Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking

Emmanouil Panaousis, Aron Laszka, Johannes Pohl, Andreas Noack, Tansu Alpcan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceeding with ISSN or ISBNConference contribution with ISSN or ISBNResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users’ “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and as such, privacy-aware users wish to maximize it. This privacy can be, for instance, threatened by a company, which collects users’ traces and shares them with third parties. To maximize their location privacy, users can decide to get offline so that the company cannot localize their devices. The longer a user stays connected to a network, the more services he might receive, but his location privacy decreases. In this paper, we analyze the trade-off between location privacy, the level of services that a user experiences, and the profit of the company. To this end, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game between the User (follower) and the Company (leader). We present theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of the game. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the economically rational decision-making of the service provider (i.e., the Company) in conjunction with the rational decisionmaking of users who wish to protect their location privacy. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we have used real-data from a testbed, and we have also shown that the game-theoretic strategy of the Company outperforms non-strategic methods. Finally, we have considered different User privacy types, and have determined the service level that incentivizes the User to stay connected as long as possible.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
Place of PublicationIEEE Xplore
PublisherIEEE
Pages1006-1013
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781467379519
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jun 2015
EventProceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications - Helsinki, Finland, August 20-22, 2015
Duration: 3 Jun 2015 → …

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
Period3/06/15 → …

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Industry
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Profitability
Decision making

Bibliographical note

© 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Cite this

Panaousis, E., Laszka, A., Pohl, J., Noack, A., & Alpcan, T. (2015). Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (pp. 1006-1013). IEEE Xplore: IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/Trustcom.2015.476
Panaousis, Emmanouil ; Laszka, Aron ; Pohl, Johannes ; Noack, Andreas ; Alpcan, Tansu. / Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking. Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications. IEEE Xplore : IEEE, 2015. pp. 1006-1013
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Panaousis, E, Laszka, A, Pohl, J, Noack, A & Alpcan, T 2015, Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking. in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications. IEEE, IEEE Xplore, pp. 1006-1013, Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, 3/06/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/Trustcom.2015.476

Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking. / Panaousis, Emmanouil; Laszka, Aron; Pohl, Johannes; Noack, Andreas; Alpcan, Tansu.

Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications. IEEE Xplore : IEEE, 2015. p. 1006-1013.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceeding with ISSN or ISBNConference contribution with ISSN or ISBNResearchpeer-review

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AU - Alpcan, Tansu

N1 - © 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

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N2 - Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users’ “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and as such, privacy-aware users wish to maximize it. This privacy can be, for instance, threatened by a company, which collects users’ traces and shares them with third parties. To maximize their location privacy, users can decide to get offline so that the company cannot localize their devices. The longer a user stays connected to a network, the more services he might receive, but his location privacy decreases. In this paper, we analyze the trade-off between location privacy, the level of services that a user experiences, and the profit of the company. To this end, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game between the User (follower) and the Company (leader). We present theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of the game. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the economically rational decision-making of the service provider (i.e., the Company) in conjunction with the rational decisionmaking of users who wish to protect their location privacy. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we have used real-data from a testbed, and we have also shown that the game-theoretic strategy of the Company outperforms non-strategic methods. Finally, we have considered different User privacy types, and have determined the service level that incentivizes the User to stay connected as long as possible.

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Panaousis E, Laszka A, Pohl J, Noack A, Alpcan T. Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications. IEEE Xplore: IEEE. 2015. p. 1006-1013 https://doi.org/10.1109/Trustcom.2015.476