**Tom Hickey**

**Holocaust Lineages: Anti-Semitism before Nazism – history and the struggle today**

It was the Italian Idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce, in giving us the aphorism “all history is contemporary history”, who insisted that the issues and parameters of history are always defined by the concerns of the present. We look back through today’s optic; we rewrite the past as servant to our current projects. It was a view echoed by the British philosopher, Collingwood, in his *The Idea of History*.**1** How then do we explain the Holocaust? How do we explain how it was that Europe’s most cultured nation should have attempted the extermination of a whole people? How do we ensure that our historical explanation, in being moulded by our present concerns, is not distorted into a lie?

One of our current, and central, projects in the UCU is expressed by the slogan, ‘Never Again!’ It is the campaign against fascism and racism, and in opposition to the BNP. Yet, unless we are clear about what precisely it is of which we are seeking to prevent a repetition, we may be in jeopardy of mistaking our enemy. As Brian Klug has lucidly demonstrated in this publication, the issue of how we define ‘anti-Semitism’ is pivotal in determining the actuality and the level of threat in any country, and at any time. It is also pivotal, as a consequence, in enabling an effective mobilization, and forearming of our allies, against that threat. Yet the issue is plagued with conceptual difficulties.

How do we then explain the Holocaust? Does the undoubted existence of a widespread culture of anti-Semitism in Germany and Central Europe, one that pre-dated Nazism, imply that the Holocaust was not a peculiarly Nazi phenomenon but rather something that either emerged from German culture and history, or more generally from Modernity and the European Enlightenment?

Let us register the significance of these questions for any project that orients itself around the slogan ‘Never Again!’ It is that if we are committed to the idea of preventing a repetition of genocide, and this particular form of genocide, then we do and must, as a matter of fact, believe that its repetition is possible. The historical questions then resonate in precisely that way: are we correct in thinking a repetition to be possible; are we capable of identifying the causal forces at work so as to provide ourselves with the levers for intervention in contemporary politics?

The key historiographical issues are these:

* if there was a pronounced and well-rooted culture of anti-Semitism in Germany prior to the 1930s, was that a feature of German development whose continuity and culmination was to be found in the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Treblinka, and in the extermination battalions of the Einzatsgruppen?
* if we are to argue to the contrary, however, and to suggest that the explanation is to be found in the *peculiarities* of the politics of the 1930s,circumstances that enabled the project of a brutalized and atavistic section of European society, where then does that leave the possibility of repetition?

These questions that I want to pose today are themselves not innocent, of course. The very idea that Nazi exterminism should be explained is a contested suggestion.**2** The idea of *explaining* the event rather than simply condemning it as ‘evil’ has been questioned.

Elie Wiesel, for example, Nobel prize winner and Auschwitz survivor, thinks that the “Holocaust negates answers”. It “lies outside, if not beyond, history”; it “defies both knowledge and description”, and is “never to be comprehended or transmitted”.**3** Deborah Lipstadt concurs. She believes that to doubt the uniqueness of the Holocaust is “far more insidious than outright denial. It nurtures, and is nurtured by, Holocaust denial.” **4** By contrast, the questions that I have posed quite explicitly reject such a view. They are predicated on the belief that unless we can explain an historical phenomenon then we are at permanent risk of reliving it. If that is to be avoided then we need to identify the causes responsible for its occurrence.

So, to the argument. Let me first explain what is wrong with what has come to be known as ‘The Goldhagen Thesis’. In 1996, when an Associate Professor of Political Science at Harvard University, Daniel Goldhagen published *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*.**5** His argument was that it is a mistake to blame the Nazis for the Holocaust because without the active support of the German population the genocide would not have been possible. That support was readily available because Germans were already primed with what he described as “ eliminationist antisemitism” – a unique, pervasive, endemic and genocidal hostility to Jews that affected virtually the entire non-Jewish population.

The problems with this argument is not only that it is cavalier with the historiographical evidence concerning the extent and virulence of German anti-Semitism but that it also uses that evidence to which it does choose to appeal to draw a series of non-sequiturs. **6**

There is little doubt over the significance and extent of anti-Semitism as a social and economic force in Germany prior to the 1930s. Though German Jews secured important emancipatory progress during the c.19th, and full political rights, their position in German society began to deteriorate again in the c.20th. A new racist ideology developed, and entrenched anti-Jewish prejudice amongst a sizeable minority of the population. Despite this, it is also the case that anti-Semitism played a very small part in the rise of the Nazi Party to popularity before 1933 – and over this judgement there is virtually an historiographical consensus amongst social and political historians of the Weimar Republic and of Nazism. Before 1933, few Germans, and no group even within the Nazi party, with the exception of the Streicher faction in Bavaria, and no identifiable section of the Nazi’s electoral support, wanted the complete removal of civil rights from Jews, or their separation from the population by force. There was certainly anti-Semitism at all levels of German society, and periods when it was blatant and others when it was latent, but no periods in the c.19th and early c.20th where there was popular, spontaneous anti-Semitic violence.

One problem then with the argument offered by the Goldhagen Thesis (that exterminism was carried out by ordinary Germans) is not that this element of the argument is mistaken, or even that it is novel and mistaken (for it has been made before) but rather that it sits uncomfortably with the argument that the Judeocide was a peculiarly German phenomenon. It is true that the bureaucrats who organized the trains to the camps, the architects and engineers of the crematoria, the chemists who adapted Ziklon B, etc., were not rabid racists, foaming at the mouth. They were, according to all accounts, frighteningly ordinary, and frightening *because* ordinary. They were part of a process whose history they either did not understand, or were too frightened to stand out against. This was, after all, the argument of Hannah Arendt, corresponding to her idea of “the banality of evil” in her 1963, *Eichman in Jerusalem*.**7** The value of that text lies precisely in its registration of the dual presumption that underpinned the Nazi project: not only the drive of the ideologically committed exterminists amongst the Party’s leadership but also the expected complicity and passivity of non-Nazi Germans after 1933 – especially those in business, the professions, the armed services and the civil service. These were expectations fulfilled.

What the Goldhagen Thesis does not address at all is the evidence that many Germans (even amongst those who voted for the Nazis) disapproved of their treatment prior to the war. Nor does it mention that there was no political mechanism for this disapproval to congeal into political opposition. Already by February 1933, 10,000 communists had been arrested, and, by the end of 1933, 130,000 had been incarcerated (of whom over 2,500 had been murdered). By then, the population knew that political opposition would mean consignment to a concentration camp.

Yet even in these circumstances there was still opposition. Even by as late as April 1939, the Gestapo reported holding 162,734 people in ‘protective custody’ for political reasons, and a further 225,000 had been imprisoned for up to three years. Between 1933 and 1945, no less than *3 million non-Jewish Germans* had been in concentration camps for political reasons. Thus the homogenous ‘nation of exterminists’ of Goldhagen’s thesis is a notion that could only survive if it excluded not only this 3 million but also those who did oppose Nazism but were *not caught* doing so, and the *additional millions* who did not *act* against the regime at all but were nevertheless opposed to it.

Moreover, the political record of voting for left-wing parties prior to 1933 demonstrates that this was not an electorate dominated by anti-Semitism. Even when the Nazis secured a 33% vote in November 1932, the combined vote for the communists (the KPD) and the social democrats (the SPD) was at 37%, and in the March election of 1933, the Communist Party had 4.8 million Germans voting for it. That level of opposition to Nazism, and its covert continuation throughout the Nazi period including during the war, is the reason why, by as late as 1943 (ten years after the Nazis came to power and four years into the war), there were still 130,000 Jews in hiding in Berlin and Frankfurt, and by 1945 still 1,000 in Berlin – hidden and supported by non-Jewish Germans.

Apart from its contradiction of, or willful obliviousness to, this historical evidence, the Goldhagen Thesis also stands in sharp contrast to the testimony of survivors. The recollection of survivors is that their guards in the camps, apart from a small percentage, were not sadists but absolutely ordinary. As Primo Levi attested,

More and more insistently as the time recedes I am asked by the young who our torturers were. The term alludes to our SS guards and is inappropriate. It brings to mind twisted individuals, sadists afflicted with an original flaw. Rather they were from the same cloth as we. They were average human beings, averagely intelligent, averagely wicked; save for exceptions they were not monsters, they had our faces but had been reared badly. They were, for the greater part, diligent followers and functionaries, some fanatically convinced of the Nazi doctrine, many indifferent, or fearful of punishment, or desirous of a good career, or too obedient. **8**

The problem with the Goldhagen Thesis then is that it is historically mistaken, and that it is interpretatively obtuse. While demonstrating the barbarity of the genocide, and a clear exterminist inclination of the Nazi leadership, it also makes further claims about the peculiarly German nature of this barbarity, and about the extent and timing of the genocidal intent, that are without any evidential basis, and which contradict counter-evidence produced by other historians of the period.

Its mistakenness as an historical thesis is not its greatest shortcoming, however. That credit must be reserved for its implication. For if the Holocaust is to be explained by reference to aspects of German culture then it must follow that Primo Levi is mistaken in arguing that, “it happened therefore it can happen again … it can happen and it can happen anywhere”. And that is why it is equally problematic to describe the Holocaust as ‘unique’. If it is historically unique, the peculiar outcome of the precise set of circumstances pertaining in Germany between 1918 and 1945, then it cannot be repeated, and that could only be described as a chorus of complacency, and, if mistaken, a highly dangerous argument.

Of course, in one sense, all historical events are unique. In respect of the Holocaust, we are speaking of an attempted eradication of a whole people by a fascist political force that had emerged from a sophisticated culture, using the industrial and bureaucratic methods of capitalist modernity, and arising from a logic of exterminism that gradually unfolded as the project for the reformation of German society, and its imperial extension Eastwards through the colonization of Poland, Belorussia, Russia and the Ukraine, unraveled after the military defeats at Moscow and Stalingrad. **9**

Of course it is the case that those tight specificities will not occur again but that cannot be said of the general causal account. The Nazis Party came to power through its self-presentation as the saviour of the nation, hiding much of its murderous intent, and with the collusion of a ruling élite that was concerned to eliminate the threat of Bolshevism, domestically and overseas. With political power attained, that beast then slipped its chains, and progressively abandoned its political dissembling. The Holocaust was thus certainly unprecedented as a modern, industrialised genocide, and has not (yet) been repeated, but that does not make it historically ‘unique’. **10**

That leads us directly to the contemporary relevance of such considerations.

There can be little doubt that there is evidence of an increase in visible, and hence recordable, anti-Semitic incidents in Europe. In this, the claim of Norman Finkelstein that there is no significant increase in anti-Semitism seems to be mistaken, at least in respect of reported incidents. **11** This can be seen in the record of individual attacks on Jews, attacks and arson attempts on Jewish institutions, the desecration of Jewish graves or whole cemeteries, slogans used in demonstrations, graffiti on walls and in images, rhetoric in newspapers and magazines, and in some campaigns to boycott Jewish businesses. This record can be found repeated across Europe: in France and in Belgium; in Italy; in Poland and Russia; and here in the UK, and in Ireland. Not all of these forms of anti-Semitism can be evidenced in all of these countries but in all of them can be found an increased incidence of some of the forms. Indeed, though the research has not, of course, been done because requiring an impossibly exhaustive survey, it would be surprising if there were to be *any* country in Europe in which no form of anti-Semitism could be found.

Now, of course, statisticians will observe that this record will, in part, reflect a rise in the reporting of incidents rather than a rise in the incidence of anti-Semitic incidents, and that this itself reflects a renewed emphasis on exposing and publicizing what is happening rather than a rise in the quantity or seriousness of such attacks. They will also observe that neither a change in the incidence of anti-Semitic attacks, nor a change in the incidence of reports of such attacks, constitute a measure of the level of anti-Semitic attitudes, i.e. antipathy towards Jews in virtue of their Jewishness.

Whatever such caveats might guard us against, however, they cannot be treated as a ground for skepticism about the rise of anti-Semitism, nor for minimizing the political and social implications of that rise. The French polling service, SOFRES, and work by the Anti-Defamation League in the USA, show that there is a growth in the tolerance of milder forms of rhetorical anti-Semitism, and a continuance of the belief amongst some of the standard anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews. Yet care must be exercised here because it is also clear (and from the same sources) that amongst the young there is far less incidence of prejudice. In France, for example, the country of the Dreyfus Affair and of the Vichy Government’s collusion with the Nazi concentration of Jews and their transport to Auschwitz and to death, the problem is, if anything, on the wane. Amongst non-Muslim youth anti-Semitism has declined virtually to zero, and the dominant opinion of that group is that the Holocaust should be talked about *more* rather than less. Of this group, 90% think that attacks on French synagogues are ‘a scandal’. These poll results are, moreover, replicated in most other European countries, and in the USA. So, the empirical picture is a complicated one: increased incidents of anti-Semitic attacks combined with evidence of a marked decline in anti-Semitic attitudes.

Reference, however, to the poll results for ‘non-Muslim youth’ indicates one of the difficulties. This is that part of the rise in the anti-Semitic incidents that the statistics reveal is directly related to issues in the Middle East rather than in Europe. As one commentator has observed, the incidence of attacks on Jews and Jewish property in some of the urban centers in France reflects exasperation, amongst some Muslim youth, with the policies of Israel, and their discovery of the French Jewish community as a ready surrogate of, and scapegoat for, the Israeli Government and Israel in general. Provoked by unscrupulous, and sometimes Government-backed sources in the Arab world, the Internet now provides an easy mechanism for the propagation of older stereotypes and myths from the last century – from the lie of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, through the myth of Jewish economic power and conspiratorial lobbies, through to blood libels.

This is unquestionably one source of what has been called ‘the New Anti-Semitism’. It is the presumed slippage from criticism of, and opposition to, Israel or Israeli policy into attacks on Jews – it is, in other words, and in the view of those who affirm the existence of a ‘New Anti-Semitism’ the real and practical concordance between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. If it were to exist, this concordance would be, in fact, the mirror image of the Zionist identification of the interests of all Jews with the interests of Israel. But does it exist?

In one sense there must be *some* element of hostility to Jews in *some* hostility to Israel. Amongst many inveterate anti-Semites hostility to Jews *as Jews* will be the cornerstone of their identity, and since Israel is ‘a Jewish state’ it will bask in their animosity as much as will their local synagogue or kosher store. That will be a motivation only for a small minority of those hostile to Israel, however. Yet the problem is arguably not just limited to those possessed of such visceral anti-Semitism. As Frank Furedi, amongst others, has observed, critics of Israel who are not motivated by hostility to Jews sometimes allow the confusion of Zionism and Jewishness to creep into their words and actions, and on other occasions they fail to speak out against expressions of anti-Semitism when these arise in the context of arguments or demonstrations against Israel. Furedi cites Harry van Bommel, the Dutch Socialist Party MP, who in a speech criticizing Israel is reported to have failed to distance himself from, or otherwise criticize, those who were making anti-Semitic remarks at the gathering. **12**

Similarly, the advocacy of a boycott of Jewish-owned shops or businesses because of their cultural identity is just as much a form of anti-Semitism as is the propagation of myths and stereotypes about Jews, or the destruction of gravestones. So, for example, it is reported that Giancarlo Desiderati, speaking for the Italian union Flaica-Cub (Confederazione Unitaria di Base), called for a boycott of Jewish businesses. The plan was, it is reported to have been declared, to draw up a list of Jewish-owned shops but then, as if in an afterthought, it was suggested that it might be better to list the street locations of where the Jewish shops are concentrated so that people could avoid the area altogether. **13** This explicit (if presumably unintended) anti-Semitism was then compounded by reports from Denmark of a comparably unintended but actual anti-Semitism concerning the attempt by some school headmasters to refuse to accept Jewish children on the grounds of avoiding tension in their schools where there was a preponderance of Muslim children.

These acts and arguments are clearly anti-Semitic. They are prejudicial acts or words directed at Jews in virtue of their being Jews. They are anti-Semitic irrespective of their provocation or their intent – a provocation, in these cases, from without Europe, and emerging from the anger generated by Israeli policy and its treatment of the Palestinians.

This is one set of examples of what is referred to as the ‘New Anti-Semitism’. It is contrasted with the ‘Old Anti-Semitism’ (which had no counterpart in the Middle East or in Asia or in Africa). Old anti-Semitism consisted of open persecution and open hatred of Jewish people – because they were held responsible for killing Christ, or because they were held responsible for economic crises or social conditions – for whom it was then necessary to apply collective punishment. This old anti-Semitism disappeared after the war against the Nazi regime in Germany and Austria, it is argued, because it became socially unacceptable as a result of that association. Nevertheless, according to the advocates of the ‘New Anti-Semitism’, its deep-rooted origins in ubiquitous popular prejudice remained embedded as an attitude.

That takes us to the heart of the problem of attempting to theorize about a new anti-Semitism in Europe. The problem is that while there is strong evidence of a rise in incidents and attitudes that are clearly, and properly described as, anti-Semitic, the attempts to theorise this phenomenon in order to explain it, or to locate it historically and comparatively, have been dominated by a highly tendentious and contentious characterization of this ‘New Anti-Semitism’.

The thesis offered by defenders of the ‘New Anti-Semitism’ view is the following: that the popular revulsion amongst the public for the medical, political, educational, and welfare conditions of the Palestinians as a result of Israel’s policies has provided an opportunity for the long-established anti-Semitism that is seeped in European culture to reassert itself publicly. In other words, anti-Semites have found a socially acceptable way of expressing their hatred of Jews – they do so now through Anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel. Thus the latter is a disguised form of the former. This new form of anti-Semitism is more dangerous than its forebears because it is insidious, more difficult to expose and to name, and hence more difficult to oppose. Chesler expresses the view succinctly,

Today’s new anti-Semite hides behind the smoke-screen of anti-Zionism … because they really do hate and blame Jews, they have found that anti-Zionism is a popular and politically respectable way to do so. **14**

Or, as Abraham Foxman puts it,

The harsh but undeniable truth is this: what some like to call anti-Zionism is in reality anti-Semitism – always, everywhere and for all time. **15**

The difficulty with this theorization (at least one empirical difficulty) is that there is strong survey evidence to suggest a sharp break between these different things. Denmark is the European country where is found the highest level of pro-Palestinian attitudes amongst the general population yet it registers one of the lowest scores for popular anti-Semitic attitudes throughout Europe. Similarly in the case of the Netherlands, which according to the Anti-Defamation League has the lowest score for anti-Semitic attitudes of all European countries, and where one finds that 83% of the Dutch population believes that the Government should play a proactive role in countering anti-Semitism, there is strong support for Palestinian self-determination and for resistance to Israel.

So, there is a paradox for those who would like to present the ‘New Anti-Semitism’ as old anti-Semitism dressed up as anti-Zionism: the countries that express the strongest disapproval of Israel and its policies are those where there is the least evidence of anti-Semitic attitudes. Moreover, that pattern is also represented in its inverse: countries, groups and individuals which evince some of the highest levels of anti-Semitic attitudes also have a tendency to sympathise with Israel. The leader and founder of the French fascist party, the Front Nationale, Jean-Marie Le Pen, interviewed by the Israeli paper *Ha’aretz* in April 2002, for example, expressed his “understanding” of the harsh policies followed by Ariel Sharon, “… a war on terror (he opined) was a brutal thing”. Doubtless, he had partly in mind by way of reference the torture, barbarity and collective punishments delivered to the indigenous population by the French colon police and the French army during France’s war against Algerian independence in the 1950s and 1960s in which war he was himself directly involved as an intelligence officer.

This inversion of allegiances is perhaps most notable in the case of Eastern Europe. In a recent article in *Human Architecture*, David Ost records how, in the 1980s in Poland, those who still harboured deep-seated anti-Semitic sentiments nevertheless identified with Israel during the invasion of Lebanon.**16** Why? Answer: because it was the Soviet Union that was then the ally of the Arab states and the enemy of my enemies’ ally is my friend. These anti-Semites, Ost argues, successfully de-linked Israel from Jewishness in their minds. The cultural and religious identity of Israel did not matter to them despite their suspicion of, and prejudice toward, Jews.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Stalinism in Poland, that alliance and identification with Israel has persisted. The 2005-7 coalition Government of Jaroslaw Koczynski (a coalition between his Law and Justice Party and the fascist-sympathising League of Polish Families), was one in which the Minister of Education was Roman Giertych, the grandson of Poland’s premier anti-Semitic writer of the inter-war period, Jedrzej Giertych. It appears that Giertych the younger has not disowned the elder. Here we had, if not undoubtedly then at least circumstantially, a case of anti-Semitism using a cover of *pro*-Zionism. What better way for contemporary anti-Semites to disguise their domestic bigotry, and the rewriting of their own national history, than to proclaim their support for Israel?

These problems with the analysis that we are offered are glossed over by the defenders of the ‘New Anti-Semitism’ thesis. The radically different conditions in Europe between the past and the present, between Germany in the period 1918-1945 and Europe in the c.21st, are ignored in order to conflate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism. Whatever good reasons that there may be to criticize Israeli policy, or for addressing the existential question of the consequences of maintaining the state of Israel in its current form, are put aside as mere camouflage by anti-Zionists to obscure their anti-Semitism. These reasons are no more, according to this view, than a mechanism to disguise the real motivation for the criticism – a hatred of Jews.

The problem with this view is not, as another commentator has observed, that the link between events in the Middle East and some contemporary anti-Semitism is missed. The connection is not missed. The problem is that the *direction* of the causal relation is inverted. Instead of Israeli policy being seen as the cause of hostility towards Jews (however illegitimate such a connection might be, and however mistaken are those who make it), the causality is reversed, and it is an originary anti-Semitism (a presumed pre-given condition of Muslims and the non-Jewish European population) that is advanced as the source of any and all anti-Zionism.

That is why the question of definition cannot be severed from the question of history and of historical analysis. If we are to mount an effective fight against a re-emergence of anti-Semitism today then we need to know in what ways it overlaps as an ideological position with the anti-Semitism of yesterday, and we need to know how it is importantly different from its predecessor. If a section of young, urban Muslims in the main cities of Europe are echoing some of the anti-Jewish rhetoric of yesterday then to rescue them from that dangerous illusion (to counter their insipient anti-Semitism, in other words) requires us to know what it is that has induced this reaction in them. We need to know how its causes are distinct from those that existed in West-Central Europe in the inter-war period of the c.20th. We also need to know about the character and genesis of that anti-Semitism in the last century so that we do not simply concede the easy but dangerously mistaken, and ultimately risible, argument that anti-Semitism is a natural characteristic of all non-Jews, and that it exists, therefore, outside history and independently of culture or circumstance.

As David Krug has insisted elsewhere in this volume, the devil is in the definition. The dangers of obfuscation and tendentious justifications are manifest in the debate over definitions, and sharply exemplified by the approach adopted by the definitional choices made in the report of the Parliamentary inquiry into anti-Semitism in 2006. **17** Here we find a definition that makes anti-Semitic anything that makes a Jew feel uncomfortable in virtue of his or her Jewishness. It is a position explicitly drawn from the judgement of Lord Macpherson in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, where racism was defined in terms of the judgement of the victim. However understandable that might have been in the circumstances of the time, and in the interests of securing the idea of institutional racism, that definition is clearly *indefensible* analytically since it ignores the fact that feelings may be unfounded, and may even be falsely declared for effect when they are not felt. There is, after all, an important distinction between ‘feeling discomfort because one thinks one is being intimidated’, on the one hand, and ‘being intimidated’, on the other. **18** The latter is a question of fact, and of the meaning of the words in context. Even for the most radical discourse theorist, feelings about the world are not the same as facts in it, however discursively constructed one might think the latter to be.

It is for these reasons that fighting anti-Semitism today entails historical sensitivity and philosophical and linguistic reflection as well as political mobilization.

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**2** This is not just an attitude of exterminism towards Jews, of course, but also towards Slavs and Roma and the disabled and homosexuals and the incorrigibly criminal and social misfits and the incurably ill.

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**6** See, *inter alia*., Finkelstein, N. and R. Birn (eds.) *A Nation On Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth*, Henry Holt, New York, 1998; and Eley, G. (ed.) *The Goldhagen Effect: History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German Past*, Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2000; and Stern, F. ‘The Goldhagen Controversy: The Past Distorted’ in idem. *Einstein's German World*, pp.272-288, Princeton, NJ, 1999; and Kershaw, I. *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, Arnold, London, 2000, and idem. *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution*, Yale, New Haven, 2008

**7** Arendt, H. *Eichman in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil*, Viking, New York, 1963

**8** Levi, P. *The Drowned and the Saved*, Summit, New York, 1988, p.202; see also idem. *If This Is A Man*, Abacus, London, 1979

**9** Mayer, A. *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The ‘Final Solution’ in History*, Pantheon, New York, 1988

**10** Rwanda, Armenia, the Indian droughts and famines of 1876-9 and 1896-1902, etc., are genocides and holocausts for those subject to and observing them but where they were genocidal in intent they were not industrial, and where they were otherwise holocausts by virtue of their impact they were not driven by genocidal intent.

**11** [www.normanfinkelstein.com/finkelstein-on-dn-no-new-antisemitism/](http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/finkelstein-on-dn-no-new-antisemitism/) See also Finkelstein, N. *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of ‘Anti-Semitism’ and the Abuse of History,* University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2008. In this otherwise trenchant and impressive critique of the tendentious misuse of ‘anti-Semitism’ by apologists for the state of Israel, the author underestimates the significance of the recent growth in the incidence of anti-Semitic incidents in Europe.

**12** [www.frankfuredi.com/index.php/site/article/282/](http://www.frankfuredi.com/index.php/site/article/282/)

**13** Furedi, F. ‘After Gaza: what’s behind c.21st anti-Semitism?’ [www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/6117/](http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/6117/)

**14** Chesler, P. *The New Anti-Semitism: The Current Crisis and What We Must Do About It*, Josse-Bass, 2003

**15** Foxman, A. *Never Again: The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism*, (foreword by Elie Wiesel), HarperCollins, San Francisco, 2003

**16** Ost, M. ‘Anti-Semitism in the Peculiar Context of Eastern Europe’, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, v.VII, n.2, Spring 2009, pp.15-22

**17** House of Commons, *Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism*, Stationary Office, London, 2006. The Report also urges the adoption of the definition of anti-Semitism recommended by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Neither the Report’s definition nor the definitions of the EUMC have been adopted by the House of Commons or by the EU, respectively. This is hardly surprising since the former is incoherent (see main body above), and the latter would render most criticism of Israel anti-Semitic. The latter includes in its definition of anti-Semitism: “(d)enying the Jewish people their right to self-determination … ; (a)pplying double standards by requiring (of Israel) behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation; (d)rawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”

**18** One may declare oneself to feel intimidated or some discomfort as a Jew because of criticism of Israel, and some Jewish people may indeed feel intimidated or discomforted in the presence of such criticism, but that cannot be taken to be any kind of evidence (prima facie, or circumstantial, or indirect, much less conclusive) for the existence of such intimidation.

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