Moral luck, information ethics and natural goodness

This paper is about the extent to which the paradox of moral luck can be incorporated or accommodated in our evaluations of professional responsibility in Computer Ethics. Previously, I have pointed out the various ways in which standard macro-ethical theories frequently deployed in Computer Ethics are vulnerable to different types of moral luck. It seems that none of the standard theories are particularly robust in dealing with luck. Here I analyze the concept of moral luck in relationship to two relatively non-standard macro-ethical theories those of Luciano Floridi‘s Information Ethics and Philippa Foot's 'natural normativity'. I conclude that Floridi‘s theory is vulnerable to moral luck in much the same way that other consequentialist moral theories are. In contrast I argue that Foot‘s theory may offer a more convincing way out of the paradox with its focus on reasons for acting within a general framework of 'natural normativity'.