerned with division and composition and their legitimation, so to can memory be legislated in terms of spaces.

P E N C E R

P O N S E R

P A N S E R

P O N C E R

P E N S E R

P A N C E R

San Carlo - detail of Crypt, possibly a room designed by Borromini to contain his grave.

On Satie's death his friends visited his apartment. No one had ever been invited there. He had a single room. A bed, a wardrobe and a set of drawers. On the top of the wardrobe were nine cardboard boxes. In each was an identical brown corduroy suit, unworn, unpacked. Satie had worn the tenth for the last twenty years of his life.

Again, let us use this divagation to reintroduce the subject of hierarchies, the archetype and the copy. These copies are kept in 'space'. A divine artificer copies these in different places, therefore creating many things from the same form [printing / moulding / casting] Redit   . . . . . redire . . . .

reduit . . . . [tiny room, {niche/chine}] . . . . cliché . . . . .
overexposure / the trite / the stereotype [the double art of confusing art
and nature, model and 'model']

22 (now 34) rue
Cauchy, Arcueil

Satie's room was on the
third floor

Staircase to Satie's
room from rue
Cauchy

this too is the scene of pleasure, of Jouissance, of the overlaying, the
intermingling, the infection of the indulgent with the 'pure', with Lucia's
final aria.

▶▶▍   Finally, repetition's two gifts : the true repetitions of reflections, echoes and doubles, the 'easy' repetitions of similarities.

▶▶▍   **H**umour and irony   ▍◀◀   . . . . again, like a new preface, the present as the repeater : the past as repetition itself : the future is that which is repeated.

❚❚   At the beginning of **D/f**, Lyotard talks inside his own speech . . . . writing . . . . . *mauvaise foi.*

▍◀◀   . . . . in the context too of Diderot's metaphors, his *'expressions heureuses'*, his felicitous guesses, his *jouissance*, his exploring of the senses where and when their connections are at their most brittle, these brilliant fireworks mark out a boundary where the need for passports can be 'taken as read.'

December 1999

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[Blanc]

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The Exhibition

The Exhibition took place in the University of Brighton Gallery, Grand Parade, between 26th January and 3rd October 2000.

There were two pieces in the show,

fix-rhetoric

and   d f_1 .F. L.

FIX RHETORIC consisted of seven pieces

3 désagréables
5 form
6 Kasimir
2 icon
1 Pear
4 piece

And one object which was untitled.

The layout

General view of   **FIX RHETORIC**

Individual pieces

3   désagréables

5   form

No 2   Icon

(detail)

1   Pear

4   piece

6 Kasimir

And one object which was untitled.

d *f* / F. L. consisted of eight pieces

7	Carlino
2	cross
1	floor
3	~~Penser~~
6	Panser
4	Penser
5	Poncer
8	wardrobe

general plan

general views

individual pieces

7   carlino

carlino [detail]

2   cross

I   floor

6   Panser

4   pencer

5 Poncer

(detail)

8 Wardrobe