Abstract
Skilful decision making is fundamental to successful performance in high-level sport where high pressure conditions impose numerous perceptual and cognitive demands. Decision making in sport can manifest in various forms, comprising a unique combination of automatic (intuitive) and controlled (deliberative) cognitive processes. Which decision making processes takes precedence may depend on several factors, including whether the sport is performed in an open-skill or a closed-skill environment, the performer’s level of expertise, and the degree of cognitive load imposed.The present research examined the impact of these specific factors on sport-specific decision making through two main experiments, which followed from a pilot test designed to develop a valid and reliable test protocol: Experiment 1 focused on the effects of expertise and cognitive load in an open-skill sport (soccer), while Experiment 2 examined these factors in a closed-skill sport (snooker).
Both expert and non-expert participants completed a decision making task specific to their domain of expertise under conditions of both low cognitive load and high cognitive load, the latter being induced using a mental addition task. Measures of the anticipation efficiency score, which incorporated both the accuracy and speed of the responses, were obtained as the main performance indicator. Also taken were measures of response awareness, which reflected the correspondence between participants’ self-reported confidence rating and their actual accuracy score for each trial, thereby indicating how aware participants were of their own decision making accuracy.
Results from Experiment 1 showed both expertise and cognitive load significantly affected decision making during the soccer anticipation task; a large size effect (η2G = .45) was found for expertise, where skilled soccer players demonstrated significantly lower anticipation efficiency scores (M=876.66 ± 332.56), which signified superior decision making, compared to the unskilled participants (M=1920.19 ± 830.36). A medium size effect (η2G = .12) was also found for cognitive load, with more efficient anticipation being observed under low load (M=1204.79 ± 639.12) compared to high load (M=1633.80 ±941.35), suggesting that cognitive load may negatively impact decision making. However, pairwise comparisons revealed that this impairing effect of cognitive load was only significant for the unskilled group (p = .035), where mean efficiency scores increased by42.7% under high load, signifying that decision making deteriorated. Skilled players meanwhile showed a much smaller and non-significant increase in their efficiency scores of20.3% (p = .24), indicating more stable decision making performance across the load conditions.
This result may be interpreted using the Cognitive Control Hypothesis and the Expertise Reversal Effect, in that the impairing effect from cognitive load as predicted by Cognitive Load Theory does not apply to experts due to their automated decision making processes. Regrading measures of response awareness, there was a large effect of expertise (η2G= .38),where skilled players (M=2.31 ± .26) were significantly more aware of their decision making accuracy than unskilled (M=1.89 ± .33). There was also a medium size effect (η2G= .12) of cognitive load on awareness, in that both skill groups were significantly more aware of their decision making accuracy in the low load condition 2.19 (± .32) compared to high load 1.99(± .38).
Experiment 2 addressed whether the findings from Experiment 1 would transfer to a closed-skill sport, specifically snooker. The less dynamic and non-time-constrained environments typically found in closed-skill sports are thought to necessitate different sets of motor skills and cognitive functions to be executed relative to open-skill sports, and thus could plausibly induce variations in decision making processes and hence cognitive load management.
Consistent with findings from Experiment 1, there was a large size effect (η2G = .62)expertise on decision making performance; the skilled snooker players showed significantly more accurate and faster responses with a significantly lower (i.e., superior) efficiency score(M=1.62, ± .74) compared to their less-skilled counterparts (M=5.61, ± 3.87). However, unlike in Experiment 1, there was no expertise-cognitive load interaction effect on decision making (p = ; rather, both skill groups exhibited significant and comparable declines indecision-making efficiency of a large effect size (η2G = .24) when cognitive load was increased, which was indicated by a 76% increase in the efficiency score for skilled players and an 81% increase for less-skilled players. These findings indicate a predominance of deliberative decision making during non-time-constrained, closed-skill sports, a processing type which previous research has shown to be more susceptible to cognitive load interference. Also consistent with Experiment 1 was the finding that skilled players demonstrated significantly greater response awareness scores (M=2.51 ± .19) compared to less-skilled players (M=2.15 ± .20), whereby this effect of expertise of response awareness was large (η2G= .48). Unlike in Experiment 1 however, response awareness did not significantly decline under high cognitive load (p = .46), with mean scores of 2.35 (± .17) in the low load condition and 2.31 (± .22) in the high load condition.
Taken together, the experimental findings demonstrate that sports expertise, both open skill and closed-skill, is characterised by superior decision making and metacognitive capabilities. Beyond this, they also indicate that the nature of expert decision making and cognitive load management differs between open-skill and closed-skill sports, thus supporting the concept that decision making processes are a consequence of experienced derived adaptations shaped by the performance environment. This notion that experts are attuned to the specific environmental constraints and process information in accordance with this environment during decision making is consistent with predictions derived from both Ecological Dynamics and the Constraint-Attunement Hypothesis.
Specifically, the fast-paced and time-constrained conditions associated with open-skill sports foster an attunement to dynamic and unpredictable constraints. This results in the development of more automated and intuitive decision-making processes that are adaptive to varying scenarios and utilise fewer cognitive resources, making them relatively robust against impairment from concurrent cognitive load. In contrast, closed-skill sports, characterised by reduced time pressures and more stable constraints, allow players to carry out slower, more analytical responses. These deliberative processes, while effective in such environments, are possibly more susceptible to interference from high cognitive load.
| Date of Award | Nov 2025 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Nicholas Smeeton (Supervisor) & Natasha Sigala (Supervisor) |