Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis which holds that law and morality are necessarily connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the concept of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority and the obligation to obey through the necessary connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into institutionalised practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e. the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient.
Original languageEnglish
Article number6
JournalLaws
Volume8
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Feb 2019

Fingerprint

autonomy
morality
Law
obligation
idealism
weighting
Values
legitimacy

Bibliographical note

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

Keywords

  • Positivism
  • Natural Law
  • Legal Theory
  • Legal Idealism
  • Gewirth
  • Morality
  • Authority of Law

Cite this

@article{1bd0e8b1c76c4ce390a98031d866dded,
title = "Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason",
abstract = "This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis which holds that law and morality are necessarily connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the concept of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority and the obligation to obey through the necessary connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into institutionalised practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e. the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient.",
keywords = "Positivism, Natural Law, Legal Theory, Legal Idealism, Gewirth, Morality, Authority of Law",
author = "Jack Thompson",
note = "This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).",
year = "2019",
month = "2",
day = "15",
doi = "10.3390/laws8010006",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
journal = "Laws",
issn = "2075-471X",
number = "1",

}

Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason. / Thompson, Jack.

In: Laws, Vol. 8, No. 1, 6, 15.02.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason

AU - Thompson, Jack

N1 - This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

PY - 2019/2/15

Y1 - 2019/2/15

N2 - This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis which holds that law and morality are necessarily connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the concept of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority and the obligation to obey through the necessary connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into institutionalised practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e. the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient.

AB - This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis which holds that law and morality are necessarily connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the concept of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority and the obligation to obey through the necessary connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into institutionalised practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e. the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient.

KW - Positivism

KW - Natural Law

KW - Legal Theory

KW - Legal Idealism

KW - Gewirth

KW - Morality

KW - Authority of Law

U2 - 10.3390/laws8010006

DO - 10.3390/laws8010006

M3 - Article

VL - 8

JO - Laws

JF - Laws

SN - 2075-471X

IS - 1

M1 - 6

ER -